Calloway Estate Trust, by and through its and Trustee, Calloway IV, Jesse v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: C.A. No. 2025-0907-CDW
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CALLOWAY ESTATE TRUST, ) by and through its Executor and ) Trustee, Calloway IV, Jesse, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No. 2025-0907-CDW v. ) ) MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

WHEREAS:

A. On August 1, 2025, Jesse Calloway (“Applicant”), purportedly

on behalf of an alter ego entity called the “Calloway Estate Trust” (“Alter Ego

Entity”), submitted to the Register in Chancery a verified complaint

(“Complaint”) against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and an application for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (“First IFP Application”).

B. On August 7, the court denied the First IFP Application:

Applicant did not complete the First IFP Application using Applicant’s own

information as required by Title 10, Section 8802(b) of the Delaware Code,

and instead purported to complete the First IFP Application on behalf of the

Alter Ego Entity. See Order Den. Mot. for Leave to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis, Docket Item 1 (“First IFP Order”) ¶ I. C. As the court explained in the First IFP Order, “our laws do not

recognize Applicant’s attempt to use the Alter Ego Entity—a fiction—as

something separate from Applicant in order to exempt Applicant from federal,

state, and local laws.” Id. ¶¶ E, H. So the court disregarded the Alter Ego

Entity and denied the First IFP Application. Id. ¶¶ H, 1.

D. On August 18, Applicant filed a new application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (“Second IFP Application”). In the Second IFP

Application, Applicant says (1) he is not employed and has no income because

(purportedly) everything he does is “solely in fiduciary capacity as Executor

& Trustee of Calloway Estate Trust,” (2) he has no property because

(purportedly) “all Property is held in trust,” and (3) he has “Minimal Personal

expenses” because (purportedly) the “trust covers operational obligations.” In

short, Applicant says, “[n]o personal assets, property[,] or real property [are]

held by me. All assets, real property, or personal property [are] held in and

by trust.” At the top of every page Applicant has added the words “Submitted

under protest and with full reservation of rights, UCC 1-308, Executor &

Trustee, not Surety.”1

1 Accompanying the Second IFP Application is a declaration from Applicant in which he asserts his exceptions to the First IFP Order and attaches four documents Applicant describes as follows: (1) “Military Power of Attorney (MPOA)”; (2) “Ecclesiastical Deed Poll”; (3) “Twelve Maxims of Equity”; and (4) “Scriptural Foundation of Authority.” The court does not address the substance of the

–2– IT IS ORDERED, this 19th day of August, 2025, that:

1. The Second IFP Application is DENIED.

2. The Second IFP Application fails because, like the First IFP

Application, it is based on a fiction—that Applicant and the Alter Ego Entity

are separate things. They are not.

3. If Applicant wants the court to evaluate his eligibility to proceed

in forma pauperis in the way that Title 10, Section 8802 allows, he must

submit an in forma pauperis application that includes all of his financial

information, none of it hidden behind the veil of his fictional Alter Ego Entity.

4. Because the court denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis

under Title 10, Section 8802(b), the court has not reviewed the Complaint

exceptions here because they are premature, as the First IFP Order was not yet a final report under Court of Chancery Rule 144. See First IFP Order ¶ 3; see also Ct. Ch. R. 144(c)(2)(A) (“A party may take exceptions to any Report only after entry of the Final Report.”). The court does note Applicant incorrectly asserts in the exceptions that he already paid the $474 filing fee that would be due if he is not granted in forma pauperis status: The Final Report fails to address that the filing fee was tendered via a lawful, negotiable instrument—a Promissory Note—in compliance with UCC 1-103, UCC 3-603, and UCC 3-604, which Delaware has codified under Title 6. This tender constituted full payment and satisfaction of the obligation to pay court costs. The Court’s refusal to accept the Promissory Note, without lawful cause, constitutes a dishonor of tender, a breach of commercial law, and an impairment of the obligation of contracts, in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.

–3– under Title 10, Section 8803 to determine if the Complaint is factually or

legally frivolous or malicious.2

5. As with the First IFP Order, if Applicant wishes to continue this

case, then Applicant has three options:

a. Applicant may submit a third application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis using Applicant’s own personal and

financial information, as Title 10, Section 8802(b) requires, without

trying to treat Applicant and the Alter Ego Entity as separate entities

and trying to shield Applicant’s income, assets, and expenses by

claiming they belong to the Alter Ego Entity. The court will then

review the third application to determine whether it complies with Title

10, Chapter 8802, and, if it does, the court will then review the

Complaint under Title 10, Section 8803 to determine if the Complaint

is factually or legally frivolous. If Applicant chooses this option,

Applicant must file the new in forma pauperis application by

September 4, 2025, and it will be Applicant’s final opportunity to file a

valid in forma pauperis application for this Complaint.

2 See 10 Del. C. § 8803. The court does not review a complaint under Section 8803(b) to determine if it is factually or legally frivolous or malicious unless and until the court first issues an order under Section 8803(a) granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

–4– b. Applicant may accept the denial of the First IFP

Application and Second IFP Application and pay the $474.00 filing fee

in the form of Federal Reserve notes or circulating coins produced by

the United States Mint (i.e., cash), or a personal check, certified check,

or money order, which must be denominated in U.S. dollars. If

Applicant chooses this option, Applicant must pay the filing fee by

September 4, 2025.

c. Applicant may choose neither of the foregoing options and

instead take exceptions to this order and the First IFP Order under Court

of Chancery Rule 144. If Applicant chooses neither of the foregoing

options, the Complaint will be rejected, this matter will be considered

closed, and this order will become a final report on September 4, 2025.

After September 4, Applicant may file exceptions to this order and to

the First IFP Order under Court of Chancery Rule 144, which must be

submitted by 5:00 p.m. on September 15, 2025.

/s/ Christian Douglas Wright Magistrate in Chancery

–5–