NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0547n.06
Case No. 25-5334
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 25, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) CALVIN LYNDELL DIBRELL, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ROGER REX, JR., ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION )
Before: BATCHELDER, GILMAN, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Police officer Roger Rex, Jr. arrested Calvin
Lyndell Dibrell for driving with a suspended Tennessee driver’s license and for resisting arrest.
Dibrell contends, however, that his license was not lawfully suspended. Although a grand jury
later indicted Dibrell on both offenses, the charges were subsequently dropped by the prosecutor.
Dibrell then brought suit against Rex, the Alcoa Police Department, and the City of Alcoa
(collectively, Defendants), alleging that they had wrongfully arrested and prosecuted him.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims except Dibrell’s
claim against Rex under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution. Following discovery, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of Rex on the remaining claim. Dibrell now appeals
both rulings. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
I. BACKGROUND
Rex is a police officer employed by the Alcoa Police Department, which serves the City of
Alcoa, Tennessee. On July 9, 2018, Rex responded to a report from employees at the Regions
Bank in Alcoa concerning a man acting suspiciously. Although the man left before Rex arrived,
Rex obtained enough information to identify him as Dibrell. Rex then conducted a records check,
which revealed that Dibrell’s driver’s license had been suspended since October 30, 2016 for
failure to pay court fines and costs.
Two days later, Rex received another report that Dibrell had returned to the Regions Bank.
When Rex arrived, Dibrell was sitting in his vehicle parked at the bank, outside of any marked
parking spot. Rex approached the vehicle, asked for Dibrell’s identification, and inquired why he
was parked there. Dibrell answered that he was at the bank to conduct business. Rex then informed
Dibrell that his license was suspended. Dibrell responded that he was “waiting on some paperwork
to come back from the courthouse to get all that worked out.”
Rex, joined by a second officer, Officer Michael Westfield, then ordered Dibrell to step
out of his vehicle. When the officers attempted to handcuff Dibrell, he began to resist arrest. The
officers repeatedly instructed Dibrell to stop resisting and warned him that Officer Westfield would
tase him if he did not comply. When Dibrell continued to resist, Officer Westfield deployed his
taser. Additional officers arrived on the scene, and, despite Dibrell’s continued resistance, they
were eventually able to place him in handcuffs. Dibrell was then transported to the Blount County
Jail.
Following the arrest, Rex filed two Affidavits of Complaint against Dibrell in the General
Sessions Court of Blount County. The first charged Dibrell with driving on a suspended license,
and the second charged Dibrell with resisting arrest. On February 28, 2019, the General Sessions
-2- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
Court held a preliminary hearing, during which Rex testified that, at the time of his arrest, Dibrell’s
license was suspended. The judge ultimately found probable cause for both charges and bound
the matter over to the grand jury for further proceedings. After hearing the evidence, including
Rex’s testimony, the grand jury found probable cause to believe that Dibrell had driven with a
suspended license and had resisted arrest. It thus indicted him on both charges on April 1, 2019.
In a separate lawsuit, a district court in the Middle District of Tennessee issued a
memorandum decision in July of 2018 holding that Tennessee’s policy of revoking driver’s
licenses for failure to timely pay court debts was unconstitutional. See Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F.
Supp. 3d 475, 491–94 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. Thomas v.
Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019). Pursuant to that decision, the Commissioner of the
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security agreed to “continue his cessation of
driver’s license revocations for nonpayment of court debt” and to “administratively lift all
revocations for nonpayment of court debt.”
Rex testified during his deposition that at some time after Dibrell’s arrest, he learned of
this policy change regarding license suspensions for unpaid court debt. But he could not recall
when he learned of this policy change or whether he knew of it when he testified before the grand
jury.
In January 2022, the charges against Dibrell were dismissed. Dibrell then commenced this
lawsuit against Defendants in June 2022, asserting numerous federal and state causes of action. In
February 2024, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims except
Dibrell’s § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim against Rex. Thereafter, in March 2025, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Rex on the remaining claim. This timely appeal followed.
-3- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
“When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure], we review the district court’s decision de novo.” Booth Fam. Tr. v. Jeffries, 640 F.3d
134, 139 (6th Cir. 2011). “We construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[],
accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and decide whether the plaintiff[] can prove
any set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief.” Lindsay v. Yates, 498
F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2007).
“Similarly, we review de novo a grant of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.” Booth,
640 F.3d at 139. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “When evaluating a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must construe
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 683 (6th
Cir. 2017). A party opposing a properly supported summary-judgment motion, however, “may
not rest upon mere allegation[s] or denials of [her] pleading, but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256
(1986).
