Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 402 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-24-391
CALANDRA LOCK-FRASER AND Opinion Delivered September 3, 2025
JAHNELL FRASER APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 30JV-20-69] V. HONORABLE STEPHEN SHIRRON, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD AFFIRMED APPELLEES
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Calandra Lock-Fraser and Jahnell Fraser appeal the denial of their motion for
continuance and the grant of the decree of adoption to Victoria and Brandon McCorkle,
Minor Child’s (MC’s) foster parents. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the decree of
adoption is void, and therefore, that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for
continuance as moot. We affirm.
I. Background
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-
neglect concerning MC on October 23, 2020. In the petition, the affiant attested that there
were findings of inadequate supervision, minimal compliance with the case plan, and failures to protect.1 MC was removed from the care of her biological parents because the
circumstances in the home presented an immediate danger to her health. After multiple,
unsuccessful attempts at reunification, parental rights were terminated on May 12, 2023.2
DHS initially attempted to place MC with Calandra Lock-Fraser, MC’s maternal
grandmother; and Jahnell Fraser, Calandra’s spouse, but it determined that the Frasers were
not suitable caretakers for MC. Specifically, DHS noted that Jahnell had recently been
arrested for aggravated assault with Calandra listed as the victim, and Jahnell had previously
been arrested in 2018 for pulling a knife on Calandra.3 Further, DHS noted that MC’s
biological mother would likely have unrestricted access to MC if she was placed with the
Frasers. Consequently, MC was placed in foster care outside the family.
On November 29, 2023, the Frasers sought to intervene in the case, and the circuit
court entered an order allowing them to intervene for the sole purpose of pursuing their
petition to adopt MC. On February 5, 2024, the Frasers filed their petition for adoption but
did not seek DHS’s consent for their petition, nor is there evidence that they later tried to
obtain DHS’s consent. Without DHS’s consent, the circuit court was unable to grant the
1 The failure-to-protect claim resulted from the biological mother and father engaging in heavy drug use in front of MC, the mother driving “high” with MC in the vehicle, posting on Facebook Live that MC was getting a “contact high,” and the belief that the biological father was dealing controlled substances while caring for MC. 2 The biological parents appealed, and the termination order was affirmed on appeal. Moore v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 4, 682 S.W.3d 706. 3 The charges were later dropped or never formally charged.
2 Frasers’ petition. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-206(a)(3) (Repl. 2020). On February 21, 2024,
the McCorkles filed identical adoption petitions both in the instant case and in a new
secondary case.
The circuit court held a post-termination hearing on March 13, 2024.4 The circuit
court set the hearing on the McCorkles’ adoption petition on the same day as the hearing
on the Frasers’ adoption petition, April 10, 2024. On April 5, the Frasers sought a
continuance, claiming that they needed additional time to perfect service on DHS. The
Frasers renewed their motion for continuance on April 9, alleging only that they needed
additional time to perfect service on DHS.
No orders granting or denying the Frasers’ two motions for continuance were issued,
and all parties were present at the April 10 hearing.5 At that point, the Frasers’ again
requested a continuance in order to serve the director of DHS. The Frasers’ further requested
a continuance on the McCorkles’ petition to adopt MC. The Frasers’ counsel attested that
he had “placed the necessary documents, certified mail, to – to attempt that service” but
failed to articulate when he mailed these documents and why he had waited until just before
the hearing to do so. Additionally, the Frasers’ counsel mistakenly thought that the hearing
4 The Frasers were not present for the post-termination hearing; however, their limited intervention allowed them only to petition to adopt MC, and that did not extend to the post-termination hearing. 5 The Frasers’ attorney, Charlie Cunningham, was unable to attend the April 10 hearing but sent another attorney—Logan Mustain—in his stead. Mr. Mustain informed the court that he was “well and sufficiently advised as to what’s going on this case.”
3 was solely for the purpose of addressing the motions to continue rather than a hearing on
the merits: “It’s my understanding that, you know, for the purposes of today, really we are
addressing the motion to continue.”
The circuit court ruled that the Frasers lacked standing to request a continuance in
the McCorkles’ adoption case. The Frasers then conceded that if the circuit court granted
the McCorkles’ petition to adopt, their motions for continuance would be moot. The circuit
court held in abeyance the Frasers’ motion to continue and held the scheduled hearing on
the McCorkles’ petition. After finding that it was in MC’s best interest to be placed with the
McCorkles, the circuit court denied the Frasers’ motions to continue as moot.
II. Standard of Review
A motion for continuance shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.
Grimwood v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 417, at 3, 586 S.W.3d 667, 669. The
appellant bears the burden of showing that the circuit court’s denial of a continuance was
an abuse of discretion, and to show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that he
or she was prejudiced by the denial. Id. at 3–4, 586 S.W.3d at 670. A circuit court abuses its
discretion when it acts improvidently and without due consideration. Id. Lack of diligence
by the moving party is sufficient reason to deny a motion for continuance. Britt v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 95, at 7–8, 640 S.W.3d 721, 726. Credibility determinations
are within the circuit court’s discretion, and appellate courts will not question those
determinations on appeal. Copp v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 491, at 13, 679
S.W.3d 380, 390.
