Calkins v. Kousouros

237 P.2d 1053, 72 Idaho 150, 1951 Ida. LEXIS 232
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 23, 1951
Docket7762
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 237 P.2d 1053 (Calkins v. Kousouros) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Calkins v. Kousouros, 237 P.2d 1053, 72 Idaho 150, 1951 Ida. LEXIS 232 (Idaho 1951).

Opinion

GIVENS, Chief Justice.

January 30, 1950 plaintiffs-appellants filed suit to quiet title to the following described property: “Beginning at the northwest corner of the parcel of land herein referred to at a point where the North line of Lot 3, Sec. 22, T. 56 N. Range 1 W. B. M. intersects the East line of existing road across said tract as the point of beginning; thence on a line South 16° 42' East 143.1 ft. to a point being the Southwest corner of the tract of land herein referred to; thence on a line North 78° 42' East 179.8 ft. to the Southeast corner of the tract herein referred to; thence on a line North 5° 30' West 102.2 ft. to the Northeast comer of the tract herein referred to; thence West 207.8 ft. to point of beginning, being the Northwest corner of the tract herein described and enclosed.” as against defendants-respondents, claiming by adverse possession and on two deeds, one to appellants *152 from Michael and Catherine Szmanski, husband and wife, April 14, 1942 describing the lot in controversy as follows:

“A tract of land in Lot Three (3), Section Twenty-two (22), Township Fifty-six (56) North, Range One (1) West, Boise Meridian, more particularly described as follows to-wit:
“Commencing at a point where the north line of Lot Three (3) intersects with the road as now located on said Lot Three (3) ; thence in a southerly direction 142 feet along said road; thence East 148 feet; thence North 87 feet; thence West 208 feet to the place of beginning.” Dfts. Ex. 5 and the other from respondent Opal Roberge Kousouros, formerly Opal McGee Roberge, and her then husband, Joseph O. Roberge, grantors, of August 16, 1941, to the above Szmanskis containing the same description.

Appellants’ complaint alleged enclosure of the area claimed by them by a substantial wire fence from April 14, 1942; the improvement and erection thereon of various structures since 1942; that the descriptions in the Roberge and Szmanski deeds were inaccurate and indefinite, but that by their enclosure and occupancy, appellants’ claim of ownership thereof has been open, notorious, continuous, and adverse .to the world; and asked that the proper description be determined and they be decreed to be the owners of the tract claimed, and their title quieted thereto against respondents, etc.

Respondents’ answer admitted the deeds; that the sale to Szmanskis was without accurate survey; denied the description therein was inaccurate or indefinite; denied the-enclosure and improvements; alleged that appellants have endeavored to purchase-from ■ respondents the portion not included in the two deeds mentioned; that the use of the excessive land as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants was with permission of respondents, and so recognized by appellants.

The court found the erection of the fence,, but that it included a portion of the land belonging to respondents; attempts to purchase as alleged; occupancy by permission, of respondents; that plaintiffs were not in. open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the land claimed by them; had. not paid taxes thereon and rendered judgment that appellants take nothing by their' complaint, dismissed it and awarded costs, to respondents.

Defendants’ Exhibit 3 (copy of which is. attached hereto) is a plat made by Mr. Chas. Tiggelbeck, a surveyor, and shows, the area occupied by appellants with the fence enclosing same and a lesser area as-outlined by the deeds, except the length of the north line.

Mrs. Roberge’s absence from Sand-point for some years after 1944 and prior to 1950 did not overcome appellants’ claim, of adverse, i. e., hostile possession by occupancy and substantial enclosure, even though she denied that, because of such absence, she had any actual knowledge of *153 the situation. She testified she knew the fence was at least started in 1942. “The general rule seems to be that ‘in the absence of some special statutory provision to the ■contrary, in order to perfect title by adverse possession it is not necessary that the true owner should have had actual knowledge or notice of the claim. If the claimant’s possession is open and notorious under claim of title it is sufficient in its character, whether the true owner knew the facts or mot. The claimant need not otherwise repudiate the title of others claiming the land, or notify them of his claim of title. On ■open, visible, and notorious possession 'by the adverse claimant the law presumes notice to the true owner in the absence of evidence that inquiries of the true owner, prosecuted with due diligence, did not disclose such possession. Such possession is the equivalent of actual notice of the claim under which it is held, and if the owner fails to look after his interests until the title of the adverse claimant grows into maturity he has no one but himself to blame for the loss of his estate.’ 2 C.J. sec. 59, p. 77.” Pfleuger v. Hopple, 66 Idaho 152, at page 157, 156 P.2d 316, at page 318. Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, at pages 58-59, 100 P. 354.

There was nothing furtive, concealed, secretive or surreptitious about appellants’ possession and claim of ownership by possession. “ * * * Their (herein respondents) lack of knowledge of the precise extent of the defendants’ claim was not due to concealment by the defendants; it was due to the plaintiffs’ election to remain inactive. They are thus to be charged with knowledge.” Dame v. Fernald, 86 N.H. 468, 171 A. 369, at page 371.

Respondents correctly state that to establish adverse possession, it must be shown the land has been adversely occupied and claimed for a period of five years continuously and that claimant has paid taxes thereon as levied and assessed. Likewise, the statutes unequivocally declare possession, under written claim of title and claim of land not founded upon written instruments, is deemed to be possessed and occupied adversely where it has been protected by substantial enclosures, cultivated and improved. Sections 5-207, 8, 9 and 10, I.C.

Mrs. Kousouros, herself, testified that at the time the deed was given to the Szmanskis, they jointly ran the lines of the lot, as sold, on the ground:

“A. No, the lines were drawn out and checked with a steel tape by Mr. Szmanski and Mr. Roberge.
“Q. Were you there at that time? A. I was there most of the time.”
"Q. The property was taped out on the ground? A. That is right.”

She also testified wooden stakes were placed at the corners and that these did not coincide with pipes later placed by appellants at the northeast and southeast corners. However, the evidence is conclusive and uncontradicted that immediately after these lines were thus run the fence was *155 ■constructed around the premises and, except for possibly a slight jog in the northern line, has continuously been and now is in the same position as when first so erected.

*154

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
237 P.2d 1053, 72 Idaho 150, 1951 Ida. LEXIS 232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calkins-v-kousouros-idaho-1951.