Camasso v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp.

689 F. Supp. 384, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6093, 1988 WL 66973
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJune 23, 1988
DocketCiv. A. 87-529, 87-559
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 689 F. Supp. 384 (Camasso v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Camasso v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 689 F. Supp. 384, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6093, 1988 WL 66973 (D. Del. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION

MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

A November, 1986 alleged outbreak of salmonella poisoning at the Hyatt Regency Cerromar (“Cerromar”) Resort located in Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, led to the filing of two lawsuits in the Delaware District against identical defendants. Defendants are Dorado Beach Hotel Corporation d/b/a Hyatt Regency Cerromar Resort, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Puerto Rico; Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Puerto Rico; and Hyatt Corporation, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. The first filed suit has twenty-three plaintiffs: twelve residents of Massachusetts, five residents of New Hampshire, four residents of Connecticut, and two residents of Maine. 1 There are seventeen private plaintiffs in the second filed suit: eleven residents of Massachusetts and six residents of Connecticut, plus one Massachusetts Corporation. 2 Defendants initially filed a motion to change venue in both civil actions to Puerto Rico pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Thereafter, perceiving potential difficulties with their legal positions on transfer, defendants filed an alternative motion in both lawsuits to sever one of the defendants or dismiss the entire action on grounds of forum non conveniens.

While the two complaints have not been consolidated, defendants’ identical motions are treated in one opinion. Defendants’ motions to transfer will be denied because these lawsuits could not “have been brought” in Puerto Rico. Defendants’ alternative motion to sever or dismiss will be denied because neither is appropriate.

1. Motion for Change of Venue

Treating the two lawsuits as one for purposes of defendants’ motion, there are *386 forty individual plaintiffs, 23 from Massachusetts, 10 from Connecticut, 5 from New Hampshire and 2 from Maine, plus a Massachusetts corporation. All three defendants are Delaware corporations with two having their principal place of business in Puerto Rico. The third defendant corporation, Hyatt Corporation, is not qualified to do business in Puerto Rico.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.

(emphasis added).

The statute sets forth three criteria which must be satisfied before transfer is appropriate: 1) it must be established that the action “might have been brought” in the transferee district; 2) a transfer must serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and 3) the interests of justice must counsel transfer. If the first criteria is not met, there can be no transfer under Section 1404, irrespective of the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. See VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 809, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964).

A prerequisite to transfer under Section 1404(a) is that the plaintiff have an unqualified right to bring the action in the transferee district. This unqualified right is satisfied only if at the time of commencement of suit venue is proper in the transferee forum and the transferee district has the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1089, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960); Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910, 91 S.Ct. 871, 27 L.Ed.2d 808 (1971). Plaintiffs do not contest venue would be proper in Puerto Rico. Similarly, plaintiffs concede two of the three defendants who do business in Puerto Rico are subject to personal jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs do assert the Puerto Rico district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the third defendant, Hyatt Corporation, because it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois, and is not qualified to do business in Puerto Rico.

Defendants have pointed to no provision in the Puerto Rico long-arm statute which would permit an assertion of personal jurisdiction by the District Court in Puerto Rico. In fact, they conceded there was no personal jurisdiction in their brief:

Based on the current record, however, defendants concede that a simple transfer of the entire case pursuant to Section 1404(a) is not possible due to the fact that it does not appear from the record that plaintiffs could have obtained personal jurisdiction over Hyatt Corporation in Puerto Rico.

Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Their Alternative Motions to Sever or Dismiss, C.A. No. 87-559, Dkt. 18 at l. 3 However, at oral argument, defendants insisted there was personal jurisdiction, because if defendant Hyatt Corporation committed the acts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint, it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. Defendants contend that, because the same set of facts govern both decisions, if there is personal jurisdiction over defendant Hyatt Corporation, it is also liable and if there is no jurisdiction, it is not liable. This obviously circular argument is totally bereft of merit. It confuses personal jurisdiction with the substantive merits.

These actions could not have been brought in Puerto Rico because there is no personal jurisdiction over Hyatt Corporation. Accordingly, Puerto Rico is not a jurisdiction where suit “might have been brought” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. *387 § 1404(a). As a consequence, the Court will enter an order denying defendants’ 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion for change of venue.

II. Motion to Sever or Dismiss

Defendants, correctly perceiving they face an insurmountable obstacle for a statutory change of venue, filed an alternative motion to sever or dismiss. Defendants seek an order directing a severance of the claims against Hyatt Corporation from the claims against the other defendants so that lawsuit would be one “which might have been brought” in Puerto Rico. Defendants also urge that if their motion to sever is denied, the entire action should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Defendants have offered several inducements to pave the way for grant of its alternative motions. If the Court were to sever and transfer, Hyatt Corporation has undertaken to file a motion to intervene in the Puerto Rico action. If the Court were to order a

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Bluebook (online)
689 F. Supp. 384, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6093, 1988 WL 66973, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/camasso-v-dorado-beach-hotel-corp-ded-1988.