Camden & Co. v. Hiteshew

23 W. Va. 236, 1883 W. Va. LEXIS 26
West Virginia Supreme Court·Decided December 15, 1883·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Johnson, Judge :

J. JST. Camden & Co. filed their bill in Uovember, 1881, against Jacob Hiteshew and Sarah, his wife, alleging that in the year 1879 the defendant, Sarah Hiteshew, traded and dealt with the plaintiffs and bought goods of them, and paid in part for said goods by delivering to them stave and barrel [238] timber; that during the whole of the period, when she so traded with them, she was and is now. a married woman residing with her husband, the said Jacob Hiteshew; that the goods were bought by her in her own name and on her own credit, and upon her own separate responsibility, all of which was done with the knowledge, consent and acquiescence of her said husband; that she gave a note to close her account tor the sum of three hundred and twenty-five dollars and fifty-eight cents; that said-note is signed “Jacob Hiteshew for Sarah Hiteshew;” that Jacob Hiteshew transacted business as the agent of his said wife, for her and in her name; that the said Sarah also often purchased goods and property in person from the complainants; that the credit for goods so purchased was so given upon the representation made to ¡fiaintiffs that the said Jacob Hiteshew was acting as agent for his wife, and that he was duly authorized by her to act as such agent; that the note so given is a renewal of a former note of said Sarah Hiteshew; that she knew7 that renewals had been made of said note, and that her property was liable for the payment thereof; that she knew7 the note was taken upon the faith and credit of her property. The prayer is that her property may be subjected to the payment of said debt and for general relief.

It is alleged in the bill, that she is the owner of two tracts of land, which came from her husband, through a conveyance by him toL. N. Tavenner and by Tavenner to her, one tract described as one hundred and ninety-six acres, and the other fifty acres. The bill does not set out any personal property owned by said Sarah Hiteshew7.

A demurrer to the bill wras properly overruled.

The defendants separately answered the bill. Jacob in his answer denied that he ever did business as the agent of his wife, averring that he wms ignorant and could not read writing; that he never signed his name as agent for his wdfe to any contract or notes and did not sign his name as agent for his wife to. the note set up in the bill; and averred that he did not know7 it was so signed.

Sarah Hiteshew7 in her answer expressly denies, that she carried on business through Jacob Hiteshew7 as her agent. She also denies that she furnished Camden & Co. any staves [239] or anything else, or bought in her own name any goods from them; denies that her husband was authorized to. do anything as her agent: denies that he was authorized to sign the note set up in the bill as her agent, or that he ever did business as her agent.

On the 18th day oí December, 1882, the court entered the following decree: “This cause came on this day to be heard upon the bill and exhibits filed therewith, the answers of defendants and exhibits filed with answer of Jacob Iliteshew', and replication to said answers, and proofs filed, and Avas argued by counsel. On consideration whereof the court is of opinion, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief prayed for. It is therefore adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the plaintiffs’ bill be dismissed, and that the defendants recover against the plaintiffs their costs in this suit expended.”

From this decree plaintiffs appealed.

Is the decree light ? This depends upon a question of fact. If the note sued on is the note of Sarah Iiiteshcvq her separate estate is liable for the payment thereof out of the rents and profits of her real estate, it not appearing in the record that she has any personal property. The debts of a married Avoman, for which her separate estate is liable, are such as arise out of any transaction, out of AA'hich a debt Avould have arisen, if she had been a feme sole, except that her separate estate is not bound by a bond or covenant based on no consideration, such bond or covenant being void at larr, and she is not estopped in a court of equity from showb-ill g that it aa'RS based on no consideration. Radford v. Carwile., 13 W. Va. 572.

This Court Avere unanimous in the case of Miller v. Peck, 18 W. Va. 75, in holding, that a married Avoman having personal property, which she is-alloAvod to hold by statute as her separate property, may barter and trade Avith reference thereto through her husband as her agent, and that she will be entitled to the increase thereof, though living with her husband. Judge Green differed Avith the majority of the Court on other points decided in that case, but not on this. If therefore, as charged in the bill, Sarah Ilitshew was carrying on business through her husband as her agent, and [240] executed the said note in suit here by her husband as such agent, her separate property is liable for the payment thereof.

The answer of Jacob Hiteshew exhibits several accounts roudered to him during the time oí the dealings with Camden & Co., which were made out against him individually. The depositions of Jacob ITiteshew and Sarah Hiteshew are taken, in which they severally testily, that Jacob did no business for her as her agent, and that she had no dealings with Camden & Co.

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Camden & Co. v. Hiteshew, 23 W. Va. 236, 1883 W. Va. LEXIS 26 (W. Va. 1883).

23 W. Va. 236 (Camden & Co. v. Hiteshew) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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