UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _______________________________ ) DAVID L. CALDWELL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ. Action No. 17-1043 (EGS) ) EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ) APPEALS BOARD, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff David L. Caldwell alleges that he was
injured in July 2009 while employed at the National Gallery of
Art. See Complaint at 2, 12, ECF No. 1-1. 1 After incurring the
injury, Mr. Caldwell claimed that he was unable to work and
sought compensation from the government. See Complaint at 11-13,
16. Although Mr. Caldwell's barebones complaint does not specify
the avenues through which he sought compensation for his
disability, papers attached to the complaint do make clear that,
in December 2016, Mr. Caldwell filed an appeal of his disability
compensation decision with the Employees' Compensation Appeals
Board ("ECAB"). See Complaint at 8, 11. Apparently unhappy with
ECAB's decision, Mr. Caldwell filed a lawsuit against ECAB in
1 For ease of reference, the Court cites to the page numbers designated by the Electronic Case Filing system when citing to the parties' pleadings. 1 the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See Complaint
at 2. ECAB subsequently removed the action to federal court and
filed the instant motion to dismiss Mr. Caldwell's complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants defendant's motion and dismisses this case for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377,
114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), and a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion for dismissal presents a threshold challenge to a court's
jurisdiction, Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir.
1987). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct.
2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to hear a
particular claim, "the court must scrutinize the plaintiff's
allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol
Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). As such, the
court "need not limit itself to the allegations in the
2 complaint," but rather, "may consider such materials outside the
pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question
whether it has jurisdiction in the case." Rann v. Chao, 154 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Nor must the court "accept inferences
unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are
cast as factual allegations." Id. Still, in evaluating such a
motion, the Court must "accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint," Wilson v. District of
Columbia, 269 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted), and
should review the complaint liberally while accepting all
inferences favorable to the plaintiff, see Barr v. Clinton, 370
F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant ECAB moves to dismiss Mr. Caldwell's complaint on
the ground that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
According to ECAB, Mr. Caldwell's exclusive remedy for any
alleged injury incurred while he was working at the National
Gallery of Art – a federal government institution – is through
the administrative process set forth in the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act ("FECA"). See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 3-1.
FECA is the exclusive remedy for a federal employee injured
"while in the performance of his duty." 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a); see
3 also id. § 8116 ("The liability of the United States or an
instrumentality thereof under this subchapter or any extension
thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is
exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United
States or the instrumentality to the employee[.]"); Johansen v.
United States, 343 U.S. 427, 439, 72 S. Ct. 849, 857, 96 L. Ed.
1051 (1952) (FECA "gave the first and exclusive right to
Government employees for compensation, in any form, from the
United States."). FECA sets forth a process for federal
employees seeking compensation for injuries sustained in the
workplace, and the Act provides for an administrative review
through the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs and
ultimately ending in an appeal to ECAB for an employee
dissatisfied with the determination of his or her claim. See 10
C.F.R. § 10.625; Gallucci v. Chao, 374 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124
(D.D.C. 2005) (setting forth administrative-review process). An
appeal to ECAB is a claimant's sole remedy and is "not subject
to review by another official of the United States or by a
court." 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b); see also Gallucci, 374 F. Supp. 2d
at 124 ("Administrative review is the claimant's only avenue for
review of a claim because Congress precluded judicial review of
claims disputes."). Thus, where FECA applies, "federal courts
are without subject matter jurisdiction over covered claims."
4 Zellars v. United States, 05-CV-1670, 2006 WL 1050673, at *2
(D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2006).
Here, Mr. Caldwell concedes that his injury was sustained
at the National Gallery of Art while he was an employee there.
See Complaint at 11, ECF No. 1-1. Accordingly, his claim for any
resulting disability was subject to FECA. See 5 U.S.C. §
8102(a). Indeed, Mr. Caldwell appears to have sought
compensation through the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, which ultimately resulted in an appeal of the decision
on his claim to ECAB. See Compl. at 11-12; see also Def.'s Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (explaining that Mr. Caldwell
filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
"based upon his claim that there was a power outage at work,
fumes ensued and as a result, his eyes were burned"), ECF No. 1-
1. Mr. Caldwell does not contest any of these facts. See
generally Pl.'s Supp. to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 6. 2
2 ECAB filed its motion to dismiss on June 7, 2017.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _______________________________ ) DAVID L. CALDWELL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ. Action No. 17-1043 (EGS) ) EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ) APPEALS BOARD, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff David L. Caldwell alleges that he was
injured in July 2009 while employed at the National Gallery of
Art. See Complaint at 2, 12, ECF No. 1-1. 1 After incurring the
injury, Mr. Caldwell claimed that he was unable to work and
sought compensation from the government. See Complaint at 11-13,
16. Although Mr. Caldwell's barebones complaint does not specify
the avenues through which he sought compensation for his
disability, papers attached to the complaint do make clear that,
in December 2016, Mr. Caldwell filed an appeal of his disability
compensation decision with the Employees' Compensation Appeals
Board ("ECAB"). See Complaint at 8, 11. Apparently unhappy with
ECAB's decision, Mr. Caldwell filed a lawsuit against ECAB in
1 For ease of reference, the Court cites to the page numbers designated by the Electronic Case Filing system when citing to the parties' pleadings. 1 the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See Complaint
at 2. ECAB subsequently removed the action to federal court and
filed the instant motion to dismiss Mr. Caldwell's complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants defendant's motion and dismisses this case for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377,
114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), and a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion for dismissal presents a threshold challenge to a court's
jurisdiction, Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir.
