HAMITER, Justice.
In July, 1956 a Ford Thunderbird automobile belonging to plaintiff was almost completely demolished in an upset or collision accident, and thereafter such owner instituted this suit in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette seeking judgment condemning the Reserve [439]*439Insurance Company and Calvert Fire Insurance Company (referred to hereinafter as Reserve and Calvert, respectively), jointly and severally, to1 pay to him the amount of the loss sustained, plus attorney’s fees, penalties, interest and costs.
At the time of the accident the mentioned automobile was being driven with plaintiff’s consent by Wilbur J. Fabre, a resident of St. Mary Parish, against whom (as a third party defendant) Reserve asked judgment in this suit for whatever sum it might be required to pay to plaintiff. Fabre excepted to the third party action on the ground that the District Court of Lafayette Parish was without jurisdiction over his person.
After a trial such court ruled as follows: “It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Kenneth C. Cameron, and against defendants, Reserve Insurance Company and Calvert Fire Insurance Company, severally, each in the amount of one-half {}/£) of the sum of Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-seven and 4%oo ($2,227.48) Dollars, with legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid, and with penalties of twelve (12%) percent on the total amount of the award of damages herein.
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that plaintiff do recover in addition to the above award attorney’s fees in the sum of Eight Hundred Fifty and No/100 ($850.00) Dollars, to be paid in equal amount by the said two (2) defendants, together with five (5'%) percent per annum interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid.
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the exception to the jurisdiction of the court filed by Wilbur J. Fabre against the third party petition of Reserve Insurance Company be and is hereby sustained and the suit against him is dismissed as of non-suit.”
From the judgment the two defendant insurance companies appealed. Plaintiff did not appeal. He answered the appeals of the defendants, praying only that the award of attorney’s fees be increased. Fabre, the third party defendant, has moved to dismiss the appeal of Reserve insofar as he is concerned.
Although the motion of Fabre to dismiss Reserve’s appeal is untenable (the appeal was properly granted and a suitable bond furnished), we think that his exception to the jurisdiction to the court rationae personae (which he timely urged) was correctly sustained. The third party practice act (LRS 13:3381 et seq.) provides no exception to the general rule that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the court of his domicile.
Respecting the merits of this cause the evidence discloses that on March 19, 1956 Reserve insured a 1956 Lincoln automobile [441]*441belonging to plaintiff against collision or upset, the policy reciting that the insurance would be effective until September 10, 1957 and describing a chattel mortgage that encumbered that vehicle. On July 9, 1956 (while such policy was in force and effect) plaintiff traded the Lincoln for, and replaced it with, a 1956 Ford Thunderbird, he at the time executing a chattel mortgage on the new machine to secure payment of the unpaid portion of its purchase price. Six days later (July 15, 1956) Wilbur J. Fabre wrecked the Thunderbird while driving it with plaintiff’s permission. At that time Fabre owned a 1955 Chrysler automobile which was insured by Calvert against collision or upset.
