Calenzo v. Waste Management, Inc.

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided September 22, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-01499·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARY-ROSE F. CALENZO,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:24-cv-01499 (AMN/PJE)

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

MARY-ROSE F. CALENZO 553 Coyote Circle Midway Park, North Carolina 28544 Plaintiff, pro se

Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:

ORDER I. INTRODUCTION On December 10, 2024, Plaintiff Mary-Rose F. Calenzo, commenced this action pro se against her former employer, Waste Management, Inc. (“Waste Management”), and her former coworkers, James Dennis, Michael Glass, Raymond Bender, and Joseph Mazzelli (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), alleging claims of discrimination and related state law claims. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).1 This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista, who reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and on August 26, 2025, recommended

1 Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic filing system. that (i) Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants be dismissed with prejudice; (ii) Plaintiff’s Title VII claim of disparate treatment as against Waste Management be permitted to proceed; (iii) Plaintiff’s claims of unlawful termination, retaliation, and breach of contract as against Waste Management be dismissed without prejudice; and (iv) Plaintiff’s defamation claim

as against Defendants Dennis and Glass be dismissed without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 5 at 31-32 (“Report-Recommendation”). Magistrate Judge Evangelista also recommended that Plaintiff may amend her Complaint to raise claims of discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) as against the Individual Defendants. Id. at 32. Magistrate Judge Evangelista advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Parties had fourteen days within which to file written objections and that failure to object to the Report-Recommendation within fourteen days would preclude appellate review. Id. at 32-33. No objections have been filed, and the time for filing objections has expired. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If no specific objections have been filed, this Court reviews a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation for clear error. See Petersen, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition). “When performing such a ‘clear error’ review, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Dezarea W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 21-cv-01138, 2023 WL 2552452, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Canady v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 17-cv-0367, 2017 WL 5484663, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2017)). “[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,

295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). After appropriate review, “the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). III. DISCUSSION Because neither party has filed any objections to the Report-Recommendation, the Court reviews the Report-Recommendation for clear error. First, Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against

the Individual Defendants be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim because “individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.” Dkt. No. 5 at 12; see also Pitter v. Target Corp., 20-cv-183, 2020 WL 8474858, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020) (internal citations and quotations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7767629 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020); Terpening v. McGinty, 21-cv-1215, 2022 WL 2657291, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2115265 (N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2022). Second, Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment claim as against Waste Management be permitted to proceed. Dkt. No. 5 at 20. “To state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII, ‘a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against her, and (2) her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.’” Krul v. Brennan, 501 F. Supp. 3d 87, 96 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72,

87 (2d Cir. 2015). Magistrate Judge Evangelista found that Plaintiff alleged facts that at a minimum, give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination, see Krul, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 98, thereby permitting Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim to proceed as against Waste Management. Dkt. No. 5 at 20. Plaintiff alleged that “her similarly-situated male coworkers were afforded favorable treatment and working conditions, she was denied ‘training that may lead to promotional opportunities,’ and she was denied career advancement opportunities.” Id. at 19 (quoting Sotak v. Bertoni, 501 F. Supp. 3d 59, 79 (N.D.N.Y. 2020)); see also Dkt. No. 1 at 8-10. Plaintiff also contended that job openings for the position of commercial waste driver were concealed from her, while at least three male coworkers were provided the necessary training to be promoted to the position of commercial waste driver, and four male coworkers were promoted to that position

during the 2.5 years prior to Plaintiff’s termination. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8. Third, Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that Plaintiff’s unlawful termination and retaliation claims under Title VII as against Waste Management be dismissed without prejudice. Dkt. No. 5 at 12, 23. Regarding Plaintiff’s termination claim, Magistrate Judge Evangelista found that Plaintiff had not alleged any facts to plausibly infer that Plaintiff’s sex or gender was a motivating factor in her termination. Dkt. No. 5 at 10-11; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 9- 11 (alleging that Plaintiff’s termination stemmed from a series of events including Plaintiff filing a safety complaint, a dispute between Plaintiff and her supervisors, and Plaintiff’s refusal to sign written disciplinary reprimands).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Govan v. Campbell
289 F. Supp. 2d 289 (N.D. New York, 2003)
Petersen v. Astrue
2 F. Supp. 3d 223 (N.D. New York, 2012)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)