Cambria Horne v. Seattle City Light, City of Seattle, Dawn Lindell, Brian Belger, David Maxfield, John Hansen

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CAMBRIA HORNE, an individual, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01606-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART v. 10 SEATTLE CITY LIGHT, CITY OF 11 SEATTLE, a municipality; DAWN LINDELL, an individual; BRIAN 12 BELGER, an individual; DAVID MAXFIELD, an individual; JOHN 13 HANSEN, an individual,

14 Defendants. 15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 In 2022, Plaintiff Cambria Horne pursued discrimination claims against 17 Seattle City Light (“SLC”), arguing that a manager had harassed, bullied, and 18 raped her. A 2022 workplace investigation concluded that her allegations were 19 substantiated, and Seattle City Light settled with Horne in November of that year. 20 After the settlement, Seattle City Light launched another, broader workplace 21 investigation, in which Horne participated. Horne now alleges that Seattle City 22 23 1 Light and its agents discriminated and retaliated against her for participating in 2 these investigations and for pursuing antidiscrimination litigation in 2022.

3 The amended complaint asserts claims for (1) violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 4 violating the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD); (3) breach of 5 contract; (4) negligence; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”); and 6 (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Defendants move to dismiss 7 certain claims and to strike portions of the complaint that they allege contain 8 harmful and irrelevant information. Dkt. No. 17. For the reasons below, the Court

9 GRANTS the motion IN PART. 10 2. DISCUSSION 11 2.1 The complaint is not an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” 12 Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of 13 Civil Procedure 8 and 10(b), as a “shotgun pleading.” Preliminarily, on review, the 14 Court finds that the amended complaint does not violate Rule 10(b). Turning to 15 Rule 8, it requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the 16 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 17 Some district courts have found that complaints are “impermissible shotgun 18 pleadings” when they “overwhelm defendants with an unclear mass of allegations 19 and make it difficult to impossible for the defendants to make informed responses to 20 the plaintiff's allegations.” Watt v. HAL Antillen N.V., Case No. 2:24-cv-00155-RSL, 21 2024 WL 4436966, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2024) (quoting A.B. v. Hilton 22 Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 943 (D. Or. 2020)). “A complaint that 23 1 alleges ‘everyone did everything’ and prevents defendants from understanding the 2 nature of the claims asserted against each of them cannot survive a motion to

3 dismiss.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 4 Cir. 2011)). 5 The Court finds that the complaint satisfies Rule 8. It alleges that 6 Defendants, including the named individuals—management at Seattle City Light— 7 failed to respond or act on Horne’s numerous reports of retaliation and 8 discrimination after the 2022 settlement. Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 33. While the complaint

9 would benefit from more specificity, as discussed below, it is not incoherent or 10 confusing such that it violates Rule 8. 11 2.2 Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 12 The Court will grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the complaint fails to allege 13 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 15 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 16 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts 18 factual allegations pled in the complaint as true and construes them in the light 19 most favorable to the plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). 20 2.2.1 The Court dismisses claims against the individual 21 Defendants without prejudice. 22 Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss all claims against individual 23 Defendants Lindell and Maxfield because the complaint includes no factual 1 allegations specifically related to them, except that they are SLC employees. Dkt. 2 No. 17 at 17; see Dkt. No. 14 ¶¶ 14, 16 (alleging that at all relevant times, Maxfield

3 was Crew Chief at Seattle City Light, and Lindell was the Chief Executive Officer of 4 Seattle City Light). The Court agrees. Although the complaint defines all 5 Defendants “[c]ollectively” as “Defendant Seattle City Light,” id. ¶ 3, this 6 definitional shortcut cannot substitute for factual allegations showing what each 7 individual defendant did to violate Horne’s rights. Neither Lindell nor Maxfield is 8 mentioned in the factual allegations, see id. ¶¶ 19–33, and the complaint does not

9 allege that either took any specific action or inaction that harmed Horne. See 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 11 entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions”) (internal quotation 12 marks omitted). Accordingly, the claims against Lindell and Maxfield are dismissed 13 without prejudice. 14 Defendants also argue that all claims against Belger and Hansen must be 15 dismissed because the only factual allegations against them concern pre-November

16 2022 conduct. Dkt. No. 17 at 17. The Court agrees. In November 2022, Horne and 17 SLC executed a Settlement Agreement resolving Horne’s prior tort claim. Dkt. No. 18 17-4. Under its terms, Horne released all claims against the City and its employees 19 arising after the date of the settlement agreement. Id. § 1.4. The only allegations 20 against Belger and Hansen involve conduct from before January 2022. Because the 21 factual allegations against Belger and Hansen predate the settlement, these claims