In seeking to hold the two defendant insurance companies jointly and severally liable herein plaintiff invokes certain recitals contained in their respective policies, namely:
1. In Reserve’s policy originally insuring plaintiff’s Lincoln — -'TV Automatic Insurance for Newly Acquired Automobiles: If the insured who is the owner of the automobile, or his spouse if a resident of the same household, acquires ownership of another automobile and so notifies the company within thirty days following the date of its delivery, such insurance as is afforded by this policy applies also to such other automobile as of the date of such acquisition :
“(a) If it replaces an automobile described in this policy, * *
2. In Calvert’s policy insuring Fabre’s Chrysler- — -“V Use of Other Automobiles— Collision or Upset Coverage. If the insured is an individual or husband and wife and if during the policy period such insured, or the spouse of such individual if a resident of the same household, owns a private passenger automobile covered by this pollicy, such insurance as is afforded by this policy under coverage B-l with respect to said automobile applies with respect to any other private passenger automobile while being operated or used by such insured or spouse. * * * ”
Reserve contends that it is not liable under the provision affording automatic insurance for a newly acquired automobile because plaintiff granted a mortgage on the Thunderbird when replacing the Lincoln, without reporting it to the insurer, in violation of the following exclusionary clause contained in the policy: “This policy does not apply:
* * * * * ^
“(b) under any of the coverages, if the automobile is- or at any time becomes subject to any bailment lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance not specifically declared and described in this policy: * * * ”
The contention is without merit. The quoted exclusionary clause applies only [443]*443to the originally insured Lincoln, for clause 10 of the conditions section of the policy specifically states: “10. Automobile Defined : * * * Except where specifically stated to the contrary, the word ‘automobile’ wherever used in this policy .shall mean the motor vehicle, trailer or .semitrailer described in this policy. * * ” Besides, an upholding of the contention would amount to an excepting from the permitted thirty days’ notification period of the standard automatic coverage provision •of policies the vast number of cars purchased in credit transactions, because when immediately informing the insurer of the granting of a chattel mortgage on a newly purchased automobile (if such were required) the insured would necessarily be giving notice at the same time of the acquisition of the substituted vehicle. Clearly this was not intended.
Our decision in Lee v. Travelers Fire Insurance Co., 219 La. 587, 53 So.2d 692, cited by counsel for Reserve, is without application here for the reason that no automatic coverage provision was involved therein.
Consequently, we hold that Reserve’s policy, in force and effect at the time of the accident, afforded full collision or upset coverage to plaintiff’s Thunderbird.
Alternatively, Reserve maintains (as does the plaintiff herein) that both it and Cal■vert are liable; and that the judgment of the district court, which condemned each for one-half the loss, should be affirmed.
Calvert, on the other hand, contends that there is no- liability under its policy which directly insured only the Chrysler automobile owned by Fabre, the driver of the Thunderbird at the time of the accident.
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HAMITER, Justice.
In July, 1956 a Ford Thunderbird automobile belonging to plaintiff was almost completely demolished in an upset or collision accident, and thereafter such owner instituted this suit in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette seeking judgment condemning the Reserve [439]*439Insurance Company and Calvert Fire Insurance Company (referred to hereinafter as Reserve and Calvert, respectively), jointly and severally, to1 pay to him the amount of the loss sustained, plus attorney’s fees, penalties, interest and costs.
At the time of the accident the mentioned automobile was being driven with plaintiff’s consent by Wilbur J. Fabre, a resident of St. Mary Parish, against whom (as a third party defendant) Reserve asked judgment in this suit for whatever sum it might be required to pay to plaintiff. Fabre excepted to the third party action on the ground that the District Court of Lafayette Parish was without jurisdiction over his person.
After a trial such court ruled as follows: “It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Kenneth C. Cameron, and against defendants, Reserve Insurance Company and Calvert Fire Insurance Company, severally, each in the amount of one-half {}/£) of the sum of Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-seven and 4%oo ($2,227.48) Dollars, with legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid, and with penalties of twelve (12%) percent on the total amount of the award of damages herein.
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that plaintiff do recover in addition to the above award attorney’s fees in the sum of Eight Hundred Fifty and No/100 ($850.00) Dollars, to be paid in equal amount by the said two (2) defendants, together with five (5'%) percent per annum interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid.
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the exception to the jurisdiction of the court filed by Wilbur J. Fabre against the third party petition of Reserve Insurance Company be and is hereby sustained and the suit against him is dismissed as of non-suit.”
From the judgment the two defendant insurance companies appealed. Plaintiff did not appeal. He answered the appeals of the defendants, praying only that the award of attorney’s fees be increased. Fabre, the third party defendant, has moved to dismiss the appeal of Reserve insofar as he is concerned.
Although the motion of Fabre to dismiss Reserve’s appeal is untenable (the appeal was properly granted and a suitable bond furnished), we think that his exception to the jurisdiction to the court rationae personae (which he timely urged) was correctly sustained. The third party practice act (LRS 13:3381 et seq.) provides no exception to the general rule that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the court of his domicile.
