Cahall v. Burbage

121 A. 646, 14 Del. Ch. 55, 1923 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJune 1, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 121 A. 646 (Cahall v. Burbage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cahall v. Burbage, 121 A. 646, 14 Del. Ch. 55, 1923 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

In Lofland v.Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl. 1, the Supreme Court of this State, after reviewing the facts attending the issuance of fifteen shares of the capital stock of Lewes Fisheries Company by the directors to each of themselves, said:

“Our conclusion is, that' the appellants, acting as directors, issued to themselves the ninety shares of stock on September 19, 1911, not only without paying for the same as required by the Constitution, but without any consideration at all. They parted with nothing of value, paid nothing for the stock and had no thought of paying for it. Their act was a pure gift from themselves as directors to themselves as individuals without the consent or knowledge of the other stockholders, and constructively fraudulent. Such being the case, the transaction was voidable at the election of the company.”

The fifteen shares of stock issued to the defendant, Burbage, are in the same situation as were the ninety shares issued to the other six directors in the other suit. They therefore must, in the light of the Supreme Court’s finding, be held to have been fradulently issued and to be voidable at the election of the company.

The only question open for discussion in the pending cause is as to the extent of the decree to be entered. In the suit against the other six directors, it so happened that the fifteen shares issued to each of them continued to be held by each of them down to the date [57]*57of the decree. The decree in that case directed that all dividends paid .out on the shares should be returned to the company and that each of the fifteen shares, ninety in all, should be canceled. This was in harmony with the theory that the company, through its receiver, had chosen to elect to avoid the issuance of the stock.

In the instant case the facts are different. Here, Burbage does not now have the fifteen shares issued to him. After receiving a twenty per cent, dividend ($300) on January 1,1912, he sold his stock to an innocent purchaser for value, receiving therefor either $120 or $130 a share. Thereafter, further current dividends were declared on the said fifteen shares, and duly paid, as follows: December 24, 1912, ten per cent. ($150); January 15, 1914, ten per cent. ($150); January 5, 1915, ten per cent. ($150); December 20, 1916, ten per cent. ($150); and December 18,1917, and June 10, 1918, distribution dividends respectively of one hundred and fifty per cent. ($2,250) and fifteen per cent. ($225) were paid in the course of winding up the company’s affairs. It thus appears that while Burbage held the stock he personally received $300 in dividends; and that his transferee received a total in dividends of $3,075. It also appears that there will be a further distribution dividend which the purchaser of the defendant’s stock will, as an innocent holder for value, be entitled to receive.

When the six directors in the other suit paid back to the company all dividends and surrendered the shares unlawfully issued, it is apparent that they were but returning to the company all that they had personally received. In that case money damage to the company arising from the fraudulent issue exactly equaled the personal profit reaped by the defendants. In the instant case, however, the fact that Burbage sold his stock to a bona fide purchaser after personally receiving only one dividend of $300 brings about the result that the damage done to the company exceeds the persnal profit obtained by the wrongdoer, because in addition to the dividend of $300 so received by the defendant, the company has been required to pay to the present holder of the fifteen shares of stock the further dividends above mentioned and will be required to pay to such holder the final distribution dividend yet to be declared.

The defendant contends that he should be held accountable [58]*58only for the profit actually received by him personally, and that he should not be directed to make good the total loss which his wrongdoing has occasioned the company. On the other hand, the complainant contends that the measure of the sum due upon a breach of trust is not what the violator of the confidence has himself profited, but rather what he has caused his cestui que trust to lose, and that this is the rule that should prevail in such circumstances as are found here.

That the liability of the defendant is to be determined according to the principles that obtain in dealings by a trustee with property of his trust, is plainly settled by the decision of the Suppreme Court of this State in Lofland v. Cahall, supra. If this were an ordinary case of breach of trust, what would be the measure of the sum which the wrongdoer should be decreed to pay? Textbooks and adjudicated cases unite in giving the same answer to this question.

In Hill on Trustees, (2d Amer. Ed.) at star page 521, the following is found:

“The relief afforded in equity, in case of a breach of trust, is twofold: First, it is retrospective, in order to remedy the mischief already done; and, secondly, prospective, with a view to the prevention of further injury. * * * And in taking the account against the trustee, he will invariably be charged with the amount of principal and income, which would or might have been received from the trust estate, if no breach of trust had been committed."

Professor Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, (4th Ed.) at Section 1080 of Volume 3, lays down the following rule:

“It has already been shown that a beneficiary may always claim and reach the trust property through all its changes of form while in the hand of the trustee, and that he may also follow it into the possession and apparent ownership of third persons, until it has been transferred to a bona jide purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice; and that a court of equity will furnish him with all the incidental remedies necessary to enforce his claim and to render it effective. In addition to this claim of the beneficiary upon the trust estate as long as it exists, the trustee incurs a personal liability for a breach of trust by way of compensation or indemnification, which the beneficiary may enforce at his election, and which becomes his only remedy whenever the trust property has-been lost or put beyond his reach by the trustee’s wrongful act. The trustee’s personal liability to make compensation for the loss occasioned by a breach of trust is ,a simple contract equitable debt. It [59]*59may be enforced by a suit in equity against the trustee himself, or against his estate after his death, and the statute of limitations will not be admitted as a defense unless the statutory language is express and mandatory upon the court. The amount of the liability is always sufficient for the complete indemnification and compensation of the' beneficiary.”

In Perry on Trusts, (6th Ed.) Vol. 2, § 847, p. 1386, it is said:

“In awarding compensation to the cestui que trust for a breach of trust by the trustee, the court does not regard it as material that the trustee has made no profit or advantage out of the estate. If there is a breach of trust, and an inevitable calamity destroys the property, the trustee must account for it.”

In the very lengthy case of Hart v. Ten Eyck, reported in 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 62, Chancellor Kent used the following language:

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Bluebook (online)
121 A. 646, 14 Del. Ch. 55, 1923 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cahall-v-burbage-delch-1923.