Cairns v. Quinn

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 17, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-01979
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NIGEL CAIRNS, Case No.: 22cv1979-LL-KSC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

14 TOMMY QUINN, et al., [ECF No. 9] 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Robert 18 Longstreth and Abraham Barragan (together, the “Superior Court Defendants”), filed on 19 February 10, 2023. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed his response in opposition on July 19, 2023 20 [ECF No. 17], and the Superior Court Defendants filed their Reply on August 2, 2023 [ECF 21 No. 18]. The Court finds this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without 22 oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 23 7.1.d.1. Upon review of the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court 24 GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss because the Superior Court Defendants are entitled to 25 absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff Nigel Cairns filed this action against Defendants 28 Tommy Quinn, Tamatha Thomas, Dewayne Frost, Jamie Sloan, John Boyce, Robert 1 Longstreth, Abraham Barragan, and Stephen Paz. ECF No. 1. On January 12, 2023, the 2 case was transferred to the undersigned pursuant to the “low number rule” because Plaintiff 3 filed a case arising from the same or substantially identical transactions, happenings, or 4 events, involving the same or substantially the same parties or property as a case which 5 was terminated by the Court less than one year prior to the current case being filed. ECF 6 No. 5. Plaintiff’s previous case before the undersigned, brought against Quinn, Boyce, Paz, 7 Longstreth, and Barragan, was dismissed without prejudice on November 8, 2022. See 8 Cairns v. Quinn et al., No. 3:22-cv-1081-LL-KSC, ECF No. 7. On June 7, 2023, the Court 9 dismissed all defendants in the instant case, other than the Superior Court Defendants, for 10 failure to serve those defendants with the summons and complaint within ninety days of 11 filing his complaint. ECF No. 14. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 “It is well established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for their 14 judicial acts.” Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pierson v. 15 Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967)). This “reflects the long-standing ‘general principle of 16 the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in 17 exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, 18 without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of 19 Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 20 (1871)). Consistent with this principle, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because 21 the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; 22 rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all 23 jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. 24 at 351). 25 “Absolute judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to 26 nonjudicial officers for ‘all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions.’” In re 27 Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). As such, “[c]ourt clerks have 1 absolute quasi-judicial immunity . . . when they perform tasks that are an integral part of 2 the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) 3 (collecting cases) (emphasis added). Furthermore, absolute quasi-judicial immunity has 4 been extended “to court clerks and other nonjudicial officers for purely administrative acts 5 -- acts which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context 6 are actually a part of the judicial function.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 952 (citing Moore v. 7 Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996)). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff’s allegations, which include those against the now-dismissed defendants in 10 this case, revolve around events in 2021 related to his residence at the Island Inn. See ECF 11 No. 1 at 6-8. According to Plaintiff, after several disputes with individuals either contracted 12 by or employed directly by the Island Inn, and suffering an assault by Defendant Sloan, 13 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Island Inn, and Sloan filed and was granted a temporary 14 restraining order (“TRO”) against Plaintiff. Id. at 7-8.1 The ROAs in those cases show that 15 the cases were filed on the same day [ECF Nos. 17-3 at 1, 17-4 at 1], that Sloan was granted 16 a restraining order against Plaintiff on January 20, 2022 [ECF No. 17-3 at 2], and that 17 Plaintiff’s restraining order against Sloan (sued as “Jamie Doe”) was denied without 18 prejudice on that same date [ECF No. 17-4 at 2]. Plaintiff appealed the restraining order 19 granted against him in Sloan v. Cairns [ECF No. 17-3 at 2], and in designating the record 20 for his appeal, wrote in “Please see related case 37-2021-00044796-CU-PT-CTL” in the 21 section directing the appellant to designate any exhibits admitted, refused, or lodged in the 22 23 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the register of actions (“ROA”) in Sloan v. Cairns, 37- 24 2021-00044690-CU-HR-CTL [ECF No. 17-3, Ex. 1], the ROA in Cairns v. Doe, 37-2021- 25 00044796-CU-PT-CTL [ECF No. 17-4, Ex. 2], and the page three of the “Appellant’s Notice Designating Record on Appeal (Unlimited Civil Case), APP-003 (Rev. January 1, 26 2019)” [ECF No. 17-5 at 1, Ex. 3]. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 27 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record) (citing Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 28 1 underlying case [ECF No. 17-5 at 1]. Following those actions in the state court, Plaintiff 2 brought the instant action alleging a denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 3 seeking compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of one million dollars. ECF No. 4 1 at 7-9. Because the remaining Defendants have been dismissed, the Court limits its 5 discussion to the allegations pertaining to the two remaining defendants: Robert 6 Longstreth, a judge of the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego, and 7 Abraham Barragan, a court operations clerk of the same court. Plaintiff brings suit against 8 both Defendants in their individual capacities. Id. at 5. 