Respecting the merits of this cause the evidence discloses that on March 19, 1956 Reserve insured a 1956 Lincoln automobile [441]*441belonging to plaintiff against collision or upset, the policy reciting that the insurance would be effective until September 10, 1957 and describing a chattel mortgage that encumbered that vehicle. On July 9, 1956 (while such policy was in force and effect) plaintiff traded the Lincoln for, and replaced it with, a 1956 Ford Thunderbird, he at the time executing a chattel mortgage on the new machine to secure payment of the unpaid portion of its purchase price. Six days later (July 15, 1956) Wilbur J. Fabre wrecked the Thunderbird while driving it with plaintiff’s permission. At that time Fabre owned a 1955 Chrysler automobile which was insured by Calvert against collision or upset.
In seeking to hold the two defendant insurance companies jointly and severally liable herein plaintiff invokes certain recitals contained in their respective policies, namely:
1. In Reserve’s policy originally insuring plaintiff’s Lincoln — -'TV Automatic Insurance for Newly Acquired Automobiles: If the insured who is the owner of the automobile, or his spouse if a resident of the same household, acquires ownership of another automobile and so notifies the company within thirty days following the date of its delivery, such insurance as is afforded by this policy applies also to such other automobile as of the date of such acquisition :
“(a) If it replaces an automobile described in this policy, * *
2. In Calvert’s policy insuring Fabre’s Chrysler- — -“V Use of Other Automobiles— Collision or Upset Coverage. If the insured is an individual or husband and wife and if during the policy period such insured, or the spouse of such individual if a resident of the same household, owns a private passenger automobile covered by this pollicy, such insurance as is afforded by this policy under coverage B-l with respect to said automobile applies with respect to any other private passenger automobile while being operated or used by such insured or spouse. * * * ”
Reserve contends that it is not liable under the provision affording automatic insurance for a newly acquired automobile because plaintiff granted a mortgage on the Thunderbird when replacing the Lincoln, without reporting it to the insurer, in violation of the following exclusionary clause contained in the policy: “This policy does not apply:
* * * * * ^
“(b) under any of the coverages, if the automobile is- or at any time becomes subject to any bailment lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance not specifically declared and described in this policy: * * * ”
The contention is without merit. The quoted exclusionary clause applies only [443]*443to the originally insured Lincoln, for clause 10 of the conditions section of the policy specifically states: “10. Automobile Defined : * * * Except where specifically stated to the contrary, the word ‘automobile’ wherever used in this policy .shall mean the motor vehicle, trailer or .semitrailer described in this policy. * * ” Besides, an upholding of the contention would amount to an excepting from the permitted thirty days’ notification period of the standard automatic coverage provision •of policies the vast number of cars purchased in credit transactions, because when immediately informing the insurer of the granting of a chattel mortgage on a newly purchased automobile (if such were required) the insured would necessarily be giving notice at the same time of the acquisition of the substituted vehicle. Clearly this was not intended.
Our decision in Lee v. Travelers Fire Insurance Co., 219 La. 587, 53 So.2d 692, cited by counsel for Reserve, is without application here for the reason that no automatic coverage provision was involved therein.
Consequently, we hold that Reserve’s policy, in force and effect at the time of the accident, afforded full collision or upset coverage to plaintiff’s Thunderbird.
Alternatively, Reserve maintains (as does the plaintiff herein) that both it and Cal■vert are liable; and that the judgment of the district court, which condemned each for one-half the loss, should be affirmed.
Calvert, on the other hand, contends that there is no- liability under its policy which directly insured only the Chrysler automobile owned by Fabre, the driver of the Thunderbird at the time of the accident. In this connection it calls attention to the following exclusion, contained in its insuring agreement V (relative to use of other automobiles), which recites:
“This insuring agreement does not apply:
jjs >{c * H* * *
“(3) to any loss when there is any other insurance which would apply thereto in the absence of this insuring agreement, whether such other insurance covers the interest of the insured or spouse, the owner of the automobile or any other person or organization.”
