Camacho (Eduardo) Vs. State

476 P.3d 437
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 13, 2020
Docket81029
StatusPublished

This text of 476 P.3d 437 (Camacho (Eduardo) Vs. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Camacho (Eduardo) Vs. State, 476 P.3d 437 (Neb. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDUARDO CAMACHO, No. 81029 Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, FILED Respondent. NOV 1 3 2020 A. BROWN PREME COB BY IEF DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Simons, Judge. Appellant Eduardo Camacho argues that the district court erred in denying his petition as procedurally barred. We affirm.' Camacho's postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed 11 years after remittitur issued on direct appeal. See NRS 34.726(1); Camacho v. State, Docket No. 49150 (Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part, and Remanding, July 14, 2008). Camacho's petition was also successive because he had previously filed several postconviction habeas petitions and an abuse of the writ because he asserted claims that had been raised in a prior petition. See NRS 34.810(2); Camacho v. Warden, Docket No. 63354 (Order of Affirmance, September 17, 2014); Carnacho v. Warden, Docket No. 55401 (Order of Affirmance, April 6, 2011). Thus, Camacho's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

'Having considered the pro se brief filed by appellant, we conclude that a response is not necessary. NRAP 46A(c). This appeal therefore has been submitted for decision based on the pro se brief and the record. See NRAP 34(0(3). Camacho does not argue that he has good cause to excuse the procedural bars. Rather, Camacho argues that the procedural bars should be excused because he is actually innocent. Actual innocence requires Camacho to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of . . . new evidence," Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001), and that he is factually innocent, see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Camacho did not identify any new evidence but instead disputes the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Cf. Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. 565, 576, 331 P.3d 867, 875 (2014) (distinguishing actual innocence and insufficient evidence claims). We therefore conclude that the district court correctly applied the mandatory procedural bars. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005). Having considered Camacho's contentions and concluded that they do not warrant relief, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

!so...717 Parraguirre

CiPtf‘49 , J. 11— O A Hardesty Cadish

cc: Hon. Lynne K. Simons, District Judge Eduardo Camacho Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney SUPREME COURT Washoe District Court Clerk OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 4(0510

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Schlup v. Delo
513 U.S. 298 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Bousley v. United States
523 U.S. 614 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Pellegrini v. State
34 P.3d 519 (Nevada Supreme Court, 2001)
State v. Eighth Judicial District Court
112 P.3d 1070 (Nevada Supreme Court, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
476 P.3d 437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/camacho-eduardo-vs-state-nev-2020.