Caleb v. State

2 Morr. St. Cas. 1490, 39 Miss. 721
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1872
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 2 Morr. St. Cas. 1490 (Caleb v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caleb v. State, 2 Morr. St. Cas. 1490, 39 Miss. 721 (Mich. 1872).

Opinion

Smith, O. J.:

This was an indictment for murder, tried in the circuit court of Lowndes county, upon which the plaintiff in error, a slave, was convicted. A motion was made for a new trial upon the following grounds, to wit: 1. Because the verdict of the jury . was contrary to law and the evidence; 2. Because the court . erred in permitting a certain .witness to give his opinion as to , the instrument with which the wound upon the body of the deceased was inflicted; and 3. Because the jury were exposed to improper influences by the misconduct of the officers placed in charge of them.* Which motion being overruled, the prisoner , excepted, and prosecutes this writ of error.

The exceptions to the judgment are based upon the same - grounds relied on in support of the motion for a new trial. We ' shall reverse the order pursued by counsel in assigning the . causes for a new trial.

1. It is insisted that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, because the jury retired from the court-room ■ to a room at a public hotel in the town of Columbus, through [1498]*1498the public streets, at night, to consider of their verdict, without the consent of the court or the counsel for the defendant.

Affidavits were read in support of the motion. From the evidence thus furnished,- it is clear that the conduct of the bailiffs in charge of the jury was unauthorized and illegal, and should have been' severely reprehended by the presiding judge. But it is settled that it is not every improper or illegal act of the officer in charge of the jury, or of the jury themselves, which will constitute just cause for setting aside the verdict. 36 Miss. R., 136.

The question here to be considered is not whether the bailiffs in charge of the jury, in conducting the jury through the streets of the town to a room at the hotel, were guilty simply of a violation of duty, but whether, by such improper conduct on their part, the jury were exposed to influences which might have affected the purity of their verdict. If they were so exposed, according to the long and well-settled doctrines of this court, unless it were also affirmatively shown that such influences failed of effect, their verdict would be suspected, and should therefore be set aside. Here, without noticing the evidence in detail, it is only necessary to say, that it appears with sufficient certainty that the jury were not subjected to improper influences, or placed by the conduct of the officers in such a situation as it was at all probable that such influences could be brought to bear upon them. ,

This exception is, therefore, unsupported and untenable.

2. It is next contended that the court erred in permitting Charles Neilson, a witness examined on behalf of the prosecution, to state his opinion to the jury as to the particular instrument with which the wound found in the breast of the deceased was inflicted.

' This witness, in his examination before the jury, having described the locality where the deceased’s body was found, its position upon the ground, the condition of the clothes, and other connected circumstances, stated that he was well acquainted with the difference in appearance between gunshot wounds and wounds made with a lmife or sharp instrument; that his knowledge was derived from experience and observation; that he had [1499]*1499frequently seen gunshot wounds and wounds made with a knife, on the body of men ; that in gunshot wounds the edges were depressed ; in wounds made with a knife the edges were usually smooth, and the lips of the wound protruded; that he examined the wound on the body of the deceased. He saw but one wound on.the body of the deceased. That was just below the breast-bone, in the pit of the stomach, directly in front; the wound appeared to be about one and a quarter inches long, and. about three-quarters of an inch wide; that he had seen as much as a dozen gunshot wounds, and about the same number of cuts with a sharp instrument, on the human body; had seen the wounds on two persons in Mexico, who were said to have been shot in five or six places, and had seen the wounds on another person who was said to have been cut with a knife in five or six places, and had seen cuts made by medical men in lancing swellings on the human body; that all the knowledge he had in relation to the character of wounds is derived from having seen these persons, and from experience and observation; that gunshot wounds are rough, and cuts smooth; the -body of deceased was in a state of putrefaction, and he had never seen a wound when the body was in a state of putrefaction before.

Having testified as to these facts, the witness, was asked by counsel for the prosecution to state to the jury whether the wound he had described, on the body of the deceased, had the appearance of a gun-shot or'pistol-shot wound, or of having been made with a knife or sharp instrument; W'kich question was objected to, but the objection was overruled, and the witness permitted to answer. The witness stated in reply to said question, “ That the wound below “the breast-bone of the deceased (the wound he had described) was made with a knife.”

As a witness is called for the purpose of deposing as to facts only, as a general rule he is not permitted to express his opinion upon a particular question, whether such question arise upon a fact stated, or a combination of facts, admitted or proved. Notwithstanding this is the general rule, there are some classes of witnesses who may deliver their opinions. For example, “ On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of the like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called experts, may not only testify [1500]*1500to facts, but are permitted to give'their opinions in evidence. Thus, the opinions of medical men are constantly admitted as to the cause of disease or death, or the consequences of wounds, &c., and also as to other subjedts of professional skill.” Roscoe’s Or. Ev., 166, 167; 1 Greenleaf’s Ev., § 440; Jones v. Finch, 37 Miss. R. 461.

There was not a particle of evidence before the court, except the statements of the witness himself, which tended to prove that he possessed the knowledge or skill requisite to enable any one to form an intelligent opinion on the subject about which he deposed. The witness was not offered as a person skilled in the science of medicine or surgery; and he did not himself pretend to any knowledge in either of those branches of science. He states his entire knowledge and experience in regard to wounds made upon the human body by gun-shot and by sharp-edged instruments. From his own statements, it is most manifest that he was not embraced in any class of witnesses, made exceptions to the general rule above laid down..

The court therefore erred in permitting the question to be propounded to this witness, and his answer to go to the jury as evidence. And the error here committed may have had an important effect upon the verdict; for without proof that the mortal wound was inflicted by means of a knife or some sharp-edged weapon, as no knife or sharp-edged weapon was found near the corpse of the deceased, the jury may have doubted, under all the circumstances proved, whether the deceased fell by his own hand or that of an assassin. For this error the judgment must be reversed.

3. The last exception which we shall notice, points to the error alleged to have been committed by the court in overruling the motion for a new trial.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 Morr. St. Cas. 1490, 39 Miss. 721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caleb-v-state-miss-1872.