Calvert v. Young

200 F. Supp. 52, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2866
District Court, S.D. West Virginia·Decided December 19, 1961·No. Civ. A. No. 1071·Published

Opinion

HARRY E. WATKINS, District Judge.

This is an automobile accident case tried by the Court without a jury. John Calvert and Eunice Calvert, the plaintiffs in this action, are husband and wife and reside in Proctorville, Ohio. All defendants reside in Cabell County, West Virginia, except Burgess Rowe, who resides in Wayne County, West Virginia. The defendants T. Edward Young, Philip E. Rice, Dorothy M. Buzek and Donald B. Kelly are partners doing business as Black Diamond Fruit & Produce Company.

The accident in question occurred July 28, 1960, at approximately 1:30 p. m., at the intersection of U. S. Route 60 with Fourteenth Street (Oak Street) in the City of Kenova, West Virginia. At that point U. S. Route 60 is a four lane highway of concrete construction, two lanes eastbound and two lanes westbound. These lanes are separated by a concrete island except in the intersection. Fourteenth Street runs north and south, crossing Route 60, and at this intersection traffic is controlled by an overhead elec[53] trical signal light. This traffic light at the scene of the accident was properly installed and was in proper operation at the time of the accident. At the time of the accident the weather was clear and the pavement was dry.

On July 28, 1960, Eunice Calvert was 61 years of age and John Calvert was 67 years of age. John Calvert was driving a 1953 Plymouth 4-door sedan and his wife was riding in the front seat as a passenger. They were proceeding west over Route 60 and traveling from the direction of Huntington and going toward Catlettsburg, Kentucky.

At the place and time of the accident defendant, Burgess Rowe, age 32, an employee of Black Diamond Fruit & Produce Company, while acting within the scope of his employment, was driving a 1958 International 2-ton van-body truck, with something like a half load of produce, in a westerly direction on Route 60, i. e., from Huntington toward Catletts-burg, Kentucky. He was alone in the truck and was traveling immediately to the rear of the Plymouth automobile occupied by the plaintiffs, both vehicles traveling in the same direction.

The collision occurred when the front of defendant’s truck collided with the rear of the Plymouth. Burgess Rowe, the driver of the truck, was not injured. Both Eunice and John Calvert were removed from the scene of the accident by ambulance and were taken to St. Mary’s Hospital in Huntington, W. Va. John Calvert was treated and released. Eunice Calvert was admitted to the hospital and remained there from July 28, 1960, to September 5, 1960, six weeks and three days. As a result of this accident John Calvert incurred towing and medical expenses in the amount of $97.07, and the damage to his car amounted to $150.00. Eunice Calvert incurred medical expenses totalling $1102.52. All of the foregoing facts have been agreed upon by the parties.

John Calvert, being retired, was kept from no gainful employment by reason of the accident. Eunice Calvert made $15.00 per week babysitting. She was unable to do this from the time of the accident (July 28, 1960) until December 2, 1960, a total of eighteen weeks or a loss of $270.00 in wages. During the hospitalization and recuperation of his wife at home, John Calvert was required to do all the domestic chores which would normally be done by his wife.

As to the specific details of the accident and damages resulting therefrom, the Calvert car was traveling between 25 and 30 miles per hour and was 25 to 30 feet east of the intersection when John Calvert first observed the traffic light change to yellow. Earlier he had observed that the light was green, and he knew that the change to yellow meant that the next change would be to red. Upon seeing this change to yellow, he applied his brakes and gradually coasted to a stop as the light turned red. The Calvert car was fully stopped at the red light for at least five seconds when the truck driven by Rowe crashed into the rear of the Calvert car. Rowe admitted that when he was about three car lengths (approximately 54 feet) back, approaching the traffic light, he saw the light change from green to yellow. When he observed this change he estimated that the car in front of him, the Calvert car, was about 27 feet from the light. He admitted that when he saw the light turn from green to yellow, he could have applied his brakes and stopped without hitting the Calvert car. He stated thát he did not slow down because he thought that both he and the Calvert car could make it through the intersection before the light changed to red. He stated that he thought the Calvert car was going, and should have gone, on through the intersection.

There are three main points of conflict in the testimony about the accident, two of which are of no consequence. The Calverts said they were in the left lane of the two-lane portion of the highway used by westbound traffic when they were hit, and that their car was propelled about 60 feet across the intersection. Rowe testified that the collision occurred in the right lane and that the car only [54] went about 20 feet across the intersection. But there is no question that both vehicles were in the same lane when the collision occurred and that the Calvert car was knocked some distance through the intersection. The discrepancies as to details are, therefore, of little importance. The final point of conflict concerns the operation of the brake lights on the Calvert car. The Calverts testified that these lights were in perfect working order, while Rowe testified that thé brake lights never came on. This was the main reason Rowe assigned for not thinking that the Calverts were going to stop. This explanation avails him little, however, since, notwithstanding the condition of the brake lights, the traffic light at the intersection gave a clear indication that a stop would be required, and he could, or should have, seen that the Calvert car was slowing down to stop in obedience to the overhead traffic control light. He had no reasonable cause to believe that the Calvert car would take the chance of running through a yellow light that would probably be red before that car reached the intersection.

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Calvert v. Young, 200 F. Supp. 52, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2866 (S.D.W. Va. 1961).

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