Countering Calvert’s contention of non-liability, Reserve insists that its insuring agreement IV, relating to automatic coverage, contains the same exclusion; and that, as a result, co-insurance on the Thunderbird existed and each insurance company must pay its prorata share of the loss. The exclusion thus relied on reads: “This insuring agreement does not apply: (a) to any loss against which the insured or such spouse has other valid and collectible insurance, * * (Italics ours)
[445]*445A careful reading of the quoted two exclusionary clauses will disclose that they are not the same. The one found in Reserve’s policy prevents the full automatic coverage from becoming operative only when the insured (this plaintiff) has other valid and collectible insurance, meaning obviously direct insurance obtained on the substituted vehicle (in this cause none had been secured by plaintiff). Whereas, as stated in the other exclusion, Calvert would not be liable under the “use of other automobile” provision for “any loss when there is any other insurance which would apply thereto in the absence of this insuring agreement.” By the latter clause, undoubtedly, Calvert’s liability was rendered secondary to any other insurance on the wrecked automobile, particularly the coverage provided by Reserve.
Since the Thunderbird was fully covered against collision or upset by Reserve’s policy the mentioned insuring agreement V between Calvert and Fabre (use of other automobile) did not become operative and, consequently, there is no liability on the part of Calvert.
Cited on behalf of plaintiff and Reserve are Pullen v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, 230 La. 867, 89 So.2d 373, and Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Machinery, Inc., La.App., 90 So.2d 417. However, because of different factual situations and issues involved those cases are not analogous here.
According to our afore announced conclusion Reserve should pay to plaintiff the full amount of his loss. But, as above shown, the trial judge condemned it to pay only one-half of the claim; 'and plaintiff neither appealed from the judgment nor answered Reserve’s appeal (except to pray for an increase in the award for attorney’s fees). Under such circumstances we are powerless to increase the principal amount of' the judgment rendered against that insurer. Westwego Canal & Terminal Co., Inc., v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 189 La. 870, 181 So. 429; Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26; Sheeks v. McCain-Richards, Inc., 226 La. 578, 76 So.2d 892, and Macaluso v. Thibodeaux, 232 La. 431, 94 So.2d 426. However, we shall reserve to plaintiff whatever further rights (if any) he might have against such defendant.
A complaint is also made by Reserve respecting the trial judge’s assessing of penalties and attorney’s fees against it for failing to timely pay plaintiff’s claim. We are not convinced that the awarding of these items was improper. From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the instant action basically is one between the two insurance companies, This being true plaintiff should not have been required to await a determination of their dispute. In our opinion the companies should have agreed upon some method by which plaintiff would have been paid, each reserving [447]*447its rights against the other pending the outcome of the litigation as between themselves.
Nor do we think that there is any merit in the contention of plaintiff that the attorney’s fees awarded should be increased. In Massey v. Consumer’s Ice Co. of Shreveport, Inc., 223 La. 731, 66 So.2d 789, 790, we said: “It is well settled that the question of the value of services rendered by an attorney-at-law is one that comes peculiarly within the province of the judge before whom the services were performed. He superintends the making up of the record, becomes closely acquainted with all the details of the proceeding' and thus obtains an intimate knowledge of the kind of services rendered and of their value. * * * ” Considering the amount of the claim herein and the extent of the services rendered in behalf of plaintiff we are unable to conclude that the award of attorney’s fees was inadequate.
For the reasons assigned the judgment of the district court against the defendant Calvert Fire Insurance Company is reversed and set aside and plaintiff’s suit against that defendant is dismissed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed, reserving to plaintiff whatever rights (if any) he might have against Reserve Insurance Company. The last named defendant shall pay all costs of this suit.
FOURNET, J., absent.