Cahill v. Sanders

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PAM CAHILL and CARL CAHILL, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) )

v. ) C.A. N23C-10-205 JRJ )

STEVEN SANDERS and MELANIE ) MCGAHA, )

)

Defendants. )

Date Submitted: July 8, 2024 Date Decided: July 25, 2024

ORDER

Upon consideration of Defendants’, Steven Sanders (“Sanders”) and Melanie

McGaha (“McGaha”), Pro Se Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

(“Motion”),1 Plaintiffs’, Pam Cahill (“Pam”)2 and Carl Cahill (“Cahill”), Pro Se

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion,3 and the record in this case, IT APPEARS

THAT:

(1) This is a civil action arising from the soured relationship between a

grandfather, Cahill, and his grandson, Sanders.4 Cahill used to reside with

1 Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Trans. ID 73562829 (July 8, 2024) (hereinafter “Mot.”). 2 The Court uses Plaintiff’s first name to distinguish her from Carl Cahill; no disrespect or familiarity is intended. 3 Pls.’ Mot. to Deny Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Trans. ID 73276897 (May 31, 2024) (hereinafter “Pls.’ Opp’n”). 4 See generally Second Am. Compl., Trans. ID 73276464 (May 31, 2024).

Defendants in Delaware. In February 2022 Defendants were looking for a new

house to better accommodate Cahill’s disabilities.5 Sanders informed Cahill that he

did not have the money for a downpayment and that he needed $100,000.00 “in the

bank” before he could purchase a new home.6 The parties entered into a verbal

agreement in which Cahill wrote a check for $100,000.00 and, in return, Sanders

agreed to look for a suitable home.7 Sanders deposited the check.8

(2) Cahill alleges that beginning March 6, 2022, Sanders became “verbally

abusive, distant, and stopped looking at houses.”9 Sanders removed a/c vents from

the ceiling and a portable heater from the room Cahill occupied, and as alleged,

rented.10 Cahill alleges that, at one point, Sanders took Cahill’s cellphone before

leaving the residence with McGaha and left him by himself.11 Cahill was 88 years

old at the time.12

5 Id. ¶ 1. 6 Id. ¶ 2. 7 Id. ¶ 3. 8 Id. ¶ 5. 9 Id. 10 Id. ¶ 6. 11 Id. 12 Id.

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(3) Cahill alleges that on or about May 10, 2022, Sanders “illegally

evicted” Cahill.13 At this point, Cahill asked Sanders to return the $100,000.00 since

the parties were no longer going to buy a house together.14 Sanders refused.15

(4) On May 14, 2022, Cahill moved out of the shared residence and

informed the Defendants that he would return on May 17th to gather the rest of his

belongings.16 When Cahill returned to the residence, McGaha prevented him from

retrieving the rest of his items.17

(5) On October 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their first Pro Se Complaint with

the Court.18 On December 21, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer denying all the

allegations made in the Complaint.19

(6) On March 7, 2024, the Court held a scheduling conference during

which it directed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the

hearing.20 Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on April 16, 2024.21 Then,

on May 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“Amended

Complaint”).22 Because Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint after Defendants

13 Id. ¶ 7. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. ¶ 9. 17 Id. ¶ 10. Cahill claims that a “Police Move Out” was required. Id. 18 Compl., Trans. ID 71185871 (Oct. 25, 2023). 19 Defs.’ Answer, Trans. ID 71675647 (Dec. 21, 2023). 20 Judicial Action Form, Trans. ID 72331744 (Mar. 7, 2024). 21 Am. Compl., Trans. ID 72758936 (Apr. 16, 2024). 22 See Second Am. Compl.

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had already filed their motion to dismiss,23 the Court granted Defendants leave to

file an amended motion to dismiss.24 Defendants filed their Motion on July 8,

2024.25

(7) Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the

grounds that “plaintiffs have thrice tried and thrice failed to create a document which

states a clear, concise and legally recognized CIVIL CLAIM.”26 Plaintiffs respond

that “[t]he claims and violation codes are recognized by DE Law and Statute and are

interpretable by an average layman.”27

(8) Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss an

action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” 28 Upon a

motion to dismiss, the Court (i) accepts all well-pled factual allegations as true, (ii)

accepts even vague allegations as well-pled if they give the opposing party notice of

the claim, (iii) draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and

(iv) only dismisses a case where the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under

any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.29 The Court will “ignore

23 Motion to Dismiss, Trans. ID 72759057 (Apr. 16, 2024). 24 Court’s Letter to Parties, Trans. ID 73426264 (June 18, 2024). 25 Mot. The Court also granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended response to the amended motion within 15 days of the amended motion being docketed. Plaintiffs did not file an amended response. 26 Mot. (emphasis in original). 27 Pls.’ Opp’n ¶ 6. 28 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). 29 See Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011).

