Calhoun v. Pierce County

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 28, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-05788
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 ARMAND R. CALHOUN, CASE NO. C20-5788 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 10 PIERCE COUNTY, et. al, MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING 11 Defendants. PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND 12

13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Pierce County, Kevin Boyle, 14 Vicki Hogan, Gerald Johnson, Linda CJ Lee, Edmund Murphy, Pierce County, David 15 Shaw, Katherine Stolz, Amanda Vitakainen, and Shawn Waite’s (“Pierce County 16 Defendants”) motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10, and Plaintiff Armand Calhoun’s (“Calhoun”) 17 motion to amend, Dkt. 19, motion for judgment, Dkt. 23, and motion for default 18 judgment, Dkt. 39. The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in 19 opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby rules for the reasons 20 stated herein. 21 22 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On July 9, 2020, Calhoun filed an amended complaint in Pierce County Superior

3 Court for the State of Washington against numerous defendants, including the Pierce 4 County Defendants, asserting numerous causes of action. Dkt. 1-2. On August 6, 2020, 5 the Pierce County Defendants removed the matter to this Court. Dkt. 1. 6 On August 7, 2020, Calhoun filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 7, 7 and a motion to appoint counsel, Dkt. 8. On August 13, 2020, the Pierce County 8 Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. Dkt. 12. On August 28, 2020, the Court

9 denied Calhoun’s motions and granted the Pierce County Defendant’s motion. Dkt. 21. 10 On August 13, 2020, the Pierce County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 11 10. On August 19, 2020, Calhoun filed a motion to amend. Dkt. 19. On August 31, 2020, 12 Calhoun responded to the Pierce County Defendants’ motion and filed a motion for 13 judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(e) and 55.1 Dkt. 23. On September 3, 2020, the

14 Pierce County Defendants replied and responded to Calhoun’s motion. Dkt. 27. On 15 September 8, 2020, Calhoun replied. Dkt. 30. 16 On October 8, 2020, Calhoun filed a motion for default judgment. Dkt. 39. On 17 October 12, 2020, the Pierce County Defendants responded. Dkt. 41. On October 14, 18 2020, Defendants Allianceone Receivables Management, Inc. (“Allianceone”), K.C.

1 Calhoun labels his motion a motion for summary judgment, but requests relief under 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(e) and 55. The Court, in reviewing the motion, finds that Calhoun does not comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) in stating with particularity the grounds for 21 seeking the order. Rather, it appears that Calhoun’s motion is a response to the Pierce County Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10. The Court therefore denies Calhoun’s motion for 22 judgment, Dkt. 23. 1 Hawthorne, Timothy Casey, and Harry Neerenberg (collectively “Allianceone 2 Defendants”) responded. Dkt. 42.

3 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 Calhoun’s claims appear to be based on allegedly unpaid fines stemming from 5 criminal judgments against him. Dkt. 1-2. The fines were apparently sent to collections, 6 and now Calhoun is asserting numerous causes of action based on imposition of the fines 7 themselves and the process of turning the fines over to collection agencies. Id. 8 On February 27, 2009, Calhoun had legal financial obligations (“LFO”) of

9 $1,100.00 imposed as part of his judgment and sentence under Pierce County Superior 10 Court Cause No. 081-03826-4. Id. at 6. On September 15, 2016, Calhoun had an LFO of 11 $800.00 imposed as part of his judgment and sentence under Pierce County Superior 12 Court Cause Nos. 15-1-04457-7 and 16-1-03111-2. Id. at 6–7. It appears that Calhoun 13 went into default and that the collection of the outstanding LFOs was assigned to

14 Allianceone. Id. at 7. Calhoun alleges that the collection of the unpaid LFOs is improper 15 and a breach of contract. Id. at 5, 11. 16 Calhoun additionally alleges that on March 11, 2019 Defendants Commissioner 17 Gerald Johnson and Pro Temp [sic] Kevin Boyle wrongfully granted an improper 18 restraining order under Superior Court Cause No. 18-3849-8. Id. at 8.

19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Pierce County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss The Pierce County Defendants move to dismiss Calhoun’s claims against it, 21 arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal 22 1 jurisdiction over the Pierce County Defendants. Dkt. 10 at 3–4. The Pierce County 2 Defendants also argue that Calhoun fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

3 granted. Id. at 6. 4 The Court agrees with Defendants that Calhoun fails to state a claim because 5 Calhoun fails to provide “a short and plain statement of [each] claim showing that [he] is 6 entitled to relief” for his claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It appears that Calhoun brings a 7 claim for breach of contract and quo warranto, Dkt. 1-2 at 4, but the Court is unable to 8 understand all of Calhoun’s claims and factual basis for each claim. To survive a motion

9 to dismiss, the complaint does not require detailed factual allegations but must provide 10 the grounds for entitlement to relief and not merely a “formulaic recitation” of the 11 elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 12 Plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 13 Id. at 570.

