AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 8, 2021
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00056-CR
CAMERON RAFAEL CASTILLO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-82223-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Cameron Rafael Castillo appeals his conviction of possession of
methamphetamine in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams. The
trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to eight years’ confinement. In
a single issue, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that he possessed the methamphetamine. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In July 2018, appellant was charged by indictment with intentionally and
knowingly possessing methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less
than four grams. At trial in December 2019, McKinney police officer Allen Copeland testified that, on December 29, 2017, at approximately 2:45 a.m.,
Copeland got a phone call from the Greenville police saying they were pinging the
cell phone of a suspect in a possible capital murder that happened in their city earlier
that day. The pinging showed the suspect was at a Walgreen’s or CVS, and the
suspect was driving “either a silver Dodge Charger or a red Dodge Charger that was
sitting in that parking lot.” Copeland saw a silver passenger car he believed was the
vehicle in question, and he watched the car back out of a parking space and pull out
onto a street. The car did not have its lights on, and Copeland followed the car and
saw it travel without any lights approximately a quarter of a mile on a main
thoroughfare.
Copeland called dispatch and initiated a traffic stop by turning on his overhead
lights. The car pulled into a Taco Bell and then got back onto the street and kept
going. Copeland “hit [his] siren a few times,” but the car did not stop. Other officers
that were “staged in the area all came out with their lights on and got behind
[Copeland] and a pursuit ensued.” At least seven vehicles joined the pursuit, and all
of them had their lights and sirens on. The car eventually turned down a dead-end
road, and Copeland pulled his squad car forward to get behind the car. The car
immediately reversed, hitting Copeland’s squad car, and then pulled forward to the
dead end. At that point, other officers were able to completely block the car so it
could not leave.
–2– Copeland could see “at least two people” in the car, and they did not initially
comply with the officers’ attempts to get them out of the car. Copeland saw
“movement” inside the car and saw the driver and passenger kiss. It took “between
one to five minutes” to get the driver out of the car, and appellant got out of the car
a minute or so thereafter.
McKinney police officer Chance Steele testified he was involved in the traffic
stop and also saw the driver exit the car first before being taken into custody, and
then appellant got out of the car. Dashcam footage showed appellant got out of the
car a little more than a minute after the driver. After the driver and appellant were
taken into custody, Greenville police requested an inventory of the car, and Steele
conducted the inventory looking for valuables. Steele testified he “found a Juicy
Fruit wrapper or a container on the passenger side in the seat.” The container was
“right in the center of the seat” where appellant had gotten out earlier. When Steele
went to move the container, it “didn’t feel right,” and he noticed “there was
something sticking out of it.” Steele opened the container and found pills
individually wrapped in plastic baggies. There were seven pills in the container, and
Steele took them to his car and used a field drug kit to test the pills for possible
narcotics. The pills tested positive for narcotics, and Steele subsequently took the
pills into evidence at the McKinney police department and submitted them to the
lab.
–3– David Eckre, an analyst at the Department of Public Safety crime laboratory,
testified he tested four yellow pills in this case and determined they contained 1.06
grams of methamphetamine. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found
appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine in an amount greater than one
gram but less than four grams. This appeal followed.
In a single issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he
possessed the methamphetamine. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellate court must ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244,
262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. Id.
A court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence
when the factfinder does not act rationally. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone
be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Id.
–4– A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he
knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance, including
methamphetamine. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.115(a), (d); see also id. §
481.002(5), § 481.102(6). To prove that appellant possessed methamphetamine, the
State was required to show that he (1) exercised control, management, or care over
the methamphetamine and (2) he knew that it was contraband. See Blackman v. State,
350 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 481.002(38) (“‘Possession’” means “actual care, custody, control or
management.”).
A defendant’s mere presence is insufficient to establish possession. Tate v.
State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When the contraband is not in
the exclusive possession of the defendant, a fact finder may nonetheless infer that
the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are
sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference. Id. at
413–14. Courts apply a non-exclusive list of fourteen factors that may indicate a
link connecting the defendant to the knowing possession of contraband:
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AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 8, 2021
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00056-CR
CAMERON RAFAEL CASTILLO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-82223-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Cameron Rafael Castillo appeals his conviction of possession of
methamphetamine in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams. The
trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to eight years’ confinement. In
a single issue, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that he possessed the methamphetamine. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In July 2018, appellant was charged by indictment with intentionally and
knowingly possessing methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less
than four grams. At trial in December 2019, McKinney police officer Allen Copeland testified that, on December 29, 2017, at approximately 2:45 a.m.,
Copeland got a phone call from the Greenville police saying they were pinging the
cell phone of a suspect in a possible capital murder that happened in their city earlier
that day. The pinging showed the suspect was at a Walgreen’s or CVS, and the
suspect was driving “either a silver Dodge Charger or a red Dodge Charger that was
sitting in that parking lot.” Copeland saw a silver passenger car he believed was the
vehicle in question, and he watched the car back out of a parking space and pull out
onto a street. The car did not have its lights on, and Copeland followed the car and
saw it travel without any lights approximately a quarter of a mile on a main
thoroughfare.