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conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.”30 In

Delaware, the governing pleading standard is “reasonable conceivability,”31 and the

“petitioner [must] place the defendant on notice of the claims against him.”32

(9) The Court notes that all parties to the action are pro se litigants. While

the Court is willing to grant pro se litigants some leeway, “[t]here is no different set

of rules for pro se plaintiffs,” and the Court will not “sacrifice the orderly and

efficient administration of justice to accommodate an unrepresented plaintiff.”33

“[A]t a minimum, the pleading must be adequate so the Court may conduct a

meaningful consideration of the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claims.”34

(10) Plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint cite to three sections/chapters of

the Delaware Code they allege Defendants violated.35

(11) Plaintiffs first reference Title 31, Chapter 39 of the Delaware Code

which concerns Adult Protective Services in relation to Welfare Agencies.36

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated several subsections of Section 3913.37

30 Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998). 31 Central Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 537. 32 Boatswain v. Miller, 2023 WL 6141312, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2023). 33 Draper v. Med. Ctr. Of Delaware, 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001). 34 Harrison v. City or Town of Smyrna, 2017 WL 5624306, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 16, 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Alston v. Dipasquale, 2002 WL 77116, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 4, 2002)). 35 See generally Second Am. Compl. 36 See 31 Del. C. § 3901. 37 Plaintiffs cite to Section 3902, but Section 3902 merely provides a list of definitions. See 31 Del. C. § 3902.

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Violations of Section 3913 are criminal violations.38 This is a civil lawsuit and so

Section 3913 is inapplicable.39

(12) Plaintiffs next cite to Title 25, Chapter 53 which governs Landlord

Obligations and Tenant Remedies. Pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 5313, Plaintiffs allege

that Defendants illegally evicted Cahill without a 60-day notice, “kept [the] balance

of rent after eviction,” excluded Cahill from the rented room, and refused to return

his property.40 Section 5313 states, “[i]f removed from the premises or excluded

therefrom by the landlord or the landlord’s agent, except under color of a valid court

order authorizing such removal or exclusion, the tenant may recover possession or

terminate the rental agreement.”41 The Court finds plaintiffs have stated a claim for

which relief can be granted under Section 5313. If Plaintiffs can prove there was an

enforceable rental agreement in place, and that Defendants were acting as landlords

under Delaware law, then Plaintiffs may be entitled to relief under Section 5313. At

the very least, Defendants are sufficiently on notice of this claim.42

38 See 31 Del. C. § 3913 (listing both misdemeanor and felony violations). 39 Plaintiffs also reference 11 Del. C. § 1451 in their Amended Complaint. Section 1451 is Theft of a Firearm, a Class F Felony. See 11 Del. C. § 1451. Again, this is a civil case, not a criminal prosecution. This section is likewise inapplicable. 40 See Second Am. Compl. at 2. 41 25 Del. C. § 5313. If Plaintiffs prevail on this claim, they would be entitled to “treble the damages sustained or an amount equal to 3 times the per diem rent for the period of time the tenant was excluded from the unit, whichever is greater, and the costs of the suit excluding attorneys' fees.” Id. 42 See Central Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 536 (“When considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a trial court should accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true, [and] accept even vague allegations in the Complaint as ‘well-pleaded’ if they provide the defendant notice of the claim . . .. Indeed, it may, as a factual matter, ultimately prove impossible for the plaintiff to

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(13) Plaintiffs seek some sort of Court redress concerning the $100,000.00

payment that Cahill made to Sanders,43 but none of Plaintiffs’ three complaints

properly plead a civil cause of action related to the $100,000.00. To the extent

Plaintiffs are attempting to allege some sort of fraud claim, that claim fails because

fraud must be pled with particularity.44

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Pro Se

Motion to Dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs’

claim as it relates to an unlawful eviction remains, the remaining claims in the

Amended Complaint are dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jan R. Jurden

Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

Original to Prothonotary cc: Pam Cahill and Carl Cahill, pro se Steven Sanders and Melanie McGaha, pro se

prove his claims at a later stage of a proceeding, but that is not the test to survive a motion to dismiss.”). 43 See Second Am. Compl. (“Plaintiff(s) seek to made whole again, pray for and seek general relief by the Defendant(s) returning the $100,000.00 plus interest . . .”). 44 See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9; Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2763903, at *9 n. 89 (Del. Super. July 1, 2021) (“Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard applies to all litigants, even pro se ones.”); see also Maddox v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 1155312, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2014) (“When the Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to better describe his claims, Plaintiff again failed to allege his fraud claim with particularity. While the Court may grant pro se litigants reasonable accommodations where possible based on their lack of familiarity with the law, procedural requirements will not be relaxed.”).