Camargo Rincon v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1376
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CAMILO ANDRE CAMARGO RINCON; No. 24-1376 CLAUDIA MARCELA SANCHEZ- Agency Nos. GUZMAN; ANDRES SANTIAGO A240-887-908 CAMARGO-SANCHEZ, A240-887-909 A240-887-916 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 21, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: OWENS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and LIBURDI, District Judge.***

Camilo Camargo Rincon, his wife Claudia Sanchez Guzman, and their son

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Andres Camargo Sanchez (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of

Colombia, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and review

questions of law de novo. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir.

2020). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. An applicant who demonstrates past persecution benefits from a

presumption of future persecution, but the Department of Homeland Security may

rebut that presumption by showing the applicant can safely and reasonably internally

relocate. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019).

The record does not compel the conclusion that internal relocation would be

unsafe. Camilo testified he had no contact with Mario or his associates during the

family’s eighteen-month stay outside Bogotá. His declaration suggesting later

threats lacked a timeline and was less reliable than his clear testimony. Because the

record does not compel a contrary conclusion, we must uphold the BIA’s finding.

See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that relocation would be

reasonable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (instructing courts to consider the “totality

of the relevant circumstances”); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.

2 24-1376 2004). Although Petitioners argue relocation caused financial hardship, the BIA

reasonably considered the totality of the circumstances—including Petitioners’

youth, health, Spanish fluency, and Camilo’s history of self-employment and

education—and concluded relocation remained feasible.

2. Because Petitioners failed to meet the lower burden required for

asylum, their withholding of removal claim necessarily fails. Pedro-Mateo v. INS,

224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).

3. The BIA properly rejected Petitioners’ due process claim regarding

their inability to obtain hearing transcripts. Noncitizens in removal proceedings must

show both fundamental unfairness and prejudice to allege a due process claim. See

Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioners offered

only counsel’s unsupported assertions that transcripts were unavailable, which are

not evidence. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984). Even assuming

transcript defects, we have explained that transcription problems alone do not

establish a due process violation because prejudice must be shown, and the record

can be reconstructed. See Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024);

United States v. Medina, 236 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioners failed to

show prejudice because they identified no missing facts or arguments that could have

affected the BIA’s decision.

3 24-1376 4. The BIA did not err in determining that Petitioners waived their

humanitarian asylum claim by failing to raise it before the BIA. See Alanniz v. Barr,

924 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69

F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). The BIA also determined that Petitioners waived

their CAT claim, and Petitioners do not meaningfully raise their CAT claim in their

opening brief to this court. See Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889

(9th Cir. 2018).

5. The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 24-1376