Cameron v. Country Mutual Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 2, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02147
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

8 Case No. C24-2147RSM

9 GEORGE CAMERON AND JANIN ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 10 CAMERON, Country Mutual Insurance DISMISS Company claimants, and all others similarly 11 situated throughout Washington State and the United States of America, 12

13 Plaintiffs,

14 v.

15 COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE 16 COMPANY, an insurance company, et al.,

17 Defendants.

19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Country Casualty Insurance Company, 21 Country Preferred Insurance Company, Country Investors Life Assurance Company, and 22 Country Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Country Affiliates”)’s Motion to Dismiss under 23 Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 Dkt. #6. Plaintiffs oppose. Dkt. #15. The Court has reviewed the 24 25 briefing and finds that oral argument is not necessary. For the reasons stated below, the Court 26 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. 27 28 1 Defendant Country Mutual Insuran ce Company, represented by the counsel, does not join this Motion and intends to file its answer after the instant Motion is resolved. See Dkt. #6 at 6 n.1. II. BACKGROUND2 1 2 This action was removed from King County Superior Court on December 27, 2024. Dkt. 3 #1. Plaintiffs George and Janin Cameron bring this putative class action against the Country 4 Affiliates, as well as Country Mutual Insurance Company and “Country Financial.” 5 On or about August 28, 2021, Plaintiffs renewed an insurance policy “cobranded with 6 both Country Financial and Country Mutual Insurance Company branding.” Dkt. #1-1 at 3. The 7 8 policy insured a Challenger tractor valued at $84,500 and a Kirby bale processor valued at 9 $45,000. It covered fire damage and debris removal as well as damage to tires. 10 On January 8, 2022, George Cameron was towing the Kirby bale processor with his 11 Challenger tractor. An unknown malfunction caused the tractor to catch fire. Both the tractor 12 13 and the bale processor were damaged. 14 Mr. Cameron soon reported the occurrence to Country Mutual Insurance Company. No 15 insurance employee came to investigate the damage. 16 Country Mutual Insurance Company instead “adopted the lowest valuation of the 17 Challenger as the actual value of the Challenger and sent out a check which only covered damages 18 19 for its valuation of the Challenger and part of the repair costs of the Kirby thus in part denying 20 Cameron’s claim.” Id. at 5. This did not cover debris removal, a lost tire, or lost fuel. Plaintiffs 21 sent the check back and later sent in additional documents to support their claims. 22 On February 12, 2024, Country Mutual Insurance Company sent a letter stating that all 23 other claims would be denied as the one-year time limit on claims had elapsed and because the 24 25 quotes were insufficient evidence of loss. 26 27 28 2 Except as otherwise noted, the foll owing background facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. #1-1 and are accepted as true for purposes of ruling on this Motion to Dismiss. Although the Complaint fails to mention where Plaintiffs live, where Defendants are 1 2 located, where the insured property is located, or where any of the insurance agreements were 3 signed, the policy indicates that the insured property was located on a farm in Eastern 4 Washington. Dkt. #7-1.3 The policy lists mailing addresses for Country Mutual Insurance 5 Company in Salem, Oregon, and Bloomington, Illinois. See id. at 1 and 61. 6 This is not Plaintiffs’ first attempt to sue these Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a putative class 7 8 action in the Eastern District of Washington on May 17, 2024. See Dkt. #7-2. That complaint 9 listed Plaintiffs as residents of Yakima County, Eastern Washington. See id. at 2. The Eastern 10 District case was dismissed without prejudice on October 23, 2024. See George Cameron et al. 11 v. Country Mutual Ins. Co. et al., No. 1:24-cv-03075-MKD, 2024 WL 4557671, at *6–8 (E.D. 12 13 Wash. Oct. 23, 2024). Plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate plausible grounds to conclude that the 14 proposed class would meet the class-member and amount-in-controversy requirements for CAFA 15 jurisdiction, even if Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend.” Id. The Eastern District Court 16 further found that Plaintiffs did not have “any Article III injury caused by the Country Affiliates’ 17 challenged insurance practices where Plaintiffs have not bought any insurance policy from the 18 19 Country Affiliates.”4 Id. 20 The instant case was filed one month later in King County Superior Court and removed at 21 the end of last year. See Dkt. #1-1. The Complaint attempts to assert liability against not just 22 Country Mutual, but the same Country Affiliates Defendants as well, accusing Country Financial 23 24