1987). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct.
2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to hear a
particular claim, "the court must scrutinize the plaintiff's
allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol
Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). As such, the
court "need not limit itself to the allegations in the
2 complaint," but rather, "may consider such materials outside the
pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question
whether it has jurisdiction in the case." Rann v. Chao, 154 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Nor must the court "accept inferences
unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are
cast as factual allegations." Id. Still, in evaluating such a
motion, the Court must "accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint," Wilson v. District of
Columbia, 269 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted), and
should review the complaint liberally while accepting all
inferences favorable to the plaintiff, see Barr v. Clinton, 370
F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant ECAB moves to dismiss Mr. Caldwell's complaint on
the ground that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
According to ECAB, Mr. Caldwell's exclusive remedy for any
alleged injury incurred while he was working at the National
Gallery of Art – a federal government institution – is through
the administrative process set forth in the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act ("FECA"). See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 3-1.
FECA is the exclusive remedy for a federal employee injured
"while in the performance of his duty." 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a); see
3 also id. § 8116 ("The liability of the United States or an
instrumentality thereof under this subchapter or any extension
thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is
exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United
States or the instrumentality to the employee[.]"); Johansen v.
United States, 343 U.S. 427, 439, 72 S. Ct. 849, 857, 96 L. Ed.
1051 (1952) (FECA "gave the first and exclusive right to
Government employees for compensation, in any form, from the
United States."). FECA sets forth a process for federal
employees seeking compensation for injuries sustained in the
workplace, and the Act provides for an administrative review
through the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs and
ultimately ending in an appeal to ECAB for an employee
dissatisfied with the determination of his or her claim. See 10
C.F.R. § 10.625; Gallucci v. Chao, 374 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124
(D.D.C. 2005) (setting forth administrative-review process). An
appeal to ECAB is a claimant's sole remedy and is "not subject
to review by another official of the United States or by a
court." 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b); see also Gallucci, 374 F. Supp. 2d
at 124 ("Administrative review is the claimant's only avenue for
review of a claim because Congress precluded judicial review of
claims disputes."). Thus, where FECA applies, "federal courts
are without subject matter jurisdiction over covered claims."
4 Zellars v. United States, 05-CV-1670, 2006 WL 1050673, at *2
(D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2006).
Here, Mr. Caldwell concedes that his injury was sustained
at the National Gallery of Art while he was an employee there.
See Complaint at 11, ECF No. 1-1. Accordingly, his claim for any
resulting disability was subject to FECA. See 5 U.S.C. §
8102(a). Indeed, Mr. Caldwell appears to have sought
compensation through the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, which ultimately resulted in an appeal of the decision
on his claim to ECAB. See Compl. at 11-12; see also Def.'s Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (explaining that Mr. Caldwell
filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
"based upon his claim that there was a power outage at work,
fumes ensued and as a result, his eyes were burned"), ECF No. 1-
1. Mr. Caldwell does not contest any of these facts. See
generally Pl.'s Supp. to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 6. 2
2 ECAB filed its motion to dismiss on June 7, 2017. Having not received any opposition within the time prescribed, the Court directed Mr. Caldwell to respond to ECAB's motion by no later than July 19, 2017. See Minute Order, June 30, 2017, ECF No. 5. On July 13, Mr. Caldwell filed an amalgamation of documents – including a copy of defendant's notice of removal, various medical records, administrative records, and documents from his case in D.C. Superior Court – on one of which he wrote "I'm responding to the defendant [sic] motion!" See Pl.'s Supp. to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 6. The Court construes this document as Mr. Caldwell's opposition to ECAB's motion to dismiss. 5 Moreover, although it appears that Mr. Caldwell was
ultimately denied compensation under FECA, see Complaint at 2
(alleging that he "never receive[d] any compensation for" his
injury), that does not change this Court's jurisdictional
inquiry. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 161 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (where Secretary of Labor had determined that FECA
applied, plaintiff's claims were not subject to review by a
court despite plaintiff's allegations that he did not receive
appropriate compensation); Scott v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 05-
CV-0002, 2006 WL 2787832, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006) (fact
that plaintiff "was ultimately denied compensation under FECA
based on a lack of competent medical evidence" was "immaterial
to the issue of the Court's jurisdiction"); Sullivan v. United
States, No. CIV.A.05 1418 CKK, 2007 WL 1114124, at *3–4 (D.D.C.
Apr. 13, 2007) ("Notwithstanding Plaintiff's statement that
'Plaintiff has not received a penny to date,' the Court does not
have any authority to question the Secretary's designation or
the manner in which the Secretary issues an award to Plaintiff
under FECA.")(citation omitted).
In short, because Mr. Caldwell seeks review of a decision
regarding benefits for injuries allegedly sustained while in the
performance of his workplace duties at a federal institution,
his claims arise under FECA. Accordingly, this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.
6 III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Employees'
Compensation Appeals Board's motion to dismiss Mr. Caldwell's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. A separate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge January 3, 2018