Calkins v. City of Seattle

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-7708
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIRK CALKINS No. 24-7708 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-01607-RSM v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF SEATTLE; CHRISTOPHER LUEDKE; ELIZABETH SHELDON; GREEN WAY HOMES, a Washington Limited Liability Company; VASILI IALANJI; GENE IALANJI,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 11, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Kirk Calkins appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his defamation and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). tortious interference claims against Green Way Homes, Vasili Ialanji, and Gene

Ialanji (the “Builder Defendants”) and granting summary judgment for the City of

Seattle, Christopher Luedke, and Elizabeth Sheldon (the “City Defendants”) on his

§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation, negligent supervision, false light, disability

discrimination, and civil conspiracy claims. We affirm.

1. The district court properly dismissed Calkins’s claims against the Builder

Defendants. Calkins alleges that the Builder Defendants made “demonstrably false

statements” to Calkins’s supervisors at the Seattle Department of Transportation

(“SDOT”). But Washington law clearly provides that any “person who

communicates a complaint or information” to a federal, state, or local government

agency is “immune from civil liability for claims based upon the communication to

the agency or organization regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency

or organization.” Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 4.24.510. SDOT is a Washington state

agency. The complaints against Calkins concerned his conduct while performing

his job as an SDOT inspector. The behavior of an SDOT inspector on the job is

certainly of concern to SDOT. The complaints were thus “communicat[ed] to the

agency” and involved a “matter reasonably of concern to that agency or

organization.” Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 4.24.510. The Builder Defendants are

accordingly “immune from civil liability” for the defamation and tortious

interference claims because those claims are “based upon” privileged

2 24-7708 communications.

2. The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City

Defendants on Calkins’s § 1983 claim. The settlement agreement Calkins signed

with the City of Seattle bars this claim. See generally American Safety Cas. Ins. Co.

v. City of Olympia, 174 P.3d 54, 59 (Wash. 2007) (“Washington law strongly favors

the public policy of settlement over litigation.”). A First Amendment retaliation

claim under § 1983 requires a showing that protected speech was “a substantial or

motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Burch v. City of Chubbuck,

146 F.4th 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2025) (simplified). And the only “protected speech”

Calkins points to are Facebook messages he sent in the year 2020. But his settlement

agreement explicitly provides that Calkins “will not refer to, reference, and/or rely

on any facts and/or allegations that occurred or became ripe prior to December 14,

2021 in any future complaints or concerns regarding the City.” So Calkins cannot

use events from before December 14, 2021—facts that were known to him at the

time he entered the settlement agreement—as the basis of his § 1983 claim. Because

this is precisely what he is trying to do, summary judgment for the City Defendants

was proper.

3. Summary judgment for the City Defendants on Calkins’s other claims was

also proper. His negligent supervision claim fails because negligent supervision in

Washington requires an employee to act outside the scope of his or her employment.

3 24-7708 See Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist., 423 P.3d 197, 209 (Wash. 2018); 16 Wash.

Prac., Tort Law and Practice § 4:8 (5th ed.). But Calkins’s claim focuses entirely on

his supervisor’s decision to terminate Calkins’s employment, and personnel

decisions regarding retention, discipline, and termination are all within the scope of

a supervisor’s employment. His false light claim fails because it is neither false nor

misleading for a supervisor to address accurate reporting with his subordinates. His

disability discrimination claim fails because he has not produced evidence of a nexus

between a disability and the conduct that led to his termination. Finally, Calkin’s

civil conspiracy claim fails because the underlying unlawful termination claim is not

actionable. See Wilson v. State, 929 P.2d 448, 459 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (a civil

conspiracy under Washington law requires an unlawful purpose or lawful purpose

by unlawful means).

AFFIRMED

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