B. The district court did not err in dismissing the majority of Dibrell’s claims
1. Fraudulent-misrepresentation and malicious-harassment claims
We start by considering the district court’s dismissal order. Dibrell first contends that
Defendants did not move to dismiss, and that the district court’s decision failed to address, his
claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and malicious harassment. We are not persuaded.
Defendants moved to dismiss Dibrell’s complaint “in its entirety.” And the district court’s order
-4- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
explicitly ruled that “to the extent [Dibrell] intended to” “raise false or fraudulent
misrepresentation and malicious harassment claims in his Amended Complaint,” “he failed to state
a claim.”
The district court did not err in so ruling. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,
a plaintiff must allege that
1) the defendant made a representation of an existing or past fact; 2) the representation was false when made; 3) the representation was in regard to a material fact; 4) the false representation was made either knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly; 5) plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresented material fact; and 6) plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the misrepresentation.
Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Metro.
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County v. McKinney, 852 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).
Dibrell’s Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendants made any false representations to
him, or that he relied on any such misrepresentations. Indeed, the only misrepresentations that
Defendants allegedly made were to third parties, not to Dibrell himself. The Amended Complaint
thus fails to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
Dibrell’s malicious-harassment claim fares no better.
[A] claim of malicious harassment requires not only that a person acted maliciously, i.e., ill-will, hatred or spite, but also that a person unlawfully intimidated another from the free exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional right by injuring or threatening to injure or coercing another person or by damaging, destroying or defacing any real or personal property of another person.
Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tenn. 2000). Dibrell’s Amended
Complaint does not identify any constitutional right that Defendants prevented him from
exercising or enjoying. In fact, its only references to malicious harassment are in paragraphs 17
and 31, which simply assert with no supporting facts that Defendants “maliciously harass[ed]”
Dibrell. Such “bare assertion[s]” are not sufficient to state a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
-5- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of
Dibrell’s fraudulent-misrepresentation and malicious-harassment claims.
2. Time-barred claims
Dibrell next challenges the district court’s ruling that the statute of limitations bars his
claims against Rex under § 1983 for excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment, and for
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee state law. He argues that these claims
did not accrue, and the statute of limitations did not begin running, until January 31, 2022, when
the charges against him were dismissed.
Dibrell is mistaken. The statute of limitations for Dibrell’s § 1983 claims is one year. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (imposing a one-year statute of limitations for actions
“brought under the federal civil rights statutes”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (directing courts to
apply state-law statutes of limitations to § 1983 claims). To determine when the statute of
limitations begins to run on a § 1983 claim, we look to “what event should have alerted the typical
lay person to protect his or her rights.” Beaver St. Invs., LLC v. Summit County, 65 F.4th 822, 826
(6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir.
1997)).
Here, the event that would have alerted Dibrell to his excessive-force claim was the July
11, 2018 arrest in which the excessive force allegedly occurred. See, e.g., Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d
227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)
(“A § 1983 claim for excessive force in effectuating an arrest accrues at the time of arrest.”).
Dibrell’s false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims, on the other hand, accrued once legal process
was issued against him—i.e., either when his charges were bound over to the grand jury on
-6- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
February 28, 2019, or, at the latest, when the grand jury indicted him on April 1, 2019. See, e.g.,
Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that false-arrest and
false-imprisonment claims “accrue when the false imprisonment ends with the issuance of legal
process—when, for example, the plaintiff is brought before a magistrate” (emphasis in original)
(citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90 (2007))). Each of these events occurred more than
one year before Dibrell commenced this action on June 8, 2022. And Dibrell cites no authority
for his argument that the statute of limitations was somehow tolled until the charges against him
were dismissed. Accordingly, these § 1983 claims are untimely.
Dibrell’s state-law tort claims are similarly time-barred. Like the § 1983 claims, these tort
claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A)
(imposing a one-year statute of limitations for “[a]ctions for . . . injuries to the person [and] false
imprisonment”); see also Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tenn. 2004) (explaining that
“personal injury tort[s]” are “governed by the general one-year statute of limitations”). The
Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “in tort actions, . . . the cause of action accrues and the
statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when in the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered.” McCroskey v. Bryant
Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1975).
Dibrell’s claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress are all based on his July 11, 2018 arrest. His injuries therefore
occurred and were discovered on that date. Tennessee law is less clear on precisely when Dibrell’s
state-law false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims accrued. In Gray v. 26th Jud. Drug Task
Force, No. 02A01-9609-CV-00218, 1997 WL 379141, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1997), the
Tennessee Court of Appeal held that “claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue[] on .
