Caguas Central Federal Sayings Bank v. United States

215 F.3d 1304
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJune 21, 2000
DocketNo. 99-5084
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 215 F.3d 1304 (Caguas Central Federal Sayings Bank v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caguas Central Federal Sayings Bank v. United States, 215 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Opinion

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

An insolvent savings and loan association and several of its former members brought this action in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking damages from the United States for the government’s alleged breach of its contractual commitment to permit the association to use a particular favorable accounting treatment of the goodwill it had acquired in connection with its merger in the early 1980’s with two financially troubled savings and loan associations. The regulatory authority ended that accounting treatment pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (“1989 Act”), which prohibited that treatment. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations bars this suit, and therefore affirm its dismissal of the case on that ground.

I

A. 1. The background facts relating to the savings and loan industry’s financial problems out of which this case arose are described in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844-858, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996). They may be summarized as follows:

In the early 1980’s the savings and loan industry had a financial crisis that resulted because many firms had “long-term, fixed-rate mortgages created when interest rates were low; when market rates rose, those institutions had to raise the rates they paid to depositors in order to attract funds. When the costs of short-term deposits overtook the revenues from long-term mortgages, some 435 thrifts failed between 1981 and 1983.” Id. at 845, 116 S.Ct. 2432 (citations omitted). “While the regulators tried to mitigate the squeeze on the thrift industry generally through deregulation, the multitude of already-failed savings and loans confronted FSLIC [Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation] with deposit insurance liabilities that threatened to exhaust its insurance fund.” Id. at 846,116 S.Ct. 2432.

“Realizing that FSLIC lacked the funds to liquidate all of the failing thrifts, the Bank Board chose to avoid the insurance liability by encouraging healthy thrifts and outside investors to take over ailing institutions in a series of ‘supervisory mergers.’ ... [T]he principal inducement for these supervisory mergers was an understanding that the acquisitions would be subject to a particular accounting treatment that would help the acquiring institutions meet their reserve capital requirements imposed by federal regulations____ [This would] permití ] the acquiring entity to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of all identifiable assets acquired as an intangible asset called ... ‘[supervisory] goodwill.’ ... The acquiring institutions [could] count supervisory goodwill toward their reserve requirements.... ” Id. at 847-50, 116 S.Ct. 2432.

“[T]he overall regulatory response of the early and mid-1980’s was unsuccessful in resolving the crisis in the thrift industry. As a result, Congress enacted the [1989 Act, which] made enormous changes in the structure of federal thrift regulation,” including eliminating supervisory goodwill as a capital asset and “establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation to liquidate or otherwise dispose of certain closed thrifts and their assets.” Id. at 856, 116 S.Ct. 2432 (citation omitted).

“The impact of [the 1989 Act’s] new capital requirements upon institutions that had acquired failed thrifts in exchange for supervisory goodwill was swift and severe. [The regulatory agency] promptly issued regulations implementing the new capital standards along with a bulletin noting that [1307]*1307[the 1989 Act] ‘eliminates [capital and accounting] forbearances’ previously granted to certain thrifts____ [M]any institutions immediately fell out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements, making them subject to seizure by thrift regulators.” Id. at 857-58, 116 S.Ct. 2432.

2. Winstar involved three suits filed in the Court of Federal Claims by entities that had acquired failed savings and loans associations pursuant to, as this court found, “negotiated contracts with the bank regulatory agencies that allowed them to include supervisory goodwill (and capital credits) as assets for regulatory capital purposes and to amortize that supervisory goodwill over extended periods of time.” Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1545 (Fed.Cir.1995). The suits sought damages for the injuries the entities sustained as a result of the 1989 Act’s prohibition upon the use of supervisory goodwill. The Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of this court that “the Government breached these contracts when, pursuant to the new regulatory capital requirements imposed by [the 1989 Act] the federal regulatory agencies limited the use of supervisory goodwill and capital credits in calculating respondents’ net worth,” and that “the United States is liable to respondents for breach of contract.” Winstar, 518 U.S. at 870, 116 S.Ct. 2432. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings “[b]ecause the Court of Federal Claims ha[d] not yet determined the appropriate measure or amount of damages.” Id. at 910, 116 S.Ct. 2432.

B. On September 29, 1995 the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Department of Justice entered into an agreement tolling the statute of limitations. The agreement began with a number of “RECITALS,” including the statements that “the RTC may possess certain claims against the United States arising out of the enactment of certain provisions of the” 1989 Act and its implementing regulations; “the RTC contends that these changes may have breached contractual obligations of the FHLBB to some institutions for which the RTC has been appointed receiver, or may have otherwise damaged these institutions. These claims shall be referred to herein as ‘Goodwill Claims’”; “the RTC and the United States both desire to avoid litigation of these Goodwill Claims” and “both intend to try to resolve these Goodwill Claims, if any, at the appropriate time, by amicable measures in order to avoid costly and contentious litigation.” The agreement then provided: “the parties agree to toll the statute of limitations that may apply to Goodwill Claims, as set forth below.”

The first three operative provisions of the agreement were as follows:

1. The running of the statute of limitations for all Goodwill Claims the RTC may possess shall be tolled from the date of this Agreement to and including one hundred-thirty (130) days after the entry of either a final and unappealable judgment in [the Winstar case (in which such judgment has not yet been entered) ].
2. During the first one hundred-twenty days of the period referred to in paragraph 1, the parties shall attempt to resolve amicably, without litigation, any and all Goodwill Claims that the RTC may then possess.
3. Following the conclusion of the one hundred-twenty day period specified in paragraph 2, the RTC shall have ten (10) days in which to file suit on any Goodwill Claim not amicably resolved by the parties.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Caguas Central Federal Savings Bank v. United States
215 F.3d 1304 (Federal Circuit, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
215 F.3d 1304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caguas-central-federal-sayings-bank-v-united-states-cafc-2000.