Cameron Dontae Robinson v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 31, 2024
• Docket: 09-23-00115-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________ NO. 09-23-00115-CR ________________

CAMERON DONTAE ROBINSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 221st District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22-01-00130-CR ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cameron Dontae Robinson challenges the trial court’s order denying his

motion to set bail pending the resolution of his appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 44.04(g) (permitting an accelerated appeal from an order denying bail

pending an appeal). Because it was reasonable for the trial court to deny Robinson’s

bail, we affirm the trial court’s order.

1 Background

In 2021, Robinson’s vehicle was stopped by a State Trooper for a traffic stop.

During the stop, the trooper observed marijuana residue on the floor of Robinson’s

vehicle, resulting in a probable cause search of Robinson’s vehicle, leading to the

discovery of drugs and $93,971 in cash. At trial, the State introduced evidence of

Robinson’s criminal history, including a prior arrest for possession of drugs.

Robinson was convicted of money laundering in an amount greater than $30,000 and

less than $150,000. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02(e)(2). He was sentenced to four

years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

After his conviction, Robinson moved to set bail pending the resolution of his

appeal. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to deny bail pending appeal for an abuse of

discretion. Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). When

reviewing matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, we do not substitute our

own judgment for that of the trial court. See Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003)). Instead, we ask whether the trial court’s decision was made without

reference to any guiding rules or principles of law, or in other words, whether it was

arbitrary or unreasonable. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.

2 Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). We uphold the trial court’s decision as long as it

falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. at 391.

Analysis

There is no federal or state constitutional right to bail pending appeal. See

Dallas v. State, 983 S.W.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Stack v.

Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)); see also Ex parte Lowe, 573 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1978); Cortez v. State, 36 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2001, pet. ref’d). However, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits

defendants to seek reasonable bail pending appeal under certain circumstances.

Pursuant to article 44.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, if the defendant’s

punishment is less than ten years and the conviction is for an offense not listed under

article 42A.054(a), the trial court may set a reasonable bail pending the resolution of

the defendant’s appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(b), (c); see also

id. art. 42A.054(a). Since Robinson’s sentence is less than ten years, and his

conviction does not involve an offense listed in article 42A.054(a), he was eligible

for bail pending appeal. Nevertheless, under article 44.04, the trial court has

discretion to deny Robinson’s bail if good cause existed to believe he would not

appear when his conviction became final, or he would likely commit another offense

while on bail. See id. art. 44.04(c). See Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001) (Against the interest of such appellants [persons convicted of a

3 felony yet still eligible for bail] must be balanced the interest of society in enforcing

the penal laws). Robinson was convicted of money laundering under Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 34.02(e)(2). The evidence at trial showed he had more than $90,000 in

cash in his vehicle when he was stopped and that he was in possession of oxycodone

pills that were not prescribed to him. Evidence at his trial, and also at the bond

hearing, revealed arrests both before and after this case, including testimony that

Robinson had violated the terms of his bail at trial when he was arrested in Arkansas

just a few weeks after being arrested in Texas. Evidence in the record also shows

that Robinson still has pending criminal cases alleging possession of drugs in Hunt

County and possession of drugs in Denton County.

In denying bail on appeal, the trial court explained, “That’s my big concern.

It is not about -- I mean, he did appear. And to his credit, he appeared when many

times his attorney at trial did not. But I am concerned because he has a lot of other

pending cases.” The trial court also agreed with the State that section 44.04(c) does

not reference convictions, but only whether the defendant is likely to commit another

offense while out on bail.

Given the nature of the underlying offense, and Robinson’s multiple arrests

both before and after his arrest here, the trial court could have reasonably found that

Robinson would likely commit another offense while on bail pending the resolution

of his appeal. Ex parte Lowe at 247; see, e.g., Ex parte Jeanmard, No. 09-08-298CR,

4 2008 WL 4936842, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (relying on the trial court’s statement that “‘[t]he

failure to follow such rules which are directly related to [the defendant’s] underlying

offense places others in jeopardy of [his] potential to commit other offenses if placed

on bail[]’” in affirming the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s application

for bond pending the outcome of his appeal). On this record, it does not appear that

the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. We cannot say that the trial court

acted without regard to guiding rules or principles of law in denying Robinson’s bail

on appeal. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order denying

Robinson’s request for bail pending the outcome of his appeal is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT Justice

Submitted on December 5, 2023 Opinion Delivered January 31, 2024 Do Not Publish

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.