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TACHICA CALLAHAN v. ICARE HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 48286)
Suarez, Wilson and Bishop, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff, a certified nursing assistant formerly employed by the defendant , appealed from the Compensation Review Board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge, who had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for benefits pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c) because the plaintiff did not file her claims within one year of sustaining her alleged injuries. She claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge’s determination that her alleged injuries did not constitute an occupational disease as defined by statute (§ 31-275 (15)) and for which the limitation period was three years. Held:
The board correctly affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge, as the administrative law judge correctly determined that the Workers’ Compensation Commission lacked jurisdiction because the claims were not filed within the one year filing period under § 31-294c, the plaintiff having failed to establish that her alleged injuries resulted from an occupational disease pursuant to § 31-275 (15), and, thus, were subject to a three year limitation period.
Argued March 23—officially released August 25, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the administrative law judge for the Second District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for benefits, brought to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Tachica Callahan, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Christopher J. Buccini, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Tachica Callahan, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), affirming the decision of the administrative law judge for the Second District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission ) dismissing her claims for benefits from the named defendant, iCare Health Management, LLC (iCare), and its workers’ compensation insurer,1 on the ground that they were time barred under General Statutes § 31-294c2 because the plaintiff failed to file her workers’ compensation claims within one year of sustaining her claimed injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge’s determination that the plaintiff’s claimed injuries did not constitute an occupational disease as defined by General Statutes § 31-275 (15)3 and that her claims, therefore, were not subject to the three year limitation period in § 31-294c (a).4 We reject the plaintiff’s claim and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.
The following procedural history and facts, as found by the administrative law judge or otherwise undisputed in 1 Memic Indemnity Company (Memic) is the workers’ compensation insurer for iCare Health Management, LLC, and is also a defendant in this appeal. Hereinafter, we refer to Memic and iCare collectively as the defendants and individually by name when appropriate.
2 General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: “No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury . . . .”
3 General Statutes § 31-275 (15) provides: “ ‘Occupational disease’
includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment.”
4 The plaintiff’s brief is not a model of clarity. In her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff listed thirteen claims in her statement of issues. We have reframed and condensed the claims to more accurately reflect the arguments set forth in the body of the plaintiff’s brief. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
We further note that the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief does not contain any meaningful analysis of her final claim regarding the board’s denial of her motion to submit additional medical evidence. Accordingly , we decline to review it. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to the record, are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff worked for iCare as a certified nursing assistant from December 31, 2015, through October 24, 2017. On June 19, 2017, the plaintiff sustained injuries to her lumbar spine and her left hip due to a work-related “lifting incident.”5 In 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action. The plaintiff filed eight “separate form 30Cs6 between January 28, 2020, and November 17, 2022, alleging various injuries, including left hip, left side, left labral tear, neck, cervical spine, back, right side, base of skull, pelvis and hips with date[s] of injury ranging from [October 2, 2017] through [February 28, 2020] . . . .” (Footnote added.) She testified before the administrative law judge that her symptoms had progressed since the initial June 19, 2017 injury. The defendants filed a form 437 contesting liability as to each of the claims.
On May 1, 2023, the administrative law judge held a formal hearing solely to determine whether the plaintiff’s this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens, 235 Conn. App. 482, 484 n.2, 345 A.3d 489 (2025).
5 The plaintiff filed a claim for this injury, dated October 31, 2017.
This claim was settled on November 19, 2019, by a full and final stipulation agreement. 6 “A form 30C is the form prescribed by the [commission] for use in filing a notice of [a workers’ compensation] claim . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fieldhouse v. Regency Coachworks, Inc., 213 Conn. App. 662, 666 n.2, 279 A.3d 195, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 906, 282 A.3d 981 (2022).
7 “A form 43 is a disclaimer that notifies a claimant who seeks workers’ compensation benefits that the employer intends to contest liability to pay compensation. If an employer fails timely to file a form 43, a claimant may file a motion to preclude the employer from contesting the compensability of his claim. . . . The form 43 generally must be filed within twenty-eight days of receiving written notice of the claim.”
alleged injuries constituted an occupational disease as defined in § 31-275 (15), subject to the three year limitation period set forth in § 31-294c (a) and, if so, whether the plaintiff filed her claims in a timely fashion to establish subject matter jurisdiction under § 31-294c of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The administrative law judge found that “the plaintiff’s position [at the hearing was] that she suffered a sequela of the original injury and now has an occupational disease of the left hip osteoarthritis.”