-7- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
. . the date of [the] arrest.” This would mean that Dibrell’s claims accrued on July 11, 2018. In
Lovell v. Warren County, No. M201900582COAR3CV, 2019 WL 6842380, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 2019), by contrast, the same court ruled that false-imprisonment claims under
Tennessee law are subject to the same accrual rules as corresponding claims under § 1983. See
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (holding that false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims accrue “when
legal process was initiated against” the plaintiff). This would mean that Dibrell’s claims accrued
no later than when he was indicted on April 1, 2019.
We need not decide which case correctly applies Tennessee law because Dibrell’s claims
are untimely under either rule. Both Dibrell’s arrest and his indictment occurred more than one
year before he commenced this action. And Dibrell once again fails to support his argument that
the statute of limitations was tolled until the charges against him were dismissed.
We note that there is language in Lovell suggesting that, contrary to the rule in Wallace,
the statute of limitations on a Tennessee false-imprisonment claim runs from the date of release of
custody. Contrast Lovell, 2019 WL 6842380, at *3 (“[W]e hold that a false imprisonment cause
of action does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the termination
of the imprisonment alleged.”), with Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390 (“[P]etitioner’s contention that his
false imprisonment ended upon his release from custody, after the State dropped the charges
against him, must be rejected.”). But to the extent that Lovell accurately reflects Tennessee law,
Dibrell’s claims are still untimely. Ms. Lovell was held in jail from her arrest until the local district
attorney general dismissed the charges against her. Lovell, 2019 WL 6842380, at *1. Dibrell, on
the other hand, was released on bond by February 2019 at the latest, so his situation implicates
none of Lovell’s concerns regarding “access to the courts.” Id. at *3. Consequently, Dibrell’s
state-law claims, like his § 1983 claims, are untimely.
-8- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
3. Malicious prosecution under Tennessee law
Dibrell also contests the district court’s ruling that he failed to state a claim for malicious
prosecution under Tennessee law. “To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant (1) instituted a proceeding against him ‘without probable cause,’ (2) ‘with
malice,’ and (3) that the proceeding ‘terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.’” Mynatt v. Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting Parrish v. Marquis, 172
S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tenn. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d
35 (Tenn. 2012)). The Tennessee Supreme Court has determined that “plaintiffs can pursue a
claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents
disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the
underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of
the accused.” Id. at 743.
The district court correctly observed that Dibrell’s Amended Complaint lacks any
allegations that the criminal case against him was terminated due to his innocence. Accordingly,
the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution under Tennessee law.
Dibrell nevertheless argues that the court should have inferred that the termination of his criminal
case was due to his innocence because he filed motions maintaining his innocence and because the
prosecutor dismissed the criminal case with prejudice. But neither of these allegations is present
in the Amended Complaint. See Berry v. United States Dep’t of Lab., 832 F.3d 627, 637 (6th Cir.
2016) (explaining that “at the motion-to-dismiss stage[,] . . . our review is typically limited to the
complaint’s allegations”).
And even if these facts were alleged, they fail to support an inference that the dismissal
was based on Dibrell being innocent of driving with a suspended license and of resisting arrest.
-9- No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
The burden lay with Dibrell to show that the dismissal was based on his innocence, but he failed
to do so. See Mynatt, 669 S.W.3d at 752 (“[T]here are numerous reasons why a prosecutor might
decide to dismiss a case.”). The district court thus did not err in dismissing his state-law malicious-
prosecution claim.
4. Remaining claims
Finally, the district court dismissed Dibrell’s claims against Rex under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
and under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as all of his claims against the Alcoa Police
Department and the City of Alcoa. Although Dibrell’s Opening Brief purports to appeal the court’s
dismissal order in its entirety, he offers no specific argument as to these claims. Any challenge to
their dismissal is therefore forfeited. See Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946
(6th Cir. 2022) (“[I]n instances where ‘issues are adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,’ we consider them forfeited.”
(cleaned up) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997))).
C. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Rex on Dibrell’s claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rex on Dibrell’s
§ 1983 malicious-prosecution claim. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that
(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff, and the defendant made[,] influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, as understood under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Sanders v.
Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2017), judgment vacated on other grounds, 583 U.S. 1047
- 10 - No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
(2018)). Here, the district court held that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether the state had probable cause to prosecute Dibrell. Dibrell contends otherwise.