9 Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court Defendants were involved in the 10 aforementioned state court legal actions in their roles as judge and as clerk. See ECF Nos. 11 1 at 7-8; 17 at 1-2. Although he does not allege specific acts or omissions by either 12 Longstreth or Barragan, Plaintiff alleges that he “could not obtain a copy of evidence [he] 13 has submitted to [Defendant Longstreth’s] department which [he] needed for [his] appeal,” 14 and that, “[t]he Court Record on Appeal did not contain the material [he] had submitted as 15 a plaintiff.” Id. at 7. Without making any more specific claims as to Longstreth or Barragan, 16 Plaintiff alleges that “Judge Longstreth dismissed my case and made Jamie Sloan’s 17 [temporary restraining order (“TRO”)] permanent. I could not get a copy of the material I 18 had submitted to Judge Longstreth to include in my appeal. Furthermore . . . the ‘Court 19 Record on Appeal” [] did not contain my original TRO filings[.]” Id. at 8. Plaintiff’s 20 opposition to the Motion to Dismiss states that he was “unable to obtain the material [he] 21 had submitted” in Cairns v. Doe by emailing Longstreth’s judicial department, and 22 subsequently attempted to include those filings to his appeal of the TRO granted against 23 him in Sloan v. Cairns by adding “please see related case 37-2021-000444796-CU-PT- 24 CTL” on his notice designating his record on appeal in Sloan v. Cairns. See ECF No. 17 at 25 2. Plaintiff also alleges that he “presume[s]” that he also appealed the denial of his 26 restraining order in Cairns v. Doe, and questions, based on its absence on the ROA, whether 27 his notice of appeal in the case was ever received. Id. 28 1 Although Plaintiff’s allegations are threadbare, the Court construes his complaint 2 liberally in light of his pro se status. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 3 1987). The Court understands Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court Defendants as 4 twofold: (1) that his appeal in Cairns v. Doe was never filed by the state court; and (2) that 5 the record in Cairns v. Doe was not included in his record on appeal of Sloan v. Cairns.2 6 Plaintiff fails to explicate these claims, but based on Plaintiff’s allegations and the ROAs 7 in Plaintiff’s state court cases, it would appear that Plaintiff argues that Longstreth is 8 responsible for Plaintiff’s inability to receive a copy of the record in Cairns v. Doe by 9 emailing Longstreth’s judicial department, and that Plaintiff argues that Barragan is 10 responsible for the non-filing of his appeal in Cairns v. Doe as well as the superior court’s 11 failure to include the record in Cairns v. Doe on his appeal in Sloan v. Cairns. 12 There are multiple grounds for granting the Superior Court Defendants’ Motion to 13 Dismiss. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint clearly 14 identify which defendant(s) are named in which claim(s) and specify—for each claim and 15 each defendant—the factual allegations that support liability for each defendant such that 16 they have fair notice of a plaintiff’s claim(s) and the grounds for their claim(s). See Dura 17 Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 18 47 (1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To state a claim against Defendants in their 19 individual capacities under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege with specificity: (1) that he 20 possessed and was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) by an individual; (3) who acted 21 under color of state law. See Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 22 23 24 2 As addressed by the Superior Court Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, to the extent 25 that Plaintiff wishes to challenge Longstreth’s rulings in the state court cases, such claim(s) are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 26 855, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established 27 jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising appellate review over final state court final judgments.”). 28 1 1991) (citation omitted). Plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated 2 in the constitutional deprivation alleged. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) 3 (citing Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)). Though Plaintiff’s complaint 4 makes reference to a denial of due process under § 1983, none of the allegations currently 5 before the Court constitute specific allegations that either articulate the deprivation of due 6 process or any other constitutional right, or that Longstreth or Barragan personally 7 participated in any of the alleged misconduct. In the absence of specific allegations 8 concerning Defendants’ involvement, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim 9 under § 1983. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and 10 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to 11 withstand a motion to dismiss.”). 12 Beyond Plaintiff’s failure to state a plausible § 1983 claim, his complaint also fails 13 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because his claims are barred by the 14 doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. As discussed above, although Plaintiff 15 has not made any specific allegations about how Longstreth or Barragan personally 16 participated in the alleged misconduct, but it is clear that all of the actions or omissions 17 alleged by Plaintiff relate to Longstreth’s judicial capacity and Barragan’s administrative 18 acts in the context of judicial functions. Plaintiff has not alleged that Longstreth or 19 Barragan have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction or that their acts were non-judicial 20 in nature. Accordingly, Longstreth and Barragan are entitled to absolute judicial immunity 21 and absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their actions. See Haile v. Sawyer, 76 F. App’x 22 129, 130 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against a judge and court 23 clerk under judicial and quasi-judicial immunity). As such, the Superior Court Defendants’ 24 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 25 Having considered the factors articulated in Foman v. Davis, the Court finds that any 26 amendment would be futile to overcome judicial and quasi-judicial immunity in this case. 27 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although the district court normally grants leave to amend when 28 1 dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 2 Cir. 2000) (en banc), the Court DENIES leave to amend as futile. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 In accordance with the above, the Court hereby: 5 1. GRANTS the Superior Court Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss □□□□□□□□□□□ 6 || complaint [ECF No. 9]; 7 2. DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs complaint [ECF No. 1]; and 8 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: August 17, 2023 NO 1] QF | 12 Honorable Linda Lopez 3 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28