At the hearing before the administrative law judge, the plaintiff specifically testified: “I believe I suffered as sequelae injur[ies] up until this point. And, now I have a[n] occupational disease, which is [osteoarthritis]. . . . And I need a total hip replacement to cure the problems and hopefully restore full function.” As to the nature of her work duties, the plaintiff testified that “the gist of it is the job is a manual laborer job. You do a lot of heavy lifting, patients or clients can be up to 200 pounds.” When asked by the administrative law judge why the plaintiff believed her condition qualified as an occupational disease, the plaintiff referred to the “progression of a disease,” and stated that, “if the job description and the type of work that you do aggravates the preexisting condition, it is considered compensable.” Then, when the administrative law judge asked the plaintiff how her osteoarthritis was peculiar to her employment as a certified nursing assistant, the plaintiff testified that she had an occupational disease “[b]ecause, when you lift and transfer, you’re using your hips, that’s the bulk of it. Lifting and transferring is a severe . . . you have to be very . . . precise in trying to lift and transfer somebody. You know, you have to use your hips, you have to use your knees, you have to use bending tactics, it’s not an easy task . . . .” Finally, the administrative law judge asked the plaintiff how her position as a certified nursing assistant was different from other manual labor jobs, and (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woodbury-Correa v. Reflexite Corp., 190 Conn. App. 623, 626 n.3, 212 A.3d 252 (2019); see also General Statutes § 31-294c (b).
the plaintiff testified: “I think those who are bricklayers, a mason, or you know, those type of people, they use tools and everything. . . . [A]s a [certified nursing assistant], I am physically taking my hands 66 percent of the shift, and I am moving human bodies to or from the bed to the toilet to the dining hall on a Hoyer lift, off a Hoyer lift.”
The plaintiff also submitted exhibits into evidence, including voluminous medical records. These records included, inter alia, a letter dated August 7, 2021, which was authored by Romero Santiago and Carrie Redlich, physicians with Yale Occupational and Environmental Medicine, who noted that the plaintiff had sustained a work-related injury in June 2017 and that her left hip labral tear and associated left hip osteoarthritis, in addition to her back pain, were work-related. The defendants submitted a form completed by Redlich titled “Physician ’s Report of Occupational Disease,” which noted that the plaintiff had sustained low back and hip pain beginning in June 2017, and noted that the exposure was “acute.” The defendants also submitted a report from Vincent Williams of UConn Health dated December 7, 2020, in which Williams opined that the plaintiff’s injuries were degenerative in nature and were not related to the type of work she did.
On November 30, 2023, the administrative law judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits. The administrative law judge found that “[t]he [plaintiff] submitted numerous medical reports attesting to her ongoing left hip osteoarthritis symptoms and the need for [a] left hip replacement, none of which specifically addresses how her left hip osteoarthritis , and any other injuries, are distinctively associated with or peculiar to her occupation as a [certified nursing assistant] with [iCare].” The administrative law judge concluded that the plaintiff “failed to prove that her alleged injuries were peculiar or more likely to be caused by her occupation as a certified nursing assistant than would other kinds of manual labor employment carried out under the same circumstances.” Furthermore, the administrative law judge found that each of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries “more closely resemble[d] . . . repetitive trauma injur[ies] . . . .” Therefore, the administrative law judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that they were time barred because they were not filed within the one year limitation period contained in § 31-294c (a).
The plaintiff filed a petition for review of the administrative law judge’s findings and dismissal. Subsequently, on November 22, 2024, the board issued a memorandum of decision in which it affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff ’s claims. The board concluded that “the administrative law judge could have reasonably determined that the injuries alleged by the [plaintiff] did not emanate from an occupational disease as she presented no expert opinions that established her occupation was unusually susceptible to those types of injuries.” The board noted that the plaintiff “argued that the opinions of . . . Redlich . . . and . . . Williams . . . established that her injuries sustained working as a [certified nursing assistant] was an occupational disease.” The board stated that, while “Redlich’s reports do contain frequent opinions associating the [plaintiff’s] injury with her employment . . . none of these reports contains any opinions as to whether the [plaintiff’s] employment as a [certified nursing assistant] made her more susceptible to sustaining her alleged injuries.” (Citations omitted.) The board determined that “all of the evidence presented prior to the record closing was considered by the administrative law judge.” The board further concluded that “none of the evidence herein would have compelled a different result had it been credited by the trier of fact.” The board affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.8 This appeal followed.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the administrative 8 The board also considered the defendants’ cross appeal, in which the defendants claimed that the administrative law judge improperly made findings of fact on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the defendants challenged the administrative law judge’s findings that “the plaintiff sustained . . . specific injur[ies] to her lumbar spine and left hip law judge’s determination that the plaintiff’s claimed injuries did not constitute an occupational disease as defined by § 31-275 (15) and that her claims, therefore, were not subject to the three year limitation period in § 31-294c (a). We disagree.