14 To the extent that the Court recognizes Calhoun’s claims, he fails to provide 15 enough facts to support his claims. In regard to his breach of contract claim, Calhoun 16 must identify the contract and allege facts to support how the contract was breached to 17 state a claim for relief. Calhoun’s claim for quo warranto requires an allegation of 18 Calhoun’s “interest in the office, franchise, or corporation which is the subject of the

19 information.” RCW 7.56.020. Calhoun has not alleged that he has a special interest in any 20 of the elected franchise or public office of the Pierce County Defendants he requests that 21 the Court oust from their office. 22 1 The Court is unable to understand the remainder of Calhoun’s claims. Such a 2 failure to understand the claims and supporting facts results in a failure to consider

3 whether these claims are time-barred or whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the 4 claims. Therefore, the Court grants the Pierce County Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 5 B. Individual Pierce County Defendants’ Immunity 6 Calhoun brings suit against Pierce County and the State of Washington, as well as 7 a variety of individuals who Calhoun interacted with in Pierce County Superior Court. He 8 brings claims Public Defender David Shaw, former Pierce County Superior Court Judge

9 Vicki Hogan, former Pierce County Superior Court Judge Katherine Stolz, Pierce County 10 Superior Court Judge Edmund Murphy, Pierce County Superior Court Judge Garold 11 Johnson, Pierce County Superior Court Judge Pro Tem Kevin Boyle, former Pierce 12 County Prosecutor Sean Waite, Pierce County Prosecutor Claire Amanda Vitakainen, and 13 former Pierce County Superior Court Judge Linda CJ Lee (“individual Pierce County

14 Defendants”). 15 The Pierce County Defendants argue that the individual Pierce County Defendants 16 are immune from Calhoun’s claims. The Supreme Court has held that “a public defender 17 does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as 18 counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

19 325 (1981). Moreover, it is well established that judges enjoy absolute immunity from 20 claims arising from any acts committed within their judicial functions. See Mireles v. 21 Waco, 503 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967); Bradley v. 22 Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872). Judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith 1 or malice. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Similarly, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from 2 liability when they act within the scope of their duties, such as in initiation and pursuing

3 criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 4 409, 430–31 (1976). 5 Here, it appears that Calhoun brings claims against the individual Pierce County 6 Defendants for actions taken when performing their traditional functions and acting 7 within the scope of their duties, including imposing LFOs and issuing restraining orders. 8 Therefore, to extent that Calhoun alleges wrongdoing arising from the individual Pierce

9 County Defendants’ official duties, Calhoun’s claims are dismissed. 10 C. Calhoun’s Motion for Default Judgment 11 Calhoun moves for default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55, arguing that 12 the Pierce County Defendants and Allianceone Defendants have not responded to his 13 summary judgment motion and therefore he is entitled to default judgment. Dkt. 39. This

14 motion is premature in the absence of an operative complaint. The Court therefore denies 15 Calhoun’s motion for default judgment. 16 D. Calhoun’s Motion to Amend 17 Before the Court may dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, it “must 18 provide the pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint and an

19 opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 20 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 21 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). Leave to 22 amend need not be granted, though, “where the amendment would be futile or where the 1 amended complaint would be subject to dismissal.” Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 2 843 (9th Cir. 1991).

3 The Pierce County Defendants seek to have Calhoun’s complaint dismissed with 4 prejudice, Dkt. 10 at 18, but fail to address whether amendment would be futile. The 5 Court finds that plaintiff could cure his complaint in amendment by alleging specific 6 facts to support his claims. The Court therefore grants Calhoun’s motion for leave to 7 amend his complaint as outlined in his motion, Dkt. 19, and grants Calhoun leave to 8 amend for the reasons stated herein.

9 If Calhoun files an amended complaint, the complaint shall contain “a short and 10 plain statement of [each] claim showing that [Calhoun] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 11 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although there is no rule precluding voluminous complaints, both 12 Defendants and the Court must be able to reasonably understand how each defendant’s 13 action injured Calhoun and why Calhoun is entitled to relief for such alleged injury.

14 Failure to provide short statements of each claim may also result in dismissal of any 15 amended complaint with or without prejudice. The Court further advises Calhoun to 16 provide allegations of actions the individual Pierce County Defendants took outside their 17 official capacities that resulted in the deprivation of his rights. Failure to provide such 18 allegations will result in the Court finding that individual Pierce Country Defendants

19 have immunity and the claims against them will be dismissed. 20 The Court additionally advises Calhoun to properly serve the Pierce County 21 Defendants and Allianceone defendants in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. See Benny 22 v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1986) (“In a federal question case such as Benny’s 1 suit, federal procedural law indisputably controls.”) (internal citation omitted). Failure to 2 properly serve the Defendants may result in dismissal.

3 IV. ORDER 4 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 5 (1) Pierce County Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 10, is GRANTED; 6 (2) Calhoun’s motion for judgment, Dkt. 23, and motion for default judgment, 7 Dkt. 39, are DENIED; and 8 (3) Calhoun’s motion to amend, Dkt. 19, is GRANTED.

9 Dated this 28th day of October, 2020. A 10 11 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 12 United States District Judge

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