Cameron Gates v. Town of Quartzsite, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03627
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Cameron Gates, No. CV-25-03627-PHX-SHD

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Town of Quartzsite, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Cameron Gates’ Application for Leave to 16 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. 3.) For the reasons stated below, the Court will 17 grant Gates’ application to proceed IFP, and will proceed to screen Gates’ Complaint, 18 (Doc. 1), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Gates’ § 1983 Equal Protection claim against 19 the Town of Quartzsite will be dismissed with leave to amend, and his § 1983 claim against 20 Defendants Kiki Tunnell, Jim Ferguson, and Joseph Estes in their official capacities will 21 be dismissed with prejudice. The remainder of Gates’ claims will be allowed to proceed. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff Cameron Gates filed the instant Complaint, (Doc. 1), 24 along with an IFP application, (Doc. 3). Gates names as defendants the Town of Quartzsite 25 (“Quartzsite”), along with three individuals in their individual and official capacities 26 (collectively “Defendants”). The three individuals (“Individual Defendants”) include Jim 27 Ferguson, the “Town Manager of Quartzsite,” and Kiki Tunnell, the “Assistant Town 28 Manager for Quartzsite,” whose duties include “administering the personnel system 1 (including hiring authority)”; and Joseph Estes, who was contracted through Pierce 2 Coleman PLLC to serve as “Town Attorney” and who “advise[d] the Council on the 3 selection of the Town Magistrate.” (Doc. 1 at 3–4.) Gates asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. 4 § 1981 for racial discrimination in hiring against the Individual Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 28.) 5 He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause 6 of the Fourteenth Amendment against the Individual Defendants, in their individual and 7 official capacities, and Quartzsite. (Id. at 29–30.) 8 Gates alleges that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis 9 of race in the hiring process for a Magistrate Judge position, unlawfully denying him 10 employment despite his qualifications. (Id. at 28–29.) He further alleges that Quartzsite’s 11 policies, customs, or failures in hiring procedures facilitated this discriminatory conduct. 12 (Id.) Gates seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages for lost employment 13 opportunities and emotional distress, attorneys’ fees and costs, and declaratory and 14 injunctive relief. (Id. at 24–31.) 15 According to the Complaint, Gates is a Black male. (Id. at 5). On August 10, 2025, 16 he applied for the Magistrate Judge position with Quartzsite. (Id.) On September 9, 2025, 17 Gates and Lori Brinkerhoff—a white candidate who was serving as interim magistrate 18 judge—were interviewed for the Magistrate Judge position during a Town Council 19 meeting. (Id. at 5–7.) Gates alleges that despite his superior qualifications, Defendants 20 failed to hire him and instead selected Brinkerhoff. (Id. at 5.) 21 Gates alleges that the decision to hire Brinkerhoff was made with discriminatory 22 intent, with the advice and knowledge of Town legal counsel, and against a historical 23 backdrop in which Quartzsite has never hired a Black individual as Magistrate Judge. (Id. 24 at 6–7.) He claims Defendants “intentionally tried to hide the hiring process because it had 25 historically hand-picked white town magistrate judges.” (Id. at 12.) 26 Gates alleges that Quartzsite deliberately structured the hiring process to favor the 27 white candidate, Brinkerhoff. (See id. at 7.) He claims that by setting the minimum 28 qualification as a high school diploma, Defendants ensured that Brinkerhoff would appear 1 qualified, despite Gates possessing significantly greater education and experience. (Id. at 2 7.) Gates asserts that he holds an associate’s degree with high distinction and a bachelor’s 3 degree, earned cum laude, in Interdisciplinary Studies with concentrations in Criminal 4 Justice and Sociology, while Brinkerhoff possesses only a high school education. (Id. at 5 7.) Although Brinkerhoff claims to hold an associate’s degree, Gates alleges that her 6 credentials were incomplete or false and that Defendants knew or should have known this 7 fact. (Id. at 9–10.) 8 Gates asserts that he fully complied with all hiring requirements by submitting a 9 completed application, references, a detailed resume, and letters of recommendation. (Id. 10 at 8–9.) And despite the availability of his references, Gates alleges that none were 11 contacted prior to the hiring vote, while Brinkerhoff was not required to submit references 12 at all. (Id. at 9.) 13 Gates also alleges that Defendants attempted to hold his interview in private, failing 14 to advise him of his statutory right under Arizona law to request a public interview, and 15 thereby attempting to mislead him into waiving that right. (Id. at 13–14.) After researching 16 his rights and consulting with counsel, Gates asserted his right to a public interview, which 17 was ultimately conducted. (Id. at 14.) Defendants did not make a similar attempt to steer 18 Brinkerhoff into a private interview. (Id. at 15.) Gates also alleges that during the public 19 interview the mayor made “offensive and racially charged” comments. (Id. at 18.) 20 Gates further alleges that during the hiring process, Brinkerhoff received 21 preferential access to professional opportunities, including attendance at a state judicial 22 education conference in Phoenix, which was not offered to Gates. (Id. at 16.) He also 23 alleges that Defendants “failed to utilize an application that requested voluntary disclosure 24 of race information as required for federal EEO-4 reporting.” (Id.) 25 On June 10, 2025, prior to the interviews, several Quartzsite residents publicly 26 expressed concern that Brinkerhoff was underqualified. (Id. at 5.) During public comment, 27 a white Quartzsite resident questioned the Town Council regarding Brinkerhoff’s outside 28 business interests. (Id. at 22.) Gates alleges the Council downplayed the issue, declined 1 to disclose that the business was related to the RV industry, and defended Brinkerhoff’s 2 general right to maintain an outside business, despite the significance of that industry to 3 Quartzsite’s economy. (Id. at 22–23.) 