We first set forth the standard of review and legal principles applicable to workers’ compensation appeals. “[T]he principles [governing] our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established. . . . The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the [administrative law judge]. . . . [T]he review . . . of an appeal from the [administrative law judge] is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [Rather, the] power and duty of determining the facts rests on the [administrative law judge and] . . . [t]he [administrative law judge] is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . . [When] the subordinate facts allow for diverse inferences, the [administrative law judge’s] selection of the inference to be drawn must stand unless it is based on an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . It matters not that the basic facts from which the [administrative law judge] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [administrative law judge] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference [that] seems most reasonable and [the administrative law judge’s] choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court. . . . This court’s review of [the board’s] in [June 2017] and thereafter continued to suffer injurious exposure due to the nature of her employment as a certified nursing assistant with [iCare],” that the plaintiff “sustained an injury to her back and left hip on June 19, 2017, and her left hip osteoarthritis [was] a sequalae of that injury,” and that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries “were due to a specific injury arising out of her employment in [June 2017] and the nature of her employment as a certified nursing assistant.” The board agreed with the defendants and ordered that these findings be stricken from the administrative law judge’s decision. The plaintiff does not appear to challenge the propriety of that order on appeal to this court.
decisions . . . is similarly limited. . . . [W]e must interpret [the administrative law judge’s finding] with the goal of sustaining that conclusion in light of all of the other supporting evidence. . . . Once the [administrative law judge] makes a factual finding, [we are] bound by that finding if there is evidence in the record to support it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchanan v. East Hartford, 233 Conn. App. 698, 709, 341 A.3d 284, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 922, 345 A.3d 810 (2025).
“Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Because the filing of a notice of claim implicates the [commission’s] subject matter jurisdiction . . . we review this determination applying a plenary standard of review. . . .
“Furthermore, [i]t is well established that, in resolving issues of statutory construction under the [act], we are mindful that the act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be construed generously to accomplish its purpose. . . . The humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers’ compensation. . . . Accordingly, [i]n construing workers’ compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act. . . . [T]he purposes of the act itself are best served by allowing the remedial legislation a reasonable sphere of operation considering those purposes. . . .
“Administrative agencies [such as the commission] are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power and they cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves. . . . The plain language of the [act] . . . requires one of four possible prerequisites to establish the [commission’s] subject matter jurisdiction over a claim: (1) a timely written notice of claim; General Statutes § 31-294c (a); (2) a timely hearing or a written request for a hearing or an assignment for a hearing; General Statutes § 31-294c (c); (3) the timely submission of a voluntary agreement; General Statutes § 31-294c (c); or (4) the furnishing of appropriate medical care by the employer to the employee for the respective work-related injury. . . .
“[Relevant to our analysis is] § 31-294c [(a)], which establishes the filing periods for notices of claim with respect to workers’ compensation injuries. As stated previously, for the commission to have jurisdiction over a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, § 31-294c (a) requires a claimant to file a written notice of claim for compensation . . . within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fieldhouse v. Regency Coachworks, Inc., 213 Conn. App. 662, 668–70, 279 A.3d 195, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 906, 282 A.3d 981 (2022).
Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he workers’ compensation scheme explicitly provides for three categories of compensable injury: (1) accidental injury; (2) repetitive trauma injury; and (3) occupational disease. . . . The mere fact that an injury is of a type that is compensable , however, does not of itself mean that the commissioner properly may consider a claim based on that injury. The notice and filing prerequisites of [§ 31-294c], which are jurisdictional . . . must also be satisfied. . . . [Section 31-294c] specifically addresses the jurisdictional filing prerequisites that must be satisfied in order to bring an accidental injury or occupational disease claim . . . [but] is silent both as to the duration of the filing period for repetitive trauma claims and as to when that period begins to run.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 574–75, 698 A.2d 873 (1997). The court also determined that, “for purposes of jurisdiction, every cognizable claim must be considered as stemming from either an ‘accident’ or an ‘occupational disease’ as those terms are used in
[§ 31-294c] . . . [and] . . . that the terms ‘accident’ and ‘occupational disease’ as they are used in [§ 31-294c] must be read broadly enough so that even an injury that is defined as stemming from repetitive trauma pursuant to [§ 31-275 (16)]9 may nonetheless be deemed to fall into one of the two extant jurisdictional categories, as appropriate to the specific facts of each particular claim.” (Emphasis omitted; footnote added; footnote omitted.) Id., 577–78.
