Cambridge Nutrition A.G. v. Fotheringham

840 F. Supp. 299, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159, 1994 WL 7641
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 10, 1994
Docket93 Civ. 3242 (MEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 840 F. Supp. 299 (Cambridge Nutrition A.G. v. Fotheringham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cambridge Nutrition A.G. v. Fotheringham, 840 F. Supp. 299, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159, 1994 WL 7641 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

In an action for breach of contract, breach of trust and unfair competition, defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, on the grounds that the exercise of jurisdiction in this ease would exceed the limits of due process.

I.

Plaintiffs Cambridge Nutrition A.G. (“CNAG”) 1 , a Swiss corporation, and Cambridge Nutrition International, B.V. (“CNI”), a Netherlands corporation, manufacture and sell a dietary formulation known as the “Cambridge Diet.”

Defendant Bill Fotheringham, a permanent resident of Spain since 1968, was a former employee and shareholder of CNAG. Fotheringham also served as the sole administrator of CNAG’s Spanish subsidiary, C.P. Ibérica, S.A. (“Ibérica”).

In July 1986, the shareholders of CNAG entered into an agreement (“Agreement”) to sell all of the company’s shares to CNI. The aggregate purchase price paid by CNI to the shareholders was $1.24 million. In Section 7 of the Agreement, CNAG shareholders, officers and employees covenant that they will not compete with the Cambridge Diet or use the Cambridge trademarks or tradenames in the manufacture and sale of dietary formulas. As consideration for the promise not to compete, the shareholders received $10,000, of which Fotheringham’s share was $900.

After the Agreement was executed in a closing held in New York, Fotheringham continued to serve as Iberica’s sole administrator. Ibérica had an exclusive distribution agreement with Cambridge Plan, S.A. (“CP-Spain”), an independent Spanish company, to distribute Cambridge products in Spain. Fotheringham oversaw Iberica’s distribution arrangement with CP-Spain and his actions in this regard are the heart of this dispute. Plaintiffs allege that Fotheringham owned shares of stock in CP-Spain and made business decisions favorable to CP-Spain and beneficial to himself, to the detriment of CNAG. The acts complained of include pricing the formula to favor CP-Spain and inducing CP-Spain to register certain Cambridge trademarks.

Plaintiffs now sue for breach of the covenant not to compete, breach of trust and unfair competition. Plaintiffs commenced suit in this court because Section 15 of the Agreement states:

“This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, U.S.A. All parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state of New York in regard to any claim, dispute or controversy relating to this Agreement, and all parties agree to accept service of process by mail.”

II.

Fotheringham moves to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Plaintiffs argue that Fotheringham is precluded from litigating this dispute elsewhere by the forum-selection clause in the Agreement. Accordingly, the threshold question on this motion is whether Fotheringham is bound by the forum-selection clause to litigate the ease in New York.

Federal law

The Supreme Court has held that, in general, “a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue *301 influence, or overweening bargaining power ... should be given full effect.” The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1914, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972). In enforcing a forum-selection clause in The Bremen, the Court recognized that “[t]he elimination of all ... uneei’tainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to [all] parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce and contracting.” Id. at 13-14, 92 S.Ct. at 1915. The Court imposed on the movant a heavy burden of showing that enforcement would be “unreasonable and unjust” or that the clause was the product of “fraud or overreaching.” Id. at 15, 92 S.Ct. at 1915.

Although Fotheringham states that he was not aware of the terms of the Agreement, he had delegated power of attorney to the CNAG legal counsel. In addition, the forum-selection clause at issue — Section 15 of the Agreement — was a negotiated term and was not hidden or buried in fine print.

In the recent case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991), the Supreme Court emphatically reinforced its decision in The Bremen and held that forum-selection clauses are enforceable even in a case involving parties with unequal bargaining power. In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court held valid a choice of forum clause contained only in the form ticket contract issued to cruise ship passengers.

Fotheringham cites inconvenience, his ill health and the availability of Spain as an alternate forum as the grounds for defeating the forum-selection clause. However, in The Bremen, the Supreme Court held that a party seeking to escape the contract must show that trial in the designated forum “will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” 407 U.S. at 18, 92 S.Ct. at 1917. Fotheringham has not met this burden.

Fotheringham distinguishes The Bremen and Carnival Cruise from the case at hand on the grounds that, according to Fotheringham, the Supreme Court decisions involved “mandatory” rather than “permissive” forum clauses; that is, The Bremen and Carnival Cruise clauses used the words “must” or “shall” rather than the words “hereby submit” in the present case. Fotheringham relies on Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir.1974), for the proposition that the holding in The Bremen is limited to so-called “mandatory” forum clauses.

The argument is unpersuasive. Neither The Bremen nor Carnival Cruise places any reliance on or even discusses the fact that the clauses at issue in those cases used particular or compulsory terms. Moreover, even if such a distinction were recognized, the language in question here — “This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, U.S.A. All parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state of New York” (emphasis added)— supports the construction that the instant clause is “mandatory.”

In sum, under federal law, the forum-selection clause at issue is valid and enforceable.

New York law

New York General Obligations Law § 5-1402 governs choice of forum. It states:

Notwithstanding any act which limits or affects the right of a person to maintain an action or proceeding ...

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
840 F. Supp. 299, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159, 1994 WL 7641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cambridge-nutrition-ag-v-fotheringham-nysd-1994.