22 fall within the scope of the release and are dismissed without prejudice. 23 1 The Court notes that Horne’s declaration submitted with her opposition to 2 this motion contains factual allegations against some individuals that were not

3 included in the amended complaint. See generally Dkt. No. 20. However, a plaintiff 4 may not amend her complaint through briefing or extrinsic materials. See Schneider 5 v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Horne may replead 6 claims against individual Defendants if she can allege specific post-settlement facts 7 showing each individual’s role in the challenged conduct. 8 2.2.2 The Court dismisses Horne’s negligence, IIED, and NIED claims with leave to amend. 9 Next, Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss Horne’s state common- 10 law tort claims for negligence, IIED, and NIED because they are duplicative of her 11 WLAD claims. “Washington courts have held that common law tort claims, such as 12 negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and intentional 13 infliction of emotional distress (which is also known as the tort of outrage), that are 14 based on the same facts underpinning a plaintiff’s claim for unlawful 15 discrimination, are duplicative of the discrimination claim and therefore must be 16 dismissed.” Ellorin v. Applied Finishing, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1093 (W.D. 17 Wash. 2014) (collecting cases). Such claims can survive only “when the claim is 18 based on a separate factual basis from the [WLAD] claim.” Id. (quoting Haubry v. 19 Snow, 31 P.3d 1186, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“An employee may recover 20 damages for emotional distress in an employment context but only if the factual 21 basis for the claim is distinct from the factual basis for the discrimination claim.”); 22 see also Martinez Patterson v. AT&T Servs. Inc., Case No. C18-1180-RSM, 2021 WL 23 1 3617179, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2021) (citing Gamble v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l 2 Council of Carpenters, Case No. 2:14-cv-00455-RSM, 2015 WL 402782, at *6 (W.D.

3 Wash. Jan 29, 2015) (“Under Washington law, a common law tort claim, such as 4 negligent supervision, that is duplicative of a discrimination claim must be 5 dismissed.”)); Francom v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 991 P.2d 1182, 1192–93 (Wash. 6 Ct. App. 2000) (affirming dismissal of NIED and negligent hiring and retention 7 claims as duplicative of discrimination claim). 8 Horne’s response fails to address whether state law tort claims may be

9 brought alongside discrimination claims when all claims are based on the same 10 facts. See Dkt. No. 18 at 14–15. Instead, she cites cases explaining an employer’s 11 duty to protect its employees from harm caused by third parties. See id. It is unclear 12 from the complaint whether Horne’s WLAD claim is necessarily based on the same 13 facts that support her negligence, IIED, and NIED claims. Accordingly, dismissal of 14 these common-law claims with leave to amend is appropriate. See DeSoto v. Yellow 15 Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (“If a complaint is dismissed for

16 failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court 17 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 18 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” (citation modified)).1 19 20 21

22 1 Defendants also argue that Horne’s common-law claims fail independently. Having already found dismissal appropriate, the Court need not address this 23 argument. 1 2.2.3 Horne states a plausible Monell claim. Horne also pursues a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 2 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 3 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Long v. 4 Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The 5 cause of action has two essential elements: “(1) that a right secured by the 6 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 7 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Id. (citing 8 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, (1988)). Horne alleges that Defendants 9 discriminated against her because of her gender in violation of the Fourteenth 10 Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 11 Under the Monell doctrine, municipalities may be liable under § 1983 when 12 the “execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the [plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. 13 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Monell liability 14 based on custom or practice “must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 15 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 16 carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (1996). Liability cannot be 17 based solely on “isolated or sporadic incidents.” Id. 18 Defendants argue that Horne fails to identify a policy or custom that inflicted 19 her injury and that her allegations amount only to “isolated acts.” The Court 20 disagrees. The complaint identifies two theories: the “practice of silencing 21 employees who oppose its toxic workplace environment and/or report workplace 22 misconduct,” and, in the alternative, the “fail[ure] to train [the City’s] 23 1 administrative staff on discrimination and retaliation.” Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 11. Whether 2 these theories are ultimately supported by the evidence is a question for another

3 day. At the pleading stage, it is enough that the complaint identifies them and 4 alleges supporting facts. 5 And the complaint does allege supporting facts. Taking Horne’s factual 6 allegations in the light most favorable to her as the non-moving party, she has 7 alleged a viable custom or practice. The complaint includes allegations about the 8 2022 and 2025 workplace investigations showing a widespread culture of

9 silencing—or retaliating against—employees who report sex discrimination. See, 10 e.g., Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 28 (“Ms. Nelson confirmed that Ms. Horne’s reluctance to 11 complain was reasonably related to her vulnerable position as an apprentice and 12 the ‘good old boys’ culture at their workplace.”), ¶ 31 (“Importantly, if employees 13 resisted or were shunned by the ‘brotherhood,’ there were economic and social 14 consequences.”), id. (“Coworkers’ pleas to stop the harassing behavior went 15 unheeded.”). These allegations describe more than isolated acts, as Defendants