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff filed notice of her claim beyond the one year filing period for accidental injuries, which includes repetitive trauma injuries that fall into the jurisdictional category of accidental injury. The administrative law judge found that each of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries “resemble[d] a repetitive trauma injury and, therefore, the [plaintiff] failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of [§] 31-294c, as the notice of claims were not filed within one year of the [plaintiff’s] last date of employment with [the defendant].”10 “Section 31-275 (15) defines occupational disease as any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his 9 General Statutes § 31-275 (16) provides in relevant part: “(A) ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee’s employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease. . . .”
10 “Our Supreme Court has concluded that the one year filing limitation of [§ 31-294c] applies to both repetitive trauma and accidental injury claims. Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 354–55, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993). It is settled law that the date of injury is either the last day of exposure to the work related incidents of repetitive trauma or the date of the accident. Id., 354. The last day of exposure is usually the last date of employment.” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 43 Conn. App. 224, 226–27, 682 A.2d 145 (1996), aff’d, 242 Conn. 570, 698 A.2d 873 (1997).
employment. In interpreting the phrase occupational disease, we have stated that the requirement that the disease be peculiar to the occupation and in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment, refers to those diseases in which there is a causal connection between the duties of the employment and the disease contracted by the employee. In other words, [the disease] need not be unique to the occupation of the employee or to the work place; it need merely be so distinctively associated with the employee’s occupation that there is a direct causal connection between the duties of the employment and the disease contracted. . . . Thus, an occupational disease does not include a disease which results from the peculiar conditions surrounding the employment of the claimant in a kind of work which would not from its nature be more likely to cause it than would other kinds of employment carried on under the same conditions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Doe v. Dept. of Correction, 268 Conn. 753, 757–58, 848 A.2d 378 (2004).
The administrative law judge found that each of the alleged injuries was not “so unique that they should qualify as . . . occupational disease claim[s].” Thus, the administrative law judge concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction because the claims were not filed in accordance with the one year filing period. The plaintiff contends that her injuries should fall under the jurisdictional category for occupational diseases, which have a three year limitation period. Accordingly, our determination of whether the commission had jurisdiction turns on our review of the administrative law judge’s finding that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries did not stem from an occupational disease.
Our Supreme Court examined similar circumstances in Discuillo. In Discuillo, the plaintiff was employed as a painter, and his duties required him to climb ladders and to work on scaffolding while carrying five gallon buckets of paint and heavy pneumatic grinding equipment . Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 242 Conn.
572. The plaintiff sustained a heart attack after working the entire day on scaffolding using a heavy grinding machine. Id. The court determined that the plaintiff’s heart attack did not result from an occupational disease because “the workplace circumstances that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s heart attack cannot be said to be ‘peculiar to’ his occupation as a painter. The physical stresses he describe[d]—having to lift, carry, and use heavy pieces of equipment—are present in many jobs involving manual labor. Likewise, the mental stress created by close supervision and productivity pressure is common throughout the working world. Neither type of stress is ‘distinctively associated with’ the plaintiff’s particular occupation as a painter. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s heart attack resulted from an occupational disease because his job and experiences as a painter were no more likely to cause his heart attack ‘than would other kinds of employment carried on under the same conditions.’ . . . Crochiere v. Board of Education , [227 Conn. 333, 353, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993)] (music teacher could not claim mental injury as occupational disease where injury [was] based upon false charges of sexual misconduct by student, because such allegations ‘could arise in numerous occupational settings’); Hansen v. Gordon, [221 Conn. 29, 37, 602 A.2d 560 (1992)] (hepatitis was occupational disease where dental hygienist was ‘at a particular risk of contracting [hepatitis] because of [her] contact with blood and other secretions’); cf. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7–8, 658 A.2d 166 [(hypertension [is] not automatically deemed occupational disease of firefighters or police officers for workers ’ compensation purposes in absence of evidence of particular linkage between ailment and occupations)], cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917, 661 A.2d 98 (1995) . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 579–80.