4 III. Discussion
On appeal, the Frasers argue that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied
their motion for continuance. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the McCorkles’ adoption
decree is void because it did not follow the case-numbering mandates under the adoption
code; accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to rely on that adoption decree to dismiss
their motion for continuance as moot. Second, the Frasers argue they were prejudiced by the
circuit court’s abuse of discretion since they were unable to introduce evidence about their
custody of MC’s half sister and have “their day in court.”
First, at the start of the April 10 hearing, the Frasers’ counsel conceded that their
motion for continuance would become moot if the McCorkles’ petition for adoption of MC
was granted. The circuit court reiterated this before holding the motion in abeyance: “And
as for your continuance in the petition for adoption . . . as you have pointed out, [counsel
for the Frasers], even if it were to be granted, it’s a moot point if the other case and the
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Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 402 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-24-391
CALANDRA LOCK-FRASER AND Opinion Delivered September 3, 2025
JAHNELL FRASER APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 30JV-20-69] V. HONORABLE STEPHEN SHIRRON, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD AFFIRMED APPELLEES
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Calandra Lock-Fraser and Jahnell Fraser appeal the denial of their motion for
continuance and the grant of the decree of adoption to Victoria and Brandon McCorkle,
Minor Child’s (MC’s) foster parents. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the decree of
adoption is void, and therefore, that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for
continuance as moot. We affirm.
I. Background
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-
neglect concerning MC on October 23, 2020. In the petition, the affiant attested that there
were findings of inadequate supervision, minimal compliance with the case plan, and failures to protect.1 MC was removed from the care of her biological parents because the
circumstances in the home presented an immediate danger to her health. After multiple,
unsuccessful attempts at reunification, parental rights were terminated on May 12, 2023.2
DHS initially attempted to place MC with Calandra Lock-Fraser, MC’s maternal
grandmother; and Jahnell Fraser, Calandra’s spouse, but it determined that the Frasers were
not suitable caretakers for MC. Specifically, DHS noted that Jahnell had recently been
arrested for aggravated assault with Calandra listed as the victim, and Jahnell had previously
been arrested in 2018 for pulling a knife on Calandra.3 Further, DHS noted that MC’s
biological mother would likely have unrestricted access to MC if she was placed with the
Frasers. Consequently, MC was placed in foster care outside the family.
On November 29, 2023, the Frasers sought to intervene in the case, and the circuit
court entered an order allowing them to intervene for the sole purpose of pursuing their
petition to adopt MC. On February 5, 2024, the Frasers filed their petition for adoption but
did not seek DHS’s consent for their petition, nor is there evidence that they later tried to
obtain DHS’s consent. Without DHS’s consent, the circuit court was unable to grant the
1 The failure-to-protect claim resulted from the biological mother and father engaging in heavy drug use in front of MC, the mother driving “high” with MC in the vehicle, posting on Facebook Live that MC was getting a “contact high,” and the belief that the biological father was dealing controlled substances while caring for MC. 2 The biological parents appealed, and the termination order was affirmed on appeal. Moore v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 4, 682 S.W.3d 706. 3 The charges were later dropped or never formally charged.
2 Frasers’ petition. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-206(a)(3) (Repl. 2020). On February 21, 2024,
the McCorkles filed identical adoption petitions both in the instant case and in a new
secondary case.
The circuit court held a post-termination hearing on March 13, 2024.4 The circuit
court set the hearing on the McCorkles’ adoption petition on the same day as the hearing
on the Frasers’ adoption petition, April 10, 2024. On April 5, the Frasers sought a
continuance, claiming that they needed additional time to perfect service on DHS. The
Frasers renewed their motion for continuance on April 9, alleging only that they needed
additional time to perfect service on DHS.
No orders granting or denying the Frasers’ two motions for continuance were issued,
and all parties were present at the April 10 hearing.5 At that point, the Frasers’ again
requested a continuance in order to serve the director of DHS. The Frasers’ further requested
a continuance on the McCorkles’ petition to adopt MC. The Frasers’ counsel attested that
he had “placed the necessary documents, certified mail, to – to attempt that service” but
failed to articulate when he mailed these documents and why he had waited until just before
the hearing to do so. Additionally, the Frasers’ counsel mistakenly thought that the hearing
4 The Frasers were not present for the post-termination hearing; however, their limited intervention allowed them only to petition to adopt MC, and that did not extend to the post-termination hearing. 5 The Frasers’ attorney, Charlie Cunningham, was unable to attend the April 10 hearing but sent another attorney—Logan Mustain—in his stead. Mr. Mustain informed the court that he was “well and sufficiently advised as to what’s going on this case.”
