Calvin Roundtree v. State of Florida

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 14, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-1906

Lower Tribunal No. F07-32233

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Calvin Roundtree,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle Delancy, Judge.

Calvin Roundtree, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 981 (Fla. 2025)

(“Erlinger1 was a direct-appeal case—not a postconviction case like Ford’s— and it involved required jury findings regarding an element. Based on these fundamental distinctions, it is clear that Erlinger provides no support for vacating Ford’s death sentences.”); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 394–95 (Fla. 2025) (finding postconviction review of defendant’s sentence based on Erlinger improper); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Apprendi2 was characterized as a procedural rule by the Supreme Court. Since announcing Teague,3 the Supreme Court has not given retroactive effect to any decisions announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.” (citation omitted)); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (“Ring4 announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980) (“[T]he essential considerations in determining whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively are essentially three: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance

1 Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).

2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

3 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

4 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

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on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.”); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 848 (Fla. 2005) (concluding Apprendi does not apply retroactively); Luton v. State, 934 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (concluding issue was not preserved because defendant did not object and jury, not judge, must determine his HVFO qualifications); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1) (“A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief. . . .”); Jackson v. State, 803 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (“To raise an illegal sentence claim under Rule 3.800(a), 1) the error must have resulted in an illegal sentence, 2) the error must appear on the face of the record, and 3) the motion must affirmatively allege that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief.” (quotations and alterations omitted)); see also Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla. 2014) (“A claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely 5 is subject to a harmless error analysis.”); see, e.g., Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Relief under rule 3.800(a) is precluded where an evidentiary determination is required. For this reason, Appellant could not demonstrate

5 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

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entitlement to relief under rule 3.800(a) without citing to facts established in the trial transcript or otherwise apparent on the face of the record.” (citation omitted)).