Cameron v. Mittuch
This text of 113 So. 2d 389 (Cameron v. Mittuch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendants, Dorothy Cameron and Dorothy Cameron, executrix of the estate of D. B. Cameron, deceased, appeal from a judgment in trespass against them. The complaint alleged that the acts constituting the trespass were accomplished by D. B. Cameron, deceased, and the original complaint was against him and others. Thereafter suggestion of death and motion for substitution of executrix1 were filed and by order of court Dorothy C. Cameron, individually and Dorothy Cameron, as executrix of the estate of D. B. Cameron were substituted as party defendants.2 Judgment was subsequently rendered against Dorothy C. Cameron as executrix of the estate of D. B. Cameron, and Dorothy C. Cameron, individually. Upon appeal the entry of the order substituting Dorothy C. Cameron individually is assigned as error. The assignment is well taken.
[390]*390Appellees urge that the inclusion of Dorothy B. Cameron, individually in the action, is authorized by the principle of law which holds a legatee under a will chargeable for debts arising out of the property inherited.3 We find that this principle is applicable to a situation where the bequest or devise is subject to a condition or a charge imposed by the testator. In such a situation the beneficiary would be personally liable, if he accepts the benefit without regard to the condition or charge to which the benefit is subject. However under this rule a beneficiary would not be personally liable for a tort action which survives against the testator’s personal representative unless of course the benefit was expressly burdened to satisfy tort claims.
It has been established in this jurisdiction that a cause of action for a tort survives the death of the tort-feasor and may be maintained against his personal representative.4 In this case the plaintiffs, as interested parties, in accordance with Rule 1.19(a) (1), 19S4 Fla.Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A.,5 made the proper motion 6 for substitution of the representative of the deceased defendant. For, where a party to a personal action dies, the legal representatives of the deceased should be substituted 7 or any other appropriate party as may be provided by law.8 Dorothy Cameron, as an individual, was not a proper party to such a cause as we now have before use, and she was not a party to the wrong committed. Therefore the judgment against her, individually, must be reversed.
The appellant has filed other assignments. All of these have been considered in light of the record and the briefs and no other reversible error was found. Therefore the cause is remanded for the entry of a judgment in accord with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
113 So. 2d 389, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cameron-v-mittuch-fladistctapp-1959.