3 was solely for the purpose of addressing the motions to continue rather than a hearing on
the merits: “It’s my understanding that, you know, for the purposes of today, really we are
addressing the motion to continue.”
The circuit court ruled that the Frasers lacked standing to request a continuance in
the McCorkles’ adoption case. The Frasers then conceded that if the circuit court granted
the McCorkles’ petition to adopt, their motions for continuance would be moot. The circuit
court held in abeyance the Frasers’ motion to continue and held the scheduled hearing on
the McCorkles’ petition. After finding that it was in MC’s best interest to be placed with the
McCorkles, the circuit court denied the Frasers’ motions to continue as moot.
II. Standard of Review
A motion for continuance shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.
Grimwood v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 417, at 3, 586 S.W.3d 667, 669. The
appellant bears the burden of showing that the circuit court’s denial of a continuance was
an abuse of discretion, and to show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that he
or she was prejudiced by the denial. Id. at 3–4, 586 S.W.3d at 670. A circuit court abuses its
discretion when it acts improvidently and without due consideration. Id. Lack of diligence
by the moving party is sufficient reason to deny a motion for continuance. Britt v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 95, at 7–8, 640 S.W.3d 721, 726. Credibility determinations
are within the circuit court’s discretion, and appellate courts will not question those
determinations on appeal. Copp v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 491, at 13, 679
S.W.3d 380, 390.
4 III. Discussion
On appeal, the Frasers argue that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied
their motion for continuance. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the McCorkles’ adoption
decree is void because it did not follow the case-numbering mandates under the adoption
code; accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to rely on that adoption decree to dismiss
their motion for continuance as moot. Second, the Frasers argue they were prejudiced by the
circuit court’s abuse of discretion since they were unable to introduce evidence about their
custody of MC’s half sister and have “their day in court.”
First, at the start of the April 10 hearing, the Frasers’ counsel conceded that their
motion for continuance would become moot if the McCorkles’ petition for adoption of MC
was granted. The circuit court reiterated this before holding the motion in abeyance: “And
as for your continuance in the petition for adoption . . . as you have pointed out, [counsel
for the Frasers], even if it were to be granted, it’s a moot point if the other case and the
adoption is granted therein.”
Second, even if the Frasers had standing to collaterally attack the validity of the
adoption decree in another case, the McCorkles’ case, they do not present a compelling
argument that the decree is void. The Frasers contend that failure to strictly adhere to the
adoption code renders the adoption decree void. In fact, our supreme court has rejected a
strict-compliance standard:
[Appellant’s] argument seems to suggest that any noncompliance with the adoption code, however slight, would prohibit a probate court’s entry of an adoption decree. Such suggestion by its very nature would extend
5 Arkansas’s settled rule so as to permit an adoption order to be set aside for a reason other than fraud, duress, or intimidation. Certainly, no statute is cited to support this idea and our case law, particularly this court’s decision in Pierce, disabuses us of any such notion.
See Martin v. Martin, 316 Ark. 765, 769–70, 875 S.W.2d 819, 821 (1994).6
Here, the McCorkles’ petition for adoption was filed in the instant case and in a new
juvenile case. The McCorkles respond that this is proper procedure and cite the “Instructions
for the State of Arkansas Circuit Court: Juvenile Dependency-Neglect” as support. Indeed,
the state-propagated instructions inform courts that “although an adoption in juvenile court
arises from an existing case, it should be filed as a new case and receive a new case number.”
Accordingly, even if it was improper to create a new case, the error was not sufficient to
render the entire adoption decree void, contrary to the Frasers’ argument.
Finally, the Frasers have not provided any evidence that they were prejudiced by the
denial of their motion for continuance. As support for a finding of prejudice, the Frasers
argue that (1) they were not able to present evidence of a relationship between MC and MC’s
half sibling; and (2) they did not get “their day in court.” Neither argument was preserved
for appellate review. Dejarnette v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 410, 654 S.W.3d
83. The only reason the Frasers cited in their motion for continuance was the need to perfect
6 The Frasers cite London v. Sauerwin, 2023 Ark. App. 525, as support for their contention that strict adherence to the adoption code is required. London does not—in any way—deal with or discuss the adoption code. Nor is it applicable to the instant case. Furthermore, London cannot override Martin.
6 service on DHS. Consequently, because these arguments were not preserved for appeal, we
do not address them here.
IV. Conclusion
The Frasers bore the burden of demonstrating that the circuit court abused its
discretion by failing to grant their motion for continuance. As explained above, they have
failed to meet this burden. The adoption decree is not void, and even if the Frasers had
standing to challenge the adoption decree in the McCorkles’ case, they have failed to preserve
any argument that they suffered any prejudice from the circuit court’s denial of their motions
for continuance.
Affirmed.
BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.
D. Franklin Arey III, for appellants.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.