Copeland called dispatch and initiated a traffic stop by turning on his overhead
lights. The car pulled into a Taco Bell and then got back onto the street and kept
going. Copeland “hit [his] siren a few times,” but the car did not stop. Other officers
that were “staged in the area all came out with their lights on and got behind
[Copeland] and a pursuit ensued.” At least seven vehicles joined the pursuit, and all
of them had their lights and sirens on. The car eventually turned down a dead-end
road, and Copeland pulled his squad car forward to get behind the car. The car
immediately reversed, hitting Copeland’s squad car, and then pulled forward to the
dead end. At that point, other officers were able to completely block the car so it
could not leave.
–2– Copeland could see “at least two people” in the car, and they did not initially
comply with the officers’ attempts to get them out of the car. Copeland saw
“movement” inside the car and saw the driver and passenger kiss. It took “between
one to five minutes” to get the driver out of the car, and appellant got out of the car
a minute or so thereafter.
McKinney police officer Chance Steele testified he was involved in the traffic
stop and also saw the driver exit the car first before being taken into custody, and
then appellant got out of the car. Dashcam footage showed appellant got out of the
car a little more than a minute after the driver. After the driver and appellant were
taken into custody, Greenville police requested an inventory of the car, and Steele
conducted the inventory looking for valuables. Steele testified he “found a Juicy
Fruit wrapper or a container on the passenger side in the seat.” The container was
“right in the center of the seat” where appellant had gotten out earlier. When Steele
went to move the container, it “didn’t feel right,” and he noticed “there was
something sticking out of it.” Steele opened the container and found pills
individually wrapped in plastic baggies. There were seven pills in the container, and
Steele took them to his car and used a field drug kit to test the pills for possible
narcotics. The pills tested positive for narcotics, and Steele subsequently took the
pills into evidence at the McKinney police department and submitted them to the
lab.
–3– David Eckre, an analyst at the Department of Public Safety crime laboratory,
testified he tested four yellow pills in this case and determined they contained 1.06
grams of methamphetamine. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found
appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine in an amount greater than one
gram but less than four grams. This appeal followed.
In a single issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he
possessed the methamphetamine. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellate court must ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244,
262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. Id.
A court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence
when the factfinder does not act rationally. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone
be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Id.
–4– A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he
knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance, including
methamphetamine. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.115(a), (d); see also id. §
481.002(5), § 481.102(6). To prove that appellant possessed methamphetamine, the
State was required to show that he (1) exercised control, management, or care over
the methamphetamine and (2) he knew that it was contraband. See Blackman v. State,
350 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 481.002(38) (“‘Possession’” means “actual care, custody, control or
management.”).
A defendant’s mere presence is insufficient to establish possession. Tate v.
State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When the contraband is not in
the exclusive possession of the defendant, a fact finder may nonetheless infer that
the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are
sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference. Id. at
413–14. Courts apply a non-exclusive list of fourteen factors that may indicate a
link connecting the defendant to the knowing possession of contraband:
(1) the defendant's presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the
–5– defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 414 (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n. 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
Although these factors can help guide a court’s analysis, ultimately the inquiry
remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and cumulative force of
the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a factfinder rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19.
It is not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of
the evidence, direct and circumstantial. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162.
Here, the evidence showed appellant was present when the search was
conducted. The contraband was not in plain view, but the yellow container holding
the contraband was in plain view in the center of the passenger seat where appellant
had been sitting. Thus, appellant was in close proximity to the contraband and had
easy access to it. Appellant clearly had the right to be inside the car: the driver kept
appellant in the car during the lengthy chase and kissed appellant before she got out
of the car. The car was an enclosed space. Steele testified the container “didn’t feel
right,” and “there was something sticking out of it.”
Appellant argues the “facts of the case only provide for mere presence at the
location of the contraband.” Appellant points out that the car belonged to the driver,
not appellant; the driver had control and custody of what was in the car; there was
–6– no odor of contraband; the pills were not in plain view; appellant possessed no other
drugs or paraphernalia; appellant had no weapons; and appellant did not flee when
the vehicle stopped.
The absence of various links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be
weighed against the affirmative links present. Espino-Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.3d
538, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a rational trier of fact
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the
methamphetamine in this case. See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262; Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319. We overrule appellant’s single issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 200056F.U05
–7– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
CAMERON RAFAEL CASTILLO, On Appeal from the 296th Judicial Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-82223- No. 05-20-00056-CR V. 2018. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Schenck and Garcia participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered March 8, 2021
–8–