25 3 Defendants have attached several exhibits to their Motion. The Court finds that these exhibits are incorporated by reference in the Complaint or are matters of public record and may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. See 26 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The doctrine of incorporation by reference may apply, for example, when a plaintiff’s claim about 27 insurance coverage is based on the contents of a coverage plan…”). 4 The Country Affiliates in the Eastern District case were the same as here: (1) Country Casualty Insurance Company, 28 (2) Country Preferred Insurance Company, (3) Country Investor Life Assurance Company, and (4) Country Life Insurance Company. See 2024 WL 4557671 at *1 n.1. of being a “joint venture” of Country Mutual Insurance Company, Country Casualty Insurance 1 2 Company, Country Preferred Insurance Company, Country Investor Life Assurance Company 3 and Country Life Insurance Company. See id. These entities allegedly share employees and 4 share the tradename “Country Financial.” 5 The Complaint states “the ultimate class should include all individuals throughout 6 Washington State and throughout the United States who have submitted a claim to Defendants 7 8 which was partially or totally denied in which there was a violation of the insurance regulations.” 9 Id. at 9. The Complaint boldly states that Defendants have “failed to properly investigate every 10 claim submitted to them resulting in $15,000,000 of wrongfully denied claims throughout 11 Washington and $250,000,000 of wrongfully denied claims throughout the United States” and 12 13 have “failed to give every claimant the necessary information on their claim settlement 14 procedures, which has resulted in $20,000,000 worth of claims being wrongfully denied 15 throughout Washington State and $300,000 [sic] worth of claims throughout the United States.” 16 Id. at 10. There appears to be only one cause of action—violations of the Washington Consumer 17 Protection Act (“CPA”) through violations of various insurance regulations. 18 19 Country Affiliates moved to dismiss on January 3, 2025. Dkt. #6. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may challenge the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations 23 in one of two ways: (1) a “facial” attack that accepts the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations but 24 25 asserts that they are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, or (2) a “factual” 26 attack that contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence 27 outside the pleadings. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2014). When a party 28 raises a facial attack, the court resolves the motion as it would under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all 1 2 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor and determining whether the allegations are 3 sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 1122. 4 In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as 5 true and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. 6 Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 7 8 However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 9 allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 10 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 11 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This requirement is met when 12 13 the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 14 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include detailed 15 allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 16 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Absent facial plausibility, 17 a plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Id. at 570. 18 19 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 20 As an initial matter, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 21 claims sufficient to retain this case and avoid remanding to King County Superior Court. 22 Defendants, including Country Mutual Insurance Company, removed this case under the Class 23 Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (“CAFA”) because Plaintiffs plead a class action 24 25 involving at least 100 putative class members and an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding 26 $5,000,000. This Court maintains CAFA jurisdiction even if it concludes that Plaintiffs cannot 27 establish a certifiable class. See United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied 28 Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 1 2 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that denial of class certification does not defeat CAFA jurisdiction “if 3 jurisdiction was properly invoked as of the time of filing”). 4 C. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Bring Claims against Country Affiliates 5 Defendants’ first argument is that Plaintiffs again lack standing to sue Country Affiliates, 6 i.e., all the Defendant insurance companies other than the one that contracted for insurance with 7 8 Plaintiffs. Defendants point out that Plaintiffs must allege an injury traceable to these Defendants’ 9 conduct and that this applies for a putative class action. Dkt. #6 at 14 (citing Fosmire v. 10 Progressive Max Ins. Co., No. C10-5291JLR, 2010 WL 3489595, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 11 2010)). Defendants cite Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2001) for the 12 13 proposition that a plaintiff who purchased life insurance policies from one insurance company 14 does not have standing to bring claims individually or on behalf of a putative class against the 15 insurance company’s subsidiary regarding similar policies. Id. at 5–6. 16 Defendants also cite to the Eastern District of Washington case dismissing Plaintiff’s 17 claims against these same parties for lack of standing. In response, Plaintiffs point to new facts 18 19 in the instant Complaint and argue that all of the Defendants are alter egos of each other or joint 20 actors. See Dkt. #15 at 14–15. Plaintiffs also cite to Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 21 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016) and Lara v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 25 F.4th 1134 (9th Cir. 2022) 22 as analogous cases where Plaintiffs were allowed to sue a defendant outside the privity of contract 23 and where Plaintiffs sued their insurer and another entity. 24 25 The problem for Plaintiffs is that the Complaint includes mere labels and conclusions to 26 support alter ego liability, director liability, joint venture liability, etc. See Dkt. #1-1 at 6–9. 27 Under Washington law, “[a] joint venture is not a status created or imposed by law, but is a 28 relationship voluntarily assumed and arising wholly out of the parties’ express or implied 1 2 contract.” Leslie v. Midgate Ctr., Inc., 72 Wn.2d 977, 980 (1967). To establish a joint venture, 3 plaintiffs must plead facts plausibly showing: “(1) a contract, express or implied; (2) a common 4 purpose; (3) a community of interest; (4) an equal right to a voice, accompanied by an equal right 5 to control.” Paulson v. Pierce Cnty., 99 Wn.2d 645, 654 (1983); see also Goeres v. Ortquist, 34 6 Wn. App. 19, 20–21 (1983) (requiring “proof that the parties contracted to carry out a single 7 8 enterprise”). Plaintiffs do not allege facts supporting these elements of a joint venture. To 9 establish alter ego liability, plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to show: (1) the corporate form 10 was “intentionally used to violate or evade a duty”; and (2) “disregarding the corporate veil is 11 necessary and required to prevent an unjustified loss to the injured party.” Columbia Asset 12 13 Recovery Grp., LLC v. Kelly, 177 Wn. App. 475, 486 (2013). None of those facts are alleged in 14 the Complaint. 15 The same issues arise for director liability and the other sources of liability for the Country 16 Affiliates. These allegations are not plausible on the pleaded facts. Rather, it is clear that 17 Plaintiffs were insured by their named insurer and that all of their claims are properly asserted 18 19 against only that entity—Defendant Country Mutual Insurance Company. 20 Accordingly, the Court agrees with all of the points raised by the Country Affiliates as to 21 standing. As this is Plaintiffs’ second attempt to sue these Defendants, the Court will dismiss 22 Plaintiffs’ claims against these entities with prejudice. 23 The Court notes that Plaintiffs otherwise fail to assert facts sufficient to show liability 24 25 under the CPA against these Defendants and that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) would also be 26 appropriate for the reasons argued by Defendants. See Dkt. # 6 at 19. 27

