Cahill v. Hall

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Cahill v. Hall

37 N.E. 573, 161 Mass. 512, 1894 Mass. LEXIS 232

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedJune 20, 1894

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 37 N.E. 573 (Cahill v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cahill v. Hall, 37 N.E. 573, 161 Mass. 512, 1894 Mass. LEXIS 232 (Mass. 1894).

Pincite

Opinion

Holmes, J.

Whether the colt belonged to the defendant or to her son, the son had possession of it for his own benefit. Putting the case in the strongest way for the plaintiff, the defendant did no more than to lend the colt to her son. She did'not know of the contract with the plaintiff. Her son did not purport to contract on her behalf, nor did the plaintiff rely upon any supposed authority from her, or render the services on her credit. When one person lends a horse to another without more, he does not authorize the latter to make him answerable for its keep or improvement. See Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass. 201; Howes v. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76, 80. Possession alone is no more ostensible authority to bind the owner for keeping and training than it is to sell, apart from statute. Even if circumstances could be imagined under which, without an actual knowledge of the owner, consent might be implied sufficient to create a lien under Pub. Sts. c. 192, § 32, (Lynde v. Parker, 155 Mass. 481,) there is nothing in this case which would warrant the finding of an actual contract binding on the defendant. There is equally little ground for charging her upon a fictitious or quasi contract. The plaintiff furnished his services under a valid contract with the son, and must look to him.

Judgment for the defendant.

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Holmes, J.

Whether the colt belonged to the defendant or to her son, the son had possession of it for his own benefit. Putting the case in the strongest way for the plaintiff, the defendant did no more than to lend the colt to her son. She did'not know of the contract with the plaintiff. Her son did not purport to contract on her behalf, nor did the plaintiff rely upon any supposed authority from her, or render the services on her credit. When one person lends a horse to another without more, he does not authorize the latter to make him answerable for its keep or improvement. See Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass. 201; Howes v. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76, 80. Possession alone is no more ostensible authority to bind the owner for keeping and training than it is to sell, apart from statute. Even if circumstances could be imagined under which, without an actual knowledge of the owner, consent might be implied sufficient to create a lien under Pub. Sts. c. 192, § 32, (Lynde v. Parker, 155 Mass. 481,) there is nothing in this case which would warrant the finding of an actual contract binding on the defendant. There is equally little ground for charging her upon a fictitious or quasi contract. The plaintiff furnished his services under a valid contract with the son, and must look to him.

Judgment for the defendant.

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Bluebook (online)

37 N.E. 573, 161 Mass. 512, 1894 Mass. LEXIS 232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cahill-v-hall-mass-1894.

Opinion

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