Cameron v. Winn Dixie Inc.

149 So. 2d 680, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1310
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 4, 1963
DocketNo. 902
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 149 So. 2d 680 (Cameron v. Winn Dixie Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cameron v. Winn Dixie Inc., 149 So. 2d 680, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

HALL, Judge.

This is a suit for damages for personal injuries arising out of an intersectional automobile collision. The trial court rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favor for $1,821.00 against the three defendants in solido and they appealed. Plaintiff answered the appeal and asked that the award in his favor be increased to $5,000.00. He also prayed for damages for frivolous appeal.

In the briefs filed in this Court the defendants admitted liability for plaintiff’s injuries but complained that the award is excessive; while the plaintiff abandoned his prayer for frivolous appeal.

Thus the sole question presented to this Court is one of quantum.

The trial court awarded plaintiff $101.00 for medical and other expense, $120.00 for the loss of earnings, and $1,600.00 for pain and suffering, making a total of $1,821.00. The award for medical and other expense is not in dispute. Only the latter two items are in contest.

Defendants contend that the $120.00 award for loss of earnings should be eliminated entirely from the judgment for the reason that all testimony permitted by the trial court to be taken with regard to this item was taken over their objection that it constituted an enlargement of the pleadings.

The record reveals that plaintiff’s petition is devoid of any allegation or mention that he had sustained any loss of earnings as a result of the accident, nor does such an allegation appear in any other pleading or document filed by him. During the course of the trial when plaintiff attempted to testify relative to his loss of earnings defendants’ counsel promptly objected to the testimony. Thereupon the following colloquy took place:

“The Court
“* * * Your objection is noted, Mr. Christovich; however he does have the right to amend his petition, and, of course, you also have the right to state that you have been prejudiced by the amendment. Do-you desire permission to amend the petition ?
[682]*682 “Mr. Plotkin:
“We desire permission to amend the petition on the loss of wages in connection with this accident.
“Mr. Christovich:
“Is there any particular figure or shall we find that out as we go along ?
“Mr. Plotkin:
“We will show Mr. Cameron’s lost wages from approximately the date of the accident August 23, to September 3 or 4.
* * * * * *
“The Court:
“That sounds reasonable, a two weeks period.
“Mr. Christovich:
“That does not sound reasonable as far as my company is concerned. Frankly, it sounds about as unreasonable as it can be. This man comes into court knowing full well this case was set for trial.
“The Court:
“Under the circumstances, Mr. Christovich, this seems to be a difference of opinion between yourself and the Court, and, of course, I will give you whatever time you may need to disprove the loss of earnings. The Court will allow the amendment and you may proceed with reference to the earnings. Mr. Christovich’s right to ask for a continuance for this particular point is reserved to him, if he sees fit to ask for it. Proceed.”

Plaintiff was then permitted by the Court to testify as to his loss of earnings without the amendment authorized by the Court having been filed or even dictated into the record (if the latter be permissable as to which we find it unnecessary to express an opinion).

Later in the trial when plaintiff’s wife attempted to testify on the same subject matter defendants’ counsel again objected:

“Mr. Christovich:
“Your honor, I understand that all of this testimony is subject to my original objection without the necessity of repeating.
“Mr. Plotkin:
“What are you referring to?
“Mr. Christovich:
“The objection to the entire of (sic) testimony. * * * My original objection was with respect * * *
“The Court:
“To the wages?
“Mr. Christovich:
“Yes, sir, that applies to this testimony without the necessity of repetition.
“The Court:
“Without necessity of repetition? Yes it does.”

■ The trial judge evidently intended in his rulings to conform to Article 1154 of the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure (LSA-C.C. P. Art. 1154) the third sentence of which reads as follows:

“If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby, and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.”

The complaint here made by appellants is not that the Court erred in authorizing an amendment of the pleadings and not that the Court was not disposed to [683]*683grant a continuance (as provided for in the fourth sentence of the quoted article). Appellants’ complaint is that having objected to the testimony as not being “within the issues made by the pleadings” and never having withdrawn or waived the objection, such objection should have been sustained in the absence of an amendment to the pleadings being made which would serve to bring the testimony “within the issues made by the pleadings”.

Appellants’ contention is well taken in our opinion. The Article 1154 in effect recognizes the validity of an objection to testimony which goes beyond the pleadings and provides that in proper circumstances the Court may permit pleadings to be amended in order to cure the objection. We are of the opinion that an amendment of the pleadings is necessary to effectuate the cure prescribed by the article, and that the granting by the trial court of permission to amend is not sufficient to cure the objection unless such permission is followed by an actual amendment being made. If the amendment is not actually made the objection to the testimony is still good because the testimony is still not “within the issues made by the pleadings”.

Whether the amendment need be in writing; whether it is sufficient simply to dictate it into the record; or whether the amendment may be- waived by the party who objected to the testimony are matters with which we are not here concerned and we express no opinion with regard thereto.

In the case before us there was ño amendment whatever and in face of the fact that they persisted throughout in their objection to the testimony as not being “within the issues raised by the pleadings” it cannot be argued that they waived the amendment.

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Bluebook (online)
149 So. 2d 680, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cameron-v-winn-dixie-inc-lactapp-1963.