California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Columbia Steamship Co.

391 F. Supp. 894, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10530
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedDecember 28, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 70-1910
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 391 F. Supp. 894 (California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Columbia Steamship Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Columbia Steamship Co., 391 F. Supp. 894, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10530 (E.D. La. 1972).

Opinion

BOYLE, District Judge:

Cálifornia and Hawaiian Sugar Company, a non-profit agricultural cooperative association, brought this action in admiralty to recover for cargo loss and damage against Columbia Steamship Company and the SS COLUMBIA BREWER arising out of the stranding of the vessel in the shallow waters of Old Providence Island off the coast of Nicaragua in the early hours of June 25, 1970. Columbia Steamship Company, Inc. denied liability to cargo and asserted a counterclaim to recover cargo’s share in contribution to general average.

Since the issues have been severed, this opinion treats only the question of liability.

On May 18, 1970 California and Hawaiian Sugar Company (Plaintiff) entered into a charter party agreement 1 whereby it chartered the COLUMBIA BREWER 2 from Columbia Steamship *897 Company, Inc. (Defendant) for the transporting of bulk sugar from a port in Hawaii to a port on the Gulf of Mexico. 3 On or about June 7, 1970, plaintiff delivered to the defendant and to the COLUMBIA BREWER at the port of Nawiliwili, Kauai, a cargo of 11,941.395 short tons of bulk sugar. The sugar was received in apparent good order and condition for shipment and a bill of lading 4 was accordingly issued. The COLUMBIA BREWER departed Nawiliwili, Kauai, and sailed to the Panama Canal Zone without incident. On June 24, 1970, the vessel completed its transit of the Panama Canal and set a course for New Orleans. On June 25 at approximately 0628 hours the vessel stranded just off Old Providence Island in the Caribbean Sea.

After the stranding of the vessel the master attempted to back off the strand with her main engine. His attempts were unsuccessful and on June 27 he signed a Lloyd’s open form salvage contract 5 and declared General Average. In the course of the ensuing salvage operations approximately 1300 tons of sugar were transferred from the COLUMBIA BREWER to the M/Y PASSAT in order to lighten the stranded vessel. On July 6 the transfer of sugar to the PAS-SAT was completed and the COLUMBIA BREWER was refloated with the assistance of the Salvage Tug RESCUE.

Plaintiff, in seeking damages for the cargo loss resulting from the stranding, its proportion of the salvage award, fees and expenses, takes the position that it is entitled to judgment as prayed for because the stranding of the COLUMBIA BREWER—which caused the cargo loss, the salvage and General Average expenses—was due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel in the following respects: (1) the absence of Hydrographic Office (H. O.) Chart 1372; (2) the unavailability of H.O. Publication No. 20; (3) inadequate radar; (4) disconnected gyro-compass repeaters, and (5) a faulty fathometer. Defendant shipowner takes the position that the. stranding was solely due to a neglect or error in navigation by the master which is an excepted peril under Section 4(2) (a) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (a). Shipowner also denies that its vessel was unseaworthy in any manner as alleged by the plaintiff and in the alternative argues that there is no causal connection between the stranding and the alleged unseaworthiness.

The Charter contained a “U.S.A. Clause Paramount” 6 under which the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., are incorporated in the charter party and the bill of lading issued subsequent thereto. The charter also included a “New Jason Clause” 7 which obligated *898 the plaintiff, as shipper, to pay salvage costs attributable to cargo as well as expenses in the nature of General Average brought about by accident or damage for which the defendant, as shipowner, is not liable.

The bill of lading evidencing delivery of the cargo to the vessel in good order together with the stipulation to the partial cargo loss 8 demonstrate that the plaintiff has carried its initial burden of proof and made out a prima facie case on its main demand. Defendant concedes that it thus has the burden of proof in bringing itself within COGSA’s 4(2) (a) exception by showing that the stranding resulted from an error of navigation or management. Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Maru, 459 F.2d 1370 (2nd Cir. 1972); Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2nd Cir. 1962); Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 162-63, § 3-43 (1957). Plaintiff would have defendant’s burden in this respect compounded by invoking the rule of The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873) on the grounds that the failure to have Chart H.O. 1372 aboard the vessel and the unavailability of H.O. Publication No. 20 constitute a violation of Coast Guard Regulation 46 CFR 97.05-5.

The rule of The Pennsylvania, clearly applicable in ship collision cases, places the burden of proof upon the vessel guilty of statutory fault to show not only that such fault might not have been a cause of the collision but also that such fault could not possibly have been the cause. We need not determine whether the absence of Chart H.O. 1372 or the unavailability of H.O. Publication No. 20 is equivalent to statutory fault for we are not persuaded to apply the rule in this case. While some courts have applied the rule of The Pennsylvania in other than collision cases, such cases are collected in Garner v. Cities Service Tankers Corp., 456 F.2d 476, n. 4 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit has yet to do so. Garner v. Cities Service Tankers Corp., supra. We agree with the finding of the Second Circuit, in a case involving the very same legal issues which are presented here, that the rule of The Pennsylvania is inapplicable where the burden of proof scheme is provided by COGSA. Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Maru, supra.

Thus we shall proceed on the basis that the shipowner has the burden of bringing itself within the excepted peril of negligent navigation. Should the defendant shipowner sustain its burden, the burden would then shift to the plaintiff to establish unseaworthiness and that the unseaworthiness caused the stranding and the resulting damages. Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Maru, supra; Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co. v. M/S Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835, 837 (2nd Cir. 1963); Cia. Atlantica Pacifica, S.A. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 274 F.Supp. 884 (D. C.M.D.1967). Should the plaintiff carry this burden, defendant could still escape liability by proving that the unseaworthiness occurred dispite its exercise of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and to see that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied.

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391 F. Supp. 894, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/california-hawaiian-sugar-co-v-columbia-steamship-co-laed-1972.