We have held that a “grand jury’s finding [of probable cause in a criminal proceeding]
creates a presumption of probable cause in later proceedings under § 1983.” Lester v. Roberts,
986 F.3d 599, 608 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, the fact that the grand jury indicted Dibrell presumptively
dooms his malicious-prosecution claim. But we have explained that “plaintiffs could defeat the
presumption by proving that the defendant knowingly or recklessly made false statements to the
grand jury.” Id. And although witnesses are normally entitled to absolute immunity for their
testimony before a grand jury, see Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367–70 (2012), Rex cannot
claim that defense because he failed to affirmatively plead it, see Lester, 986 F.3d at 609 (noting
that “absolute immunity must be affirmatively pleaded, or it is forfeited” (quoting Parnell v. City
of Detroit, 786 F. App’x 43, 47 n.3 (6th Cir. 2019))). Accordingly, the relevant question we must
resolve is whether Dibrell has presented sufficient evidence to prove that Rex knowingly or
recklessly made false statements to the grand jury.
We conclude that he did not. Dibrell argues that Rex lied when he testified before the
grand jury because he knew that Dibrell’s license had been unlawfully suspended—meaning he
knew that there was no probable cause to prosecute Dibrell for driving on a suspended license or
for resisting arrest. But this theory rests on the premise that Rex learned that Dibrell’s license was
not lawfully suspended prior to the February 2019 preliminary hearing in the Grand Sessions Court
and the grand jury proceedings roughly a month later. None of the evidence offered by Dibrell,
however, supports this unfounded premise.
Dibrell first points to the Middle District of Tennessee decision that he claims outlawed
the suspension of driver’s licenses for unpaid court debt. But even if he were correct that this order
- 11 - No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
rendered the suspension of his license unlawful, it does not show that Rex knew of this fact prior
to testifying before the grand jury. Dibrell cites a July 5, 2018 news article to argue that the change
in law was reported by the media well before Rex’s testimony. Nothing in the record, however,
suggests that Rex was ever aware of this reporting. Dibrell’s attempt to infer Rex’s knowledge
from this evidence is thus too speculative to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See K.V.G.
Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 900 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is well-established in
our case law that a party may not avoid summary judgment by resorting to ‘speculation, conjecture,
or fantasy.’” (quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004))).
Dibrell next cites Rex’s deposition testimony that he met with the state prosecutor prior to
the February 2019 preliminary hearing, and that he learned at some time after Dibrell’s arrest that
Tennessee had stopped suspending licenses for unpaid court debt. Dibrell contends that this
testimony implies that Rex must have been informed of the change in law when he testified before
the grand jury in April of 2019. But Rex explicitly stated that he could not recall when he learned
of the law being changed. And nothing in the record indicates that Rex ever discussed the change
in the law with the state prosecutor during their meeting. Once again, Dibrell relies on speculation
and conjecture, which are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See id.
Finally, Dibrell points to objections that were raised when he previously questioned Rex
about his knowledge of Tennessee’s law being changed. At the preliminary hearing, the General
Sessions Court sustained an evidentiary objection to a question by Dibrell’s counsel asking
whether Rex knew of the change at the time of Dibrell’s arrest. And at Rex’s deposition, Rex’s
counsel objected to questions concerning “what went on in [the] grand jury proceeding.” Dibrell
argues that Rex’s knowledge of the law being changed can be inferred from these objections to the
questions by Dibrell’s counsel. But Dibrell cites no authority—and we are aware of none—
- 12 - No. 25-5334, Dibrell v. Rex
permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from a sustained evidentiary objection. Nor may any
adverse inference be drawn from Rex’s refusal to disclose confidential information about the
grand-jury proceedings because such disclosure is prohibited by Tennessee law. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-12-209(a)(3) (criminalizing disclosure of “matters occurring before the grand jury”).
Accordingly, these objections are not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
Rex’s knowledge of the law having been changed prior to his grand-jury testimony.
In sum, Dibrell has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Rex “knowingly
or recklessly made false statements to the grand jury.” Lester, 986 F.3d at 608. Dibrell thus cannot
overcome the presumption, arising from the fact of his indictment, that the state had probable cause
to prosecute him. The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
of Rex on Dibrell’s malicious-prosecution claim.
This leaves Dibrell’s alternative theory of malicious prosecution—that Rex “continued or
substantially assisted in the continued prosecution of [Dibrell] after probable cause no longer
existed.” But the malicious-prosecution theory set forth in Dibrell’s Amended Complaint was that
Rex “testified against Plaintiff, knowing that Plaintiff did not violate any laws.” Dibrell never
raised his “continued-prosecution” theory until he filed his opposition to Rex’s motion for
summary judgment. As the district court correctly observed, “‘[i]t is well-settled that a plaintiff
may not expand [his] claims’ by asserting ‘new theories in response to [a defendant’s] summary
judgment’ motion.” See Renner v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. App’x 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2013). We
accordingly decline to consider this alternative theory now.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
- 13 -