Cahill v. Dorn

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Cahill v. Dorn

519 So. 2d 56, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 276, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 234, 1988 WL 4063

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJanuary 27, 1988

DocketNo. 87-0405

StatusPublished

This text of 519 So. 2d 56 (Cahill v. Dorn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Cahill v. Dorn, 519 So. 2d 56, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 276, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 234, 1988 WL 4063 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse and remand for a new trial on the authority of Dinowitz v. Wein-rub, 493 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In this case, just as in Dinowitz, the trial court admitted testimony of an investigating police officer of statements made to the officer by the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident forming the basis of this legal dispute. Since the driver of the vehicle was not a party to the legal action, his out-of-court statements constituted hearsay. In addition, we held in Dinowitz that the admission of such a statement is barred by the provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1985) barring the admission into evidence of reports made to police officers by persons involved in automobile accidents. Finally, because the statement made to the police officer was consistent [57]*57with the appellee’s version of the accident we cannot say that its admission was harmless to appellant’s case.

ANSTEAD, J., and SALMON, MICHAEL H., Associate Judge, concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse and remand for a new trial on the authority of Dinowitz v. Wein-rub, 493 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In this case, just as in Dinowitz, the trial court admitted testimony of an investigating police officer of statements made to the officer by the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident forming the basis of this legal dispute. Since the driver of the vehicle was not a party to the legal action, his out-of-court statements constituted hearsay. In addition, we held in Dinowitz that the admission of such a statement is barred by the provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1985) barring the admission into evidence of reports made to police officers by persons involved in automobile accidents. Finally, because the statement made to the police officer was consistent [57]*57with the appellee’s version of the accident we cannot say that its admission was harmless to appellant’s case.

ANSTEAD, J., and SALMON, MICHAEL H., Associate Judge, concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.

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519 So. 2d 56, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 276, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 234, 1988 WL 4063, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cahill-v-dorn-fladistctapp-1988.

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