4 Gates additionally alleges that Defendants treated his personal information 5 differently from Brinkerhoff’s. (Id. at 17.) He claims that his full application packet, 6 including his driver’s license number, home address, and other personally identifying 7 information, was posted on Quartzsite’s public website as part of the Council meeting 8 agenda. (Id.) In contrast, Quartzsite redacted or withheld similar personal information 9 from Brinkerhoff’s publicly posted materials, posting only her resume and cover letter. 10 (Id.) Gates alleges that this disparate treatment caused him significant fear for his safety 11 and privacy and contributed to his emotional distress. (Id. at 24–25.) 12 Gates also alleges that the Council failed to disclose an apparent conflict of interest 13 involving the Town Attorney, who both advised Defendants on the selection of the 14 Magistrate Judge and regularly appears before the selected magistrate as Quartzsite’s 15 prosecutor. (Id. at 23.) Gates alleges that this undisclosed relationship created the 16 appearance of impropriety and further evidences preferential treatment afforded to 17 Brinkerhoff during the hiring process. (Id.) 18 Finally, Gates alleges that the discriminatory practices observed in Quartzsite are 19 consistent with broader patterns of preferential treatment for white candidates in judicial 20 hiring within Arizona municipalities. (Id. at 21–22.) 21 II. IFP APPLICATION 22 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 23 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 24 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 25 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 26 (citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 27 Having reviewed the application to proceed IFP, (Doc. 2), the Court finds Gates 28 cannot pay the court costs and still afford necessities. Thus, the motion to proceed IFP will 1 be granted. 2 III. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 3 Because Gates is proceeding in this case, the Court must screen his Complaint: 4 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the 5 “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 6 “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines how prisoners 7 can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 8 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 9 complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous 10 or malicious. 11 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 12 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 13 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 14 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 15 screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 12(b)(6)”). 17 Hairston v. Juarez, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2023). 18 IV. CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 19 Gates brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the Individual Defendants 20 alleging racial discrimination in hiring. (Doc. 1 at 28.) He also brings a claim under 42 21 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Individual Defendants, in their individual and official capacities, 22 alleging that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated his rights under the Equal 23 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally refusing to hire him for 24 the position of Magistrate Judge because of his race. (Doc. 1 at 29–30.) 25 When analyzing employment discrimination claims brought under §§ 1981 and 26 1983, courts apply “the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate 27 treatment case.” Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 28 2008) (cleaned up); see Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2022). A plaintiff 1 may establish discriminatory intent through direct or circumstantial evidence 2 demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant’s 3 conduct and that the plaintiff was adversely affected. Ballou, 29 F.4th at 422. Where direct 4 evidence is unavailable, courts apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell 5 Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. 6 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case for 7 discrimination in hiring by demonstrating that “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) 8 he applied and had the qualifications for the position from which he was rejected; (3) he 9 was denied the position although he was qualified; and (4) Defendant hired someone for 10 the position that was not in Plaintiff's class (or continued considering other applicants with 11 qualifications similar to Plaintiff).” Memory v. EmployBridge, 2024 WL 3105906, at *3 12 (D. Ariz. 2024) (citing Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 13 (9th Cir. 2005)). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 14 the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. 15 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant can do so, the burden returns 16 to the plaintiff, who must show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. 17 Id. at 804. 18 Here, Gates is a Black man and thus a member of a protected class. He alleges that 19 he applied for a contract of employment with Quartzsite for the position of Magistrate 20 Judge, that he met the stated qualifications for the position, and that he was not selected. 21 Gates further alleges that Individual Defendants selected a white candidate, Brinkerhoff, 22 who was less qualified, and that he possessed superior educational qualifications compared 23 to the white candidate ultimately selected. 