Cameron v. INS

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 2, 1992
Docket91-2234
StatusPublished

This text of Cameron v. INS (Cameron v. INS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cameron v. INS, (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


April 2, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

___________________

No. 91-2234

NEVILLE CAMERON,

Petitioner,

v.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES,

Respondent.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

__________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

Neville E.A. Cameron on Motion in Opposition thereto.
____________________
Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Robert
___________________ ______
Kendall, Jr., Assistant Director, and Charles E. Pazar, Office of
____________ ________________
Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, on
Motion to Summarily Dispose of Petition for Review.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. The I.N.S. has moved for summary
___________

disposition of this petition for review of a deportation

order entered after petitioner failed to appear for a

hearing. We conclude the deportation order should be

summarily affirmed.

I.

In June 1989, petitioner was served with a notice to

show cause why he should not be deported under 8 U.S.C.

1251(a)(4) (1988) (authorizing deportation of an alien

convicted of a crime of moral turpitude committed within five

years after entry and sentenced to prison for a year or

more). The notice alleged that petitioner had been convicted

of burning a dwelling house and had been sentenced to five

years in prison.

Initially, petitioner was represented by Attorney

Stickney, whom he retained in March 1990. After three

months, however, Attorney Stickney moved to withdraw stating

that petitioner had failed to appear for appointments, answer

phone messages, or respond to a certified letter requesting

immediate contact. After several continuances, a hearing was

scheduled for July 10, 1990. On that day, petitioner's

lawyer, Attorney Visram, asked for a further continuance

which was granted. At the next hearing (August 14, 1990),

Attorney Visram appeared (petitioner did not) and moved to

withdraw, stating that petitioner had failed to appear for

-2-

appointments and had failed to appear for the present hearing

despite promising to do so. Consequently, counsel was unable

to represent him. Counsel was allowed to withdraw. The

deportation hearing then proceeded in petitioner's absence.

The government introduced documentation showing that

petitioner had entered the country on October 26, 1982, that

he had been convicted for burning a dwelling on October 17,

1987, and that he had received a five year sentence for the

offense. The immigration judge concluded petitioner was

deportable and ordered him deported to Jamaica.

Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

He contended that he had not appeared at the August 14, 1990

hearing because of an ulcer attack, had notified Attorney

Visram's secretary of the problem, had been assured by the

secretary that Attorney Visram would appear and obtain a

continuance, and had later spoken with Visram only to be told

that Visram's refusal to represent petitioner was because of

nonpayment of a bill.

The Board concluded that under the circumstances then

present, the immigration judge had properly conducted the

deportation hearing in absentia when petitioner failed to

appear at the hearing. 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (if alien fails to

attend a hearing without reasonable cause, the proceeding may

be conducted in his absence). As for petitioner's new

allegations of an ulcer attack and counsel malfeasance, the

-3-

Board noted that petitioner could have moved to reopen the

deportation proceeding in order to establish the alleged

facts. A motion to reopen, however, must be "supported by

affidavits or other documentary evidence." 8 C.F.R.

103.5(a)(2).1 The Board decided not to remand in order to

permit petitioner to attempt to establish the alleged facts

for two reasons. First, petitioner had not supported his

allegations by affidavit or documentary evidence. Second,

petitioner's credibility was suspect. The record disclosed

complaints from not one but two separate counsel of

petitioner's failure to cooperate. Petitioner's account of

having spoken to counsel's secretary prior to the hearing

directly contradicted counsel's statement at the hearing that

counsel had been unable to communicate with petitioner. The

Board dismissed petitioner's appeal.

II.

Petitioner's two fold response in this court to the

I.N.S.'s motion for summary disposition was to state that his

petition for review was timely filed and to ask for more time

for briefing in view of family problems and incarceration.

____________________

1. The regulation reads as follows:
(2) Requirements for motion to reopen. A
_________________________________
motion to reopen must -
(i) State the new facts to be
proved at the reopened
proceedings, and
(ii) Be supported by affidavits
or other documentary evidence.

-4-

He has failed to even hint, however, at any viable challenge

to the deportation order, and we see none. The statutory and

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Related

Ghosh v. Attorney General
629 F.2d 987 (Fourth Circuit, 1980)

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