16 contend—they allege a pattern of sufficient duration and consistency to support a 17 plausible Monell claim. 18 Defendants also briefly argue causation, stating simply that the amended 19 complaint does not “plausibly allege . . . that a policy is the moving force behind the 20 alleged constitutional right violation.” Dkt. No. 17 at 22. But one could reasonably 21 infer that the custom of retaliating against employees who report sexual

22 harassment caused Horne’s injuries. Indeed, she claims that Defendants harmed 23 1 her, at least in part, by retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity 2 related to sexual harassment concerns.2

3 The Court finds that Horne has stated a plausible Monell claim. 4 2.3 The Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike in part. 5 Defendants move to strike portions of the amended complaint—paragraphs 4, 6 19, and 29 in part and paragraphs 20–28 in full. They argue that the challenged 7 allegations are (1) irrelevant because they relate to claims that Horne released 8 under the 2022 settlement agreement; (2) unfairly prejudicial or confusing; or (3) 9 covered by Washington’s mediation communications privilege. Rule 12(f) authorizes 10 the Court to strike “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). But “[m]otions to strike are disfavored given the potential for 12 use as a delay tactic and given the limited importance of pleadings in federal 13 practice.” Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Fund v. Z-Glass, Inc., No. 2:17- 14 CV-01638-JAD-NJK, 2019 WL 10733033, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 3, 2019). 15 The Court denies the motion. Beginning with Defendants’ first objection, the 16 Court finds that allegations related to Horne’s prior complaints of sexual 17 harassment and discrimination are relevant to her current claims. These 18 allegations describe the circumstances giving rise to Horne’s current retaliation 19 claims. Additionally, past incidents of discrimination and retaliation are relevant to 20 21 2 Given the findings above, Horne’s Monell claim survives regardless of whether her 22 failure-to-train theory is plausible. The Court therefore does not address that legal theory. 23 1 Horne’s Monell claim, as discussed above. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (“Liability for 2 improper custom . . . must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,

3 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 4 carrying out policy.”). 5 Regarding unfair prejudice, Defendants assert that the allegations relating to 6 released claims “create the risk that the trier of fact will draw unwarranted 7 inferences at trial.” Dkt. No. 17 at 25. But this concern is unwarranted, as the jury 8 will not see the amended complaint during trial. Nor is “unfair prejudice” a ground

9 for striking material under Rule 12(f). Defendants’ concerns about prejudice are 10 better addressed through other procedural mechanisms as the case progresses, such 11 as motions to seal or for a protective order. 12 As for Defendants’ privilege argument regarding paragraph 29’s reference to 13 mediation communications, the Court expects that any amended complaint will 14 omit mediation communications in light of Washington’s mediation privilege. See 15 RCW 7.07.030.

16 2.4 The Court denies Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s exhibit. 17 In their reply, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s exhibit identified as 18 “Non-Monetary Items for Ms. Horne that Seattle City Light created and promised 19 Plaintiff as part of the November 23, 2022, settlement.” Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 9. The Court 20 finds that Defendants have failed to establish that the mediation communication 21 privilege applies to this document, which appears to include settlement terms. Their 22 23 1 briefing contains only two conclusory sentences on this point. Dkt. No. 21 at 12. 2 Accordingly, the Court denies the motion.

3 2.5 The Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees. 4 Defendants ask that they be awarded attorneys’ fees for bringing this motion, 5 should the Court allow Horne to amend her complaint. Defendants provide no legal 6 support for their request. Accordingly, the Court denies it. See Myrick v. United 7 States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 979, 982 (D. Ariz. 2002), aff’d, 70 F. App’x 956 (9th Cir. 8 2003) (declining to “consider arguments made without legal support”). 9 3. CONCLUSION 10 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss IN PART. Dkt. No. 17. 11 The following claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE: (1) all claims 12 against individual Defendants Lindell, Maxfield, Belger, and Hansen; and (2) the 13 negligence, IIED, and NIED claims. Defendants’ motion to strike, Dkt. No. 17, is 14 granted in part. The motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. 15 Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint within TWENTY-ONE (21) 16 days of this order. Any amended complaint should: (1) allege specific facts showing 17 each individual Defendant’s personal participation in the challenged post- 18 settlement conduct; (2) ensure that common-law tort claims rest on facts 19 independent of the WLAD claims, or explain why they are not duplicative; and (3) 20 omit mediation communications protected by RCW 7.07.030. 21 22 23 1 Dated this 17th day of February, 2026

° faa le — 3 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23