Cagle v. Bell

44 S.E.2d 119, 202 Ga. 623, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 490
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided September 6, 1947·No. 15889.·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

1. A ground of a motion for new trial alleging error in an instruction to the jury, but failing to set forth, either literally or in substance, the language complained of, does not present any question for decision as to error in the charge of the court. Page v. Brown, 192 Ga. 398, 400 (5) (15 S.E.2d 506).

2. Aside from two insufficient assignments of error on the charge of the court, as described above, the allegations in the amendment to the motion for a new trial were mere elaborations of the general grounds as contained in the original motion, and therefore the question as to correctness of the judgment refusing a new trial will be determined solely upon a consideration of such general grounds. Peagler v. Huey, 183 Ga. 677 (6) (188 S.E. 906); Lovett v. Gaskins, 23 Ga. App. 623 (4) (99 S.E. 156).

3. Under the pleadings and the evidence, and the stipulation as to the issues to be tried, to wit, that the plaintiffs own no part of lot 99, and the defendants own no part of lots 101 and 102, and that "the sole issue in the case on trial is the true boundary between lot 99 and lots 101 and 102," the defendants could not be harmed by the verdict for the plaintiffs fixing the Browning's Ferry Road as the true boundary line, unless the line as thus fixed would encroach upon lot 99 and the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that all of Browning's Ferry Road, as described in the plaintiffs' amendment, was actually within lots 101 and 102, and did not encroach upon any part of lot 99 lying adjacent to said lots 101 and 102 on the northeast.

(a) Even if the evidence for the plaintiffs may not have been sufficient to show that the true original line coincided with Browning's Ferry Road, or to show its definite location elsewhere, yet from the evidence as a whole the jury were authorized to find that such line was situated somewhere where near this road, but on the northeast side of it; and hence that the plaintiffs — in alleging that said line follows the road but, should *Page 624 said line leave said road to the north, the plaintiffs relinquish all claim to the land lying north of said road, and in thus seeking in effect to have the road established as the true line — did not claim all the land to which they might otherwise have been entitled in lots 101 and 102. Compare Roberts v. Ivey, 63 Ga. 622; Cooper v. Bowen, 140 Ga. 45 (3) (78 S.E. 413); Lokey v. Malcolm, 53 Ga. App. 434 (2) (186 S.E. 448).

4. Under the preceding rulings, the court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

No. 15889. SEPTEMBER 6, 1947.
On September 29, 1945, Mrs. Susan N. Bell and A. W. Bell Jr. filed a petition against E. J. Cagle and Marion Cagle, praying that the defendants be enjoined from trespassing upon property claimed by the plaintiffs, described in the petition and including lots 101 and 102 in the 9th District of Hall County. The defendants filed an answer on October 13, 1945, alleging that they owned lot 99 in said district and county, and that the land in dispute was a part of said lot 99. On this date, the judge passed an order, which provided: "It being conceded by the plaintiffs that they own no part of lot 99, and it being conceded by the defendants that they own no part of lots 101 or 102, it appears to the court that the issue in the foregoing matter is the location of the dividing line between lots 99 and 101 and 102, and C. H. Edwards, a surveyor, is hereby appointed and directed to survey and locate said original line between lots 99 and 101 and 102 and to report his findings to this court."

On January 24, 1947, the day the case was tried, the plaintiffs amended their petition as follows: "Now come the plaintiffs in the above-stated matter and amend their original petition by showing that the true line between lot 99, belonging to the defendants, and lots 101 and 102, belonging to the plaintiffs, is a line beginning at Browning's Ferry just north of Browning's Bridge across the Chattahoochee River and running S. 30 E. to the Southern Railroad. Plaintiffs further show that they and their predecessors in title have been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse possession of land lying southeast of said line between the Chattahoochee River and the Southern Railroad south to lands of L. O. Henson and Hall County Board of Education at White Sulphur Station for over forty years. *Page 625 Wherefore plaintiffs pray that this, their amendment, be allowed and the above-stated line decreed to be the true line between plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs further show that said line follows the road from Browning's Ferry just north of Browning's Bridge toward the Southern Railroad but, should said line leave said road to the north, plaintiffs relinquish all claim to the land lying north of said road."

It appears from the brief of evidence that the parties agreed and stipulated upon the trial as follows: "It is stipulated by the plaintiffs that they own no part of lot No. 99, and it is stipulated that defendants own no part of lots 101 and 102, and that the sole issue in the case on trial is the true boundary line between lot 99 and lots 101 and 102. It is admitted by the parties they are coterminous owners and the issue is the correct boundary between the lines enumerated."

After the introduction of oral and documentary evidence on behalf of both sides, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs; upon which verdict the court entered a judgment decreeing that the road from Browning's Ferry just north of Browning's Bridge to the Southern Railway is the true line between the property of the plaintiffs and the property of the defendants, and enjoining the defendants from trespassing upon the land of the plaintiffs lying south of said road.

The defendants moved for a new trial upon the usual general grounds, and later amended their original motion by adding one paragraph, which was designated as paragraph 1, and six subparagraphs, which were designated as a, b, c, d, e, and f, respectively. This amendment consisted only of amplifications of the general grounds and arguments in support thereof, except that in subparagraph b it was averred, "And charge of court to vary a straight line, or to change, or cause to be changed the true original land line as set out in the pleadings would also be error;" and in subparagraph d it was alleged that, "In the case before the honorable court, that part of the charge defendants allege as error, which would authorize the jury to consider prescriptive title." No part of the court's charge was set forth, either literally or in substance, nor was any part of it more definitely described than in these two quotations from subparagraphs b and d. The court overruled the motion for new trial as amended, and the defendants excepted. *Page 626

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cagle v. Bell, 44 S.E.2d 119, 202 Ga. 623, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 490 (Ga. 1947).

44 S.E.2d 119 (Cagle v. Bell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Cagle v. PMC Development Co.
212 S.E.2d 765 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1975)