Cadle v. State

610 S.E.2d 574, 271 Ga. App. 595, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 533, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 114
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 11, 2005
DocketA04A1883
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 610 S.E.2d 574 (Cadle v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cadle v. State, 610 S.E.2d 574, 271 Ga. App. 595, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 533, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

Adams, Judge.

Rodney P. Cadle was convicted by a jury of aggravated battery, seven counts of aggravated assault upon a peace officer, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. He appeals following the denial of his motion for new trial.

The evidence at trial shows that Cadle had an ongoing dispute with one of his neighbors. On the night of the events giving rise to the charges in this case, Cadle called 911 complaining the neighbors were causing a disturbance, and the neighbors called 911 complaining Cadle was causing a disturbance and threatening them; Cadle’s wife, who was at work, also called 911 complaining the neighbors were causing a disturbance at their home. Law enforcement officers made several trips to the neighborhood in response to the calls, and during the last visit, based on the neighbors’ statements that Cadle had made threats involving a weapon, they decided to arrest Cadle. However, when the officers went to Cadle’s residence and attempted *596 to arrest him, Cadle broke away from the officers and ran inside his trailer, barricading himself inside a bedroom with four weapons. During the ensuing lengthy exchange between the officers and Cadle, which was recorded by the officers and introduced into evidence at trial, Cadle stated his exasperation over the situation with his neighbors, but denied that he had threatened them with a weapon. Cadle told the officers that he had turned to them for help but they tried to arrest him instead, and that he believed the only way for it to end would be for the officers to kill him. Cadle informed the officers he had weapons with him, but stated several times that he did not intend to use them.

At one point Cadle quit talking to the officers, so the decision was made to attempt to end the standoff by firing tear gas into the bedroom. As soon as the gas was fired into the room, Cadle immediately started firing one of his weapons through the wall, seriously wounding one officer, and the officers started firing back at Cadle. Although more gas was fired into the room after the wounded officer was removed, Cadle did not come out until after his father arrived and talked him into surrendering.

1. Cadle first contends that even without a request the trial court should have charged the jury on justification because it was his sole defense to the aggravated battery and aggravated assault charges. “[I]t is well settled in this State that the failure to give a charge on a defendant’s sole defense in a criminal case, even without a request, constitutes reversible error if there is some evidence to support the charge. [Cits.]” Parker v. State, 230 Ga. App. 578, 579 (2) (497 SE2d 62) (1998).

Although Cadle did not testify at trial, he contends that his in-custody statement to police, which was admitted into evidence at trial, provided the necessary evidentiary basis to support the justification charge. We agree that this statement, which we have included in its entirety in an appendix to this opinion, offered at least some evidence to authorize a justification charge to the jury. And although the State argues that the evidence was overwhelming that the police officers did not open fire until Cadle fired on them first, this conflict in the evidence was for the jury, properly charged, to resolve. Moreover, at least one juror, even without being properly instructed, gleaned from the evidence that a justification defense had been raised. That juror, following an overnight recess from deliberations, sent the following note to the trial judge: “I have thought about this all day yesterday and last night. I believe that even if the prosecution has shown evidence to prove a crime I can still refuse to convict if I think the SWAT officers’ actions resulted in that criminal act. Even if we find evidence to convict on each count, do we have to return a verdict of guilty on each count?”

*597 In the absence of ... a [justification] charge, the trial court’s instructions to the jury as a whole contained omissions which constituted substantial error that was harmful as a matter of law. Consequently, [Cadle’s] failure to take exception to the trial court’s jury instruction, or [to] reserve the right to later object to the instructions, does not bar us from considering this matter on appeal. [Cits.]

Parker, 230 Ga. App. at 580 (2). Stiles v. State, 242 Ga. App. 484, 486 (1) (529 SE2d 913) (2000). Cadle is entitled to a new trial on the aggravated battery and assault charges. 1

2. Cadle next contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that aggravated assault could be committed with intent or by criminal negligence. The indictment in this case charged Cadle with committing the various counts of aggravated assault upon a peace officer by making an assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) and (a) (2):

Now to constitute an assault, the actual injury of the other person need not be shown. It is only necessary that the evidence show, beyond a reasonable doubt, an intention to commit an injury to another person, coupled with the apparent ability to commit that injury, or that the other person was intentionally placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury from the defendant.

During its deliberations, the jury twice sent a question to the court on whether the crime of aggravated assault required intent on the part of the defendant. In each instance, the trial court recharged the jury on the definitions of both criminal intent and criminal negligence, and in each instance defense counsel stated he had no objection to the charge. Pretermitting whether this failure to except or to reserve objections waived this issue for appellate review, we will address this contention so as to avoid error on retrial.

Cadle correctly argues on appeal that criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in proving the commission of an aggravated assault. “[A]n aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) cannot be committed by criminal negligence.” Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591-592 (2) (502 SE2d 726) *598 (1998). Although the charge is simply inapt as to an aggravated assault predicated on OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), Dunagan, 269 Ga. at 593-594 (2), in this case it is impossible to tell from the verdict which form of aggravated assault served as the basis for the conviction.

Thus, we cannot conclusively state that the verdict rested exclusively on the (a) (2) ground or that, if it rested on the (a) (1) ground, that the jury did not incorrectly substitute criminal negligence for criminal intent in rendering its verdict on the (a) (1) ground.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
610 S.E.2d 574, 271 Ga. App. 595, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 533, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cadle-v-state-gactapp-2005.