In the present case, the plaintiff likewise has not demonstrated that the physical stresses she described were distinctively associated with her occupation as a certified nursing assistant, rather than with all other manual labor jobs. The administrative law judge noted that the plaintiff failed to introduce any medical evidence that specifically distinguished her alleged injuries from injuries in other fields of employment where manual labor is performed. While the evidence does contain medical records from the plaintiff’s providers that describe her injuries as work-related, these records do not indicate that the plaintiff’s employment as a certified nursing assistant made her more susceptible to sustaining her alleged injuries. As noted previously, the plaintiff testified that she believed she had an occupational disease because her employment duties included lifting and transferring patients who weighed up to 200 pounds. A fair reading of the administrative law judge’s decision leads us to conclude that the administrative law judge did not find that the plaintiff’s testimony concerning her employment duties, standing alone, demonstrated that those duties were so sufficiently distinctive as to give rise to an occupational disease. We decline to disturb the administrative law judge’s determination concerning the weight of the evidence on appeal. See Buchanan v. East Hartford, supra, 233 Conn. App. 709; see, e.g., DiGiovanni v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Bros. Contractors , No. 5869, CRB-5-13-8 (August 5, 2014) (concluding that claimant’s injury did not constitute occupational disease when claimant produced no evidence that would support finding that heavy labor as mason was demonstrably distinguishable from other related fields in general in which heavy labor is performed). Accordingly, we conclude that the administrative law judge reasonably concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that her alleged injuries resulted from an occupational disease.
Moreover, although the plaintiff argues that “a different fact finder might have drawn different inferences from the evidentiary record,” as stated previously in this opinion, the “power and duty of determining the facts rests on the [administrative law judge and] . . . [t]he [administrative law judge] is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . . It matters not that the basic facts from which the
[administrative law judge] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchanan v. East Hartford, supra, 233 Conn. App. 709.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s reliance on Bode v. Connecticut Mason Contractors, 130 Conn. App. 672, 25 A.3d 687, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 942, 29 A.3d 467 (2011), is misplaced. In Bode, the plaintiff appealed from, inter alia, the board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge that he was not entitled to benefits because he failed to demonstrate a causal link between a physical injury and his psychiatric symptoms. Id., 690. This court affirmed the board’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide “a definitive medical opinion that the [plaintiff’s psychiatric] symptoms were related to the compensable injury.” Id. According to the plaintiff, this court’s statement in Bode that “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of proving the causal relationship between the physical injury suffered and the claimed psychiatric symptoms”; id.; supports her position that the administrative law judge improperly dismissed her claims. The issue in Bode, however, was not whether the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from an occupational disease pursuant to the jurisdictional requirements of § 31-294c, but, rather, whether the plaintiff had established a causal relationship between his physical injury and psychiatric symptoms pursuant to § 31-275 (16).
The plaintiff next argues that, in Veilleux v. Complete Interior Systems, Inc., 296 Conn. 463, 470, 994 A.2d 1279 (2010), our Supreme Court, quoting Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 242 Conn. 574–75, concluded that, “for [an administrative law judge] to have jurisdiction over a claim, that claim must fit within the existing jurisdictional provisions of [§ 31-294c]. In other words, for purposes of jurisdiction, every cognizable claim must be considered as stemming from either an accident or an occupational disease as those terms are used in [§ 31-294c].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff contends that “[o]steoarthritis and lumbar [degenerative disc disease] are disease processes that are both preexisting in nature and causally connected to [the plaintiff’s] certified nursing assistant employment at [iCare].” The plaintiff accurately quoted our Supreme Court’s statement of law in Veilleux regarding the jurisdictional provisions of § 31-294c. The fact that her injuries were work-related, however, did not conclusively establish that she had an occupational disease pursuant to § 31-294c. To establish that she had an occupational disease, the plaintiff was required to prove specifically that a certified nursing assistant was more likely to develop these diseases than “other kinds of employment carried on under the same conditions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 579–80; see, e.g., Dorsey v. United Technologies Corp./Norden Systems, Inc., 47 Conn. App. 810, 813, 707 A.2d 744 (1998) (concluding that facts did not establish that plaintiff’s occupation as powerhouse operator subjected him to hazard that made it more likely that he would suffer hearing loss than if he were otherwise employed and, therefore, plaintiff’s repetitive trauma case more closely resembled accidental injury than occupational disease). For the reasons stated previously in this opinion, we conclude that the administrative law judge correctly determined that she has failed to do so.11 As stated previously in this opinion, “[t]he mere fact that an injury is of a type that is compensable, however , does not of itself mean that the commissioner properly may consider a claim based on that injury. The notice and filing prerequisites of [§ 31-294c], which 11 In the remainder of her brief, the plaintiff likewise argues the merits of her underlying claims, rather than the jurisdictional issue underlying the administrative law judge’s dismissal of the claims. Because the administrative law judge correctly determined that the commission lacked jurisdiction because notice was not provided within the appropriate limitation period, we need not reach the merits of these additional arguments.
are jurisdictional . . . must also be satisfied.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 242 Conn. 575. Therefore, the plaintiff’s assertion that her claims were not subject to the three year limitation period in § 31-294c (a) is without merit.
The decision of the Compensation Review Board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.