24 He further alleges that Defendants structured and administered the hiring process in 25 a manner that favored Brinkerhoff, including by establishing minimal qualification 26 requirements and selectively enforcing procedural rules. According to the Complaint, 27 Gates’s references were not contacted, while Brinkerhoff was not required to submit 28 references at all. Gates also alleges that Defendants attempted to steer him toward a private 1 interview without informing him of his right to request a public interview, whereas no such 2 effort was made with respect to Brinkerhoff. In addition, Gates alleges that his personal 3 identifying information was publicly disclosed, while comparable information concerning 4 Brinkerhoff was withheld. Finally, Gates alleges that the hiring decision occurred against 5 a historical backdrop in which Quartzsite has never appointed a Black individual to serve 6 as Magistrate Judge. 7 Gates additionally alleges that the Town Council appointed Brinkerhoff with the 8 knowledge, approval, and participation of Ferguson, Tunnell, and Estes, and that Ferguson 9 and Tunnell exercised authority over the administration of the hiring process, while Estes 10 advised the Council on the Magistrate Judge selection. 11 Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Gates’ 12 favor, the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Individual Defendants personally 13 participated in, or caused, the alleged violation of Gates’ rights. Accordingly, Gates states 14 both a cognizable claim under § 1981 against the Individual Defendants and a claim under 15 § 1983 against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. Count One may 16 therefore proceed against the Individual Defendants and Count Two may proceed against 17 the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. 18 Gates also sues the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. A suit against 19 a municipal official in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the municipality 20 itself. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles, Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 21 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Gates names Quartzsite as a defendant, his § 1983 claims 22 against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed. See Ogbonnaya 23 v. City of Mesa, 2015 WL 241444, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2015); Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202, 24 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“[W]hen both an officer and the local government entity are named 25 in a lawsuit and the officer is named in official capacity only, the officer is a redundant 26 defendant and may be dismissed.”). 27 V. CLAIM AGAINST QUARTZSITE 28 Gates also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Quartzsite, alleging that 1 Quartzsite, acting under color of state law, violated his rights under the Equal Protection 2 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally refusing to hire him for the position 3 of Magistrate Judge on the basis of his race. 4 A “municipality may not be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions 5 of its subordinates.” United States v. Town of Colorado City, 935 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 6 2019). “Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local 7 government’s ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (citation omitted). In 8 other words, § 1983 only holds municipalities responsible “for their own illegal acts.” 9 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “Establishing 10 municipal liability based on a Monell theory of liability is difficult.” Bell v. Williams, 108 11 F.4th 809, 824 (9th Cir. 2024). The Ninth Circuit has “identified three ways in which a 12 plaintiff can satisfy Monell’s policy requirement”: 13 (1) when the municipality “acts pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy”; 14 (2) when the municipality has a “longstanding practice or custom”; or 15 (3) when “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an 16 official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” 17 18 Hartzell v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 130 F.4th 722, 734 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation 19 modified). 20 In limited circumstances, a municipality’s failure to train its employees may 21 constitute an official policy for purposes of § 1983, but only where the failure amounts to 22 deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the employees 23 come into contact. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. To sufficiently plead a failure-to-train theory 24 of Monell liability, “a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable 25 inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts 26 to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury 27 would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez 28 v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021). 1 If a municipality is “on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in 2 their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the 3 city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that 4 program.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. To that end, a “pattern of similar constitutional 5 violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate 6 indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62 (quotation marks omitted); see also 7 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997) (“[T]he 8 existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to 9 show that the lack of proper training . . . is the moving force behind the plaintiff’s injury.” 10 (quotation marks omitted)). But ultimately, a plaintiff must “show the need for more or 11 different action is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in 12 the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to 13 have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Sabbe v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 84 14 F.4th 807, 829 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). 