Cagle v. Judson Mills

11 S.E.2d 376, 195 S.C. 346, 1940 S.C. LEXIS 159
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedNovember 7, 1940
Docket15157
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 11 S.E.2d 376 (Cagle v. Judson Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cagle v. Judson Mills, 11 S.E.2d 376, 195 S.C. 346, 1940 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. 1940).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Baker.

This proceeding is under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act July 17, 1935, 39 St. at Targe, p. 1231, for the benefit of the widow and two minor dependent children of G. A. Cagle, deceased.

On the night of May 26, 1938-, and prior thereto, Mr. Cagle was employed in the weave room of Judson Mills, employer-appellant, as a warp hand. His duties, as such, consisted of tying in warps on the various looms, and both cotton and rayon were run in the same weave, room, the same warp hands working on both. At the time in question there were three shifts of-hands, working eight hours each, and as a warp hand Mr. Cagle’s final duty before leaving the job was to mark up his work on a board known as the Warp Board in order that his successor could take up the work where he left off. Mr. Cagle was working on the second shift, which concluded its work at 1:30 P. M. There existed a custom in the mill or weave room of the mill, whereby the management permitted all section men and warp hands to quit work fifteen minutes before “knock off” time in order to wash and change their clothes before leaving the mill, 'but the entry on the warp board had to be made after the change of clothes, or at 10:30 P. M.

In accordance with this custom Mr. Cagle left his work about 9 :45 P. M. and went to the wash room or a room below the weave room and changed his outer clothes, consisting of coveralls, for his street clothes. The record does not disclose whether he even bathed his face and hands, but he *348 could have taken a shower bath had he so desired. Upon changing his clothes Mr. Cagle returned to the weave room where he performed his last duty preparatory to leaving the mill for the night, writing the word “Unfinished” opposite the loom he last worked on. As he was writing the word “Unfinished” another employee, Mr. W. H. McGaha, coming on this shift, walked towards Mr. Cagle and asked him a question. When Mr. Cagle finished making his entry on the warp board he slightly turned as if to answer Mr. Mc-Gaha’s question and fell forward full length on to the floor. There is no question but that the fall was occasioned by Mr. Cagle’s suddenly fainting'. The point of his chin appears to have struck the wooden floor and with such force as to fracture both of his jawbones, and he no doubt suffered a concussion, resulting in cerebral edema, from which he died on June 3, 1938. Following the fainting and fall of Mr. Cagle he was carried in an unconscious condition out of the weave room on to a platform just outside the mill, where he soon regained consciousness, and according to the record, immediately made these two statements, “I felt a little weak.” “I wonder how come me to do that.”

The only question in the case is whether the accident arose out of the employment, or, in other words, whether his fall was causally connected with his work?

Mr. Cagle was a man fifty-five years of age, and had worked in Judson Mills for sixteen years, the last several years in the weave room, usually as weaver, but at times as a loom fixer. As aforesaid, he was working in the latter capacity at the time of the accident.

It is admitted that the fall occurred in the course of the employment, Mr. Cagle being on the job at the time. The evidence affirmatively excluded the theory of his fall being due to anything like slipping on a grease spot or stumbling-over an obstruction on the floor.

The whole theory of the claimant’s case is that the weave room was excessively hot on the night in question, and that *349 as a result of the excessive heat Mr. Cagle had a heat stroke, which caused him to fall and sustain the injuries from which he died.

The hearing commissioner, Honorable John W. Duncan, rejected this theory of the accident and refused an award. He held that the undisputed evidence precluded the conclusion “that the fall of Mr. Cagle can be proximately attributed to excessive heat or any other unusual atmospheric conditions in the weave room on this particular night”.

On appeal to the commission as a whole, a majority thereof found for the claimant, it being a three-two decision. Two of the commissioners, Mr. Duncan and another, dissented. In reversing the hearing commissioner and awarding respondent compensation, the majority commission stated no facts to sustain their position thereabout, and the minority dissenting Commissioners apparently relied on the very full and able statement of the facts, the findings of fact, and the conclusions as set forth by the hearing Commissioner; nor did the Circuit Judge who heard the appeal from the award of the full Commission in affirming same, set forth any facts on which to sustain the finding of the full Commission.

As aforesaid, the case comes to this Court on the single point that there is no evidence in the record to sustain the heat stroke theory or any other theory which causally connects the accident with the employment.

In Jeffers v. Manetta Mills et al., 190 S. C., 435, 438; 3 S. E., (2d) 489, 490, Mr. Justice Fishburne, as the organ of the Court, stated: “The burden rests upon the claimants to show by competent testimony, not only the fact of injury, but that it occurred in connection with the employment of the deceased; and to furnish evidence from which the inference can logically be drawn that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The award, of course, must be based upon something more than surmise or conjecture. Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Company et al., 189 S. C., 188; 200 S. E., 727.”

*350 Again in Rudd v. Pair forest Finishing Company, supra (189 S. C., 188; 200 S. E., 728), cited in the Jeffers-Manetta Mills case, is the following :• “It is a familiar formula that findings of fact by a Board or Commission on a claim under a Workmen’s Compensation Act are conclusive and the appellate court will not review such findings except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. It may reverse an award 'if there is an absence of any evidence to support it, but it is not a trier of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the Board, its finding are conclusive in the absence of fraud, and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. This is but an application to Workmen’s Compensation cases of the fundamental principle universal in Courts of law, that whether' there is any competent evidence is for the Court to determine, but whether the evidence is sufficient is a question for the jury; the function of the Commission being in that respect that of a jury in actions of law. While the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission will be upheld if there is any evidence on which it can rest, it must be founded on evidence, and cannot rest on surmise, conjecture or speculation.” (Italics added.) (See cases cited thereunder.)

Excessive heat is a relative term dependent upon the time, place and circumstances, and that which may be termed excessive heat in one instance would in another instance be no more than normal.

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Bluebook (online)
11 S.E.2d 376, 195 S.C. 346, 1940 S.C. LEXIS 159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cagle-v-judson-mills-sc-1940.