28 D. “Country Financial” 1 2 Defendants also move to dismiss all claims brought against “Country Financial,” arguing 3 that this a trade name and not a legal entity. Id. at 19–20 (citing, inter alia, Borisov v. Alamo Rent 4 A Car, No. C18-5847 BHS, 2019 WL 316710, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2019), aff’d, 796 F. 5 App’x 949 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that “a non-entity trade name lacks the capacity to be sued 6 and should be dismissed”). Plaintiffs do not argue differently, instead asserting that “[a]ll 7 8 Defendants are joint and severally liable for any wrongful actions taken under the name of 9 Country Financial therefore they are all proper parties to this lawsuit.” Dkt. #15 at 25. 10 The Court agrees with Defendants and will dismiss all claims against Country Financial with 11 prejudice. 12 13 E. Class Allegations 14 Finally, Defendants move to dismiss all class allegations brought against all Defendants— 15 Country Affiliates and Country Mutual Insurance Company—arguing that Plaintiffs do not 16 plausibly plead facts to support predominance as required by Rule 23. Dkt. #6 at 20–21. 17 To assert claims on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, a plaintiff must meet 18 19 four requirements: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; (2) questions of law 20 or fact are common to the class; (3) the claims of the representative parties are typical of the 21 claims of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 22 interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, the plaintiff must establish that “questions 23 of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 24 25 members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 26 “The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 27 warrant adjudication by representation.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 28 (2016). In general, the predominance inquiry “asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, 1 2 issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, 3 individual issues.” Id. An individual question inappropriate for consideration on a class basis is 4 one where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member 5 to member, while a common question is one where the same evidence will suffice for each 6 member to make a prima facie showing or the issue itself is susceptible to generalized, class-wide 7 8 proof. Id. 9 Here, plaintiffs seek to litigate a class action on behalf of “all individuals throughout 10 Washington State and throughout the United States who have submitted a claim to Defendants 11 which was partially or totally denied in which there was a violation of the insurance regulations.” 12 13 Dkt. #1-1 at ¶ 3.2. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he question of law and/or fact common to the class is 14 whether Defendants failed to implement and follow the minimum claim settlement standards 15 established in state laws.” Id. at ¶ 3.10. Plaintiffs then allege CPA violations predicated on 16 violations of Washington regulations governing insurance settlement practices: “The specific 17 policy provisions alleged to be consistently violated are WAC 284-30-330(4), WAC 284-30- 18 19 330(13), WAC 284-30-360(4), WAC 284-30-380(5).” Compl. ¶ 3.11. 20 Defendants argue: 21 Plaintiffs’ CPA claims, however, necessarily “require[] proof that a 22 plaintiff [w]as ‘injured in his [or her] business or property,’” which involves individual questions that are not suitable for class 23 treatment. Lara v. First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 25 F.4th 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting RCW 19.86.090). In Lara, the Ninth Circuit 24 affirmed this Court’s denial of class certification of similar CPA 25 claims based on an insurer’s alleged violation of Washington insurance regulations relating to the process for determining fair 26 market value for a totaled car. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that a 27 violation of Washington’s insurance regulations is not enough to establish a class-wide CPA claim; instead, a plaintiff must prove that 28 each class member was injured. Id. Thus, even if a class-wide violation of the insurance regulations demonstrated a common 1 question, a plaintiff cannot meet the predominance requirement for 2 class certification because he or she must prove that each class member suffered an injury, which “will require an individualized 3 determination” for each class member about whether they received “the actual cash value” of their damaged property—i.e., what the 4 class member was entitled to under their insurance policy. Id. at 5 1138–39. The Ninth Circuit further explained that and “if a putative class member was given [actual cash value for their property] or 6 more, then he or she cannot win on the merits.” Id. at 1139. Thus, “figuring out whether each individual putative class member was 7 harmed would involve an inquiry specific to that person” that 8 precludes class certification. Id. (noting that the individualized injury inquiry “would involve looking into the actual pre-accident 9 value of the [property] and then comparing that with what each 10 person was offered, to see if the offer was less than the actual value”). . . . 11 Here, plaintiffs’ class allegations present the exact same defects at 12 issue in Lara. Like in Lara, plaintiffs’ sole class-wide claim arises 13 under the CPA and requires plaintiffs to prove that each class member was actually harmed by defendants’ alleged violation of the 14 insurance regulations, i.e., they did not receive the full actual cash value on their claim or the claim was otherwise improperly denied. 15

