Camala Co. v. Inland Credit Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Camala Co. v. Inland Credit Corp.

161 A.D.2d 532, 556 N.Y.S.2d 484, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6520

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 29, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 161 A.D.2d 532 (Camala Co. v. Inland Credit Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Camala Co. v. Inland Credit Corp., 161 A.D.2d 532, 556 N.Y.S.2d 484, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6520 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. Greenfield, J.), entered April 5, 1989, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, to compel the deposition of defendant Stern, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Justice Greenfield, with costs.

We add only that assuming, arguendo, the parties’ 1978 participation agreement was ambiguous with respect to the payment of interest as opposed to reduction of principal, such ambiguity by itself was inadequate to defeat summary judgment. Rather, plaintiff was required to come forward with particular extrinsic evidence supporting its interpretation. (Mallad Constr. Corp. v County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 NY2d 285, 290; Sutton v East Riv. Sav. Bank, 55 NY2d 550, 554.) This plaintiff failed to do. Nor are plaintiff’s self-generated protests about defendant Plantsville’s acts and calculations, made only after the relevant agreements were executed, and abandoned three years before plaintiff commenced this action, sufficient to create any factual issues regarding its interpretation of the agreements. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Kassal, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. Greenfield, J.), entered April 5, 1989, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, to compel the deposition of defendant Stern, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Justice Greenfield, with costs.

We add only that assuming, arguendo, the parties’ 1978 participation agreement was ambiguous with respect to the payment of interest as opposed to reduction of principal, such ambiguity by itself was inadequate to defeat summary judgment. Rather, plaintiff was required to come forward with particular extrinsic evidence supporting its interpretation. (Mallad Constr. Corp. v County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 NY2d 285, 290; Sutton v East Riv. Sav. Bank, 55 NY2d 550, 554.) This plaintiff failed to do. Nor are plaintiff’s self-generated protests about defendant Plantsville’s acts and calculations, made only after the relevant agreements were executed, and abandoned three years before plaintiff commenced this action, sufficient to create any factual issues regarding its interpretation of the agreements. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Kassal, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

161 A.D.2d 532, 556 N.Y.S.2d 484, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/camala-co-v-inland-credit-corp-nyappdiv-1990.

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