15 The Complaint fails to state a Monell claim against Quartzsite. Here, Gates alleges 16 that Quartzsite has historically selected white candidates for the Magistrate Judge position 17 and departed from federal EEO-4 procedures. However, Gates alleges no facts showing 18 that his alleged injury was caused by a specific municipal policy or by a custom or practice 19 so longstanding or widespread as to have the force of law. See City of St. Louis v. 20 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (holding a “custom” for purposes of municipal 21 liability is a “widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express 22 municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with 23 the force of law”). Nor does he identify a particular official with final policymaking 24 authority who made, ratified, or approved the allegedly discriminatory hiring decision and 25 the basis for it. 26 With respect to the alleged pattern of discriminatory hiring, the Complaint offers 27 only generalized assertions that Quartzsite has never hired a Black Magistrate Judge and 28 has historically “hand-picked” white candidates. These conclusory allegations amount to 1 little more than a claim that Quartzsite maintains a policy of discrimination. Such 2 assertions, without specific factual allegations, are insufficient to plausibly allege a 3 municipal custom or practice under Monell. See Brown v. Contra Costa Cnty., 2014 WL 4 1347680, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing Monell claim for failure to plausibly allege a 5 county policy or custom where plaintiff offered only conclusory assertions of a “pattern 6 and practice” of racial discrimination and failed to plead facts showing a longstanding or 7 widespread practice with the force of law). 8 To the extent Gates attempts to premise Monell liability on Quartzsite’s alleged 9 failure to follow EEO-4 procedures, the Complaint likewise falls short. This allegation 10 could be construed as a claim based on Quartzsite’s failure to implement a procedural 11 safeguard or to train employees. However, to support Monell liability on a failure-to-train 12 theory, Gates must allege facts showing that (1) a constitutional violation occurred; (2) 13 Quartzsite had a training or procedural policy amounting to deliberate indifference to 14 constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutional injury would not have occurred if Quartzsite 15 had properly trained its employees. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61; Benavidez, 993 F. 3d at 1153– 16 54. The Complaint does not allege facts demonstrating deliberate indifference, a pattern 17 of similar violations, or a direct link between any failure to follow EEO-4 procedures and 18 Gates’ alleged harm. Accordingly, Gates has failed to state a cognizable Monell claim 19 against Quartzsite. 20 Unless the Court determines that a pleading cannot be cured by the allegation of 21 other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint. See Lopez 22 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A finding that any amendment 23 would be futile justifies dismissal without leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 24 815, 845 (1995). Here, the Court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile as Gates 25 could allege additional facts that would state a claim for relief. Accordingly, Gates will be 26 granted the opportunity to amend his Monell claim against Quartzsite. Gates is advised 27 that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 28 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, after amendment, the original complaint is treated as 2 nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action raised in the original complaint 3 is waived if it is not alleged in an amended complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 4 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). And any Defendant not renamed in an amended 5 complaint will remain dismissed from this case. See id. 6 VI. ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION 7 For purposes of this order, Gates is proceeding pro se. An attorney who has not 8 entered an appearance in this matter contacted chambers by telephone and email regarding 9 the status of Gates’ application to proceed IFP. Attorneys may not communicate with the 10 Court or court staff on behalf of a litigant without first filing a notice of appearance. 11 Additionally, any attorney assisting him who has not entered an appearance may not file 12 documents, sign pleadings, appear in court, or communicate with the Court on his behalf. 13 Gates is further cautioned that preparation of filings by an attorney who has not 14 entered an appearance, referred to as ghostwriting, is disfavored and improper because it 15 can disadvantage the opposing party, evade Rule 11 obligations, and mislead the Court 16 regarding the true author of filings. See Flynn v. Love, 2023 WL 2561158, at *4 (D. Nev. 17 2023). 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED granting Gates’ application for leave to proceed in forma 20 pauperis, without prepayment of costs or fees or the necessity of giving security therefore 21 (Doc. 3). 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice Gates’ § 1983 Equal 23 Protection claim against Quartzsite and dismissing with prejudice Gates’ § 1983 Equal 24 Protection claim against defendants Kiki Tunnell, Jim Ferguson, and Joseph Estes in their 25 official capacities. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gates may file a First Amended Complaint 27 (“FAC”) and amend his § 1983 Equal Protection claim against Quartzsite within 30 days 28 of the date of this Order. l IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Gates files a FAC, the Clerk of the Court || shall not issue subpoenas until the Court screens the Amended Complaint and orders || service consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Gates does not file a FAC within 30 days of || the date of this Order, the Clerk of Court shall dismiss Quartzsite as a defendant, and the 6 || action shall proceed solely on Gates’ surviving claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 7|| against defendants Kiki Tunnell, Jim Ferguson, and Joseph Estes in their individual 8 || capacities. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service of process is stayed pending either the filing and screening of a FAC or the expiration of the amendment deadline, at which time 11 || the Court will order service on the remaining defendants as appropriate. 12 Dated this 4th day of February, 2026. 13 14 □ 15 / 16 " H le Sharad H. Desai 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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