16 Dkt. #6 at 22. 17 The Court entirely agrees with Defendants and the cited cases that have come to this same 18 conclusion. Even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, determining whether any class member 19 was injured or adequately compensated for their specific insurance claim would require 20 individualized inquiries into each class member’s insurance contract, the information provided 21 22 on each specific claim, the pre-accident value or replacement cost of each piece of damaged 23 property, what each member was offered, and whether the offer was less than the pre-accident 24 value or replacement cost, among other things. Such is not appropriate for a class action. Further, 25 the Eastern District court has already held that these Plaintiffs cannot bring a nationwide class 26 27 action against Country Affiliates or Country Mutual Insurance Company as a matter of law. 28 Cameron, 2024 WL 4557671, at *8. There is no reason to believe that these structural issues could be cured by further amendment. Given all of the above, the Court will strike all class 1 2 allegations. 3 F. Leave to Amend 4 Where a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, “leave to amend should be 5 granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 6 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 7 8 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs have previously filed a near-identical case 9 in the Eastern District. The deficiencies above are mainly legal in nature, not factual. Leave to 10 amend will therefore not be granted. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 13 Having reviewed the relevant pleadings and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby 14 finds and ORDERS: 15 (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. #6, is GRANTED. 16 (2) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Country Casualty Insurance Company, Country 17 Preferred Insurance Company, Country Investors Life Assurance Company, and 18 19 Country Life Insurance Company are DISMISSED with prejudice. 20 (3) All claims against Country Financial are DISMISSED with prejudice. 21 (4) Plaintiffs’ class allegations as to all Defendants are STRICKEN. 22 (5) This case will proceed against Defendant Country Mutual Insurance Company only. 23 DATED this 2nd day of April, 2025. 24 25 A 26 27 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28