Caddo Gas Co. v. Jeffries

271 S.W. 108
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 10, 1925
DocketNo. 10913.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 271 S.W. 108 (Caddo Gas Co. v. Jeffries) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caddo Gas Co. v. Jeffries, 271 S.W. 108 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinions

The appellees Ottie Jeffries and her husband, L. J. Jeffries, filed this suit complaining of the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company and the Caddo Gas Company, a partnership composed of A. S. York, C. L. Young, and Bert Miller, and M. E. Stephens, trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of C. L. Young, in the district court of Stephens county.

Appellees alleged that on or about October 17, 1920, they were the owners of a dwelling situated in the town of Caddo, Stephens county, Tex., which had prior thereto been piped in a proper and careful manner to the Caddo Gas Company's gas line for the purpose of furnishing said dwelling with gas for fuel, heating, and cooking purposes; that the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company was furnishing the gas used by the citizens of Caddo to the Caddo Gas Company, or to the users thereof, and were so furnishing the same on or about October 17, 1920; that on or about that date the gas pressure became too low to furnish sufficient fuel for heating and cooking, and the Jeffries were using wood in its stead; that on or about said date the "Caddo Gas Company or the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company, or the Caddo Gas Company or some of their agents, employees, or representatives" turned into the gas mains in Caddo a gas pressure of such force that it blew off, bursted, and broke the connections, stops, cut-offs, and pipes in plaintiffs' residence; that as a result thereof plaintiffs' dwelling was set on fire and completely destroyed: that the defendants were guilty of negligence in the particulars above mentioned, which was the cause of the damage to plaintiffs; that the dwelling of plaintiffs was of the value of $7.060, the kitchen furniture of the value of $3,000, the wearing apparel and money $2,000, making a total value of $12,000, for which appellees sought recovery.

The appellant, Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company, answered by way of a general demurrer, special demurrer, general denial, and plea of not guilty. The demurrers were overruled, and the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in appellees' favor for the sum of $11,500. The judgment was rendered jointly and severally against the Caddo Gas Company, A. S. York, Bert Miller, and the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company for said amount. The defendants C. L. Young and M. E. Stephens, trustee, were dismissed with their costs. The appellant, Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company, alone has prosecuted an appeal.

The principal complaints, presented in various forms, are of the court's action in overruling the appellant's general and special demurrers, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict and the judgment. The demurrers are to the effect that the petition does not unconditionally allege the appellant to be guilty of the wrongs complained of, and does not allege the defendants to be joint tort-feasors. The basis of the complaint of the petition seems to rest upon the allegation hereinbefore quoted that the "Caddo Gas Company or the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company, or the Caddo Gas Company or some of their agents, employees, or representatives," turned into the *Page 110 gas mains the alleged excessive pressure of gas. It is quite true that an allegation that one or the other of the defendants committed an act which resulted in the damage complained of is insufficient in that it cannot be said therefrom which of the two defendants is the guilty party; in other words, the allegation standing alone leaves it uncertain that the Texas Pacific Coal Oil Company was guilty of the wrongs complained of, whereas the allegation should be unconditionally certain. See Oglesby's Sureties v. State, 73 Tex. 658, 11 S.W. 873; Thorndale Mercantile Gas Co. v. Evans Lee (Tex.Civ.App.) 146 S.W. 1053; Snipes v. Bomar Cotton Oil Co., 106 Tex. 181, 161 S.W. 1; Baker v. Galbreath (Tex.Civ.App.) 211 S.W. 626. So that, if the quoted allegation was all that was to be found in the petition, we would feel no hesitation in saying that the demurrers should have been sustained.

But the rule is well settled that, in passing upon the sufficiency of a petition as against a general demurrer, the petition must be considered as a whole. In other words, all of its parts and allegations and not an isolated portion must be considered. And so considering the petition before us, we fail to find reversible error in the action of the court in overruling appellant's demurrers.

We will not quote extensively from the petition, but In some parts thereof the defendants were distinctly charged as joint wrongdoers. For instance, it was alleged that:

"The defendants nor none of them gave plaintiffs any notice that said high pressure would be and was going to be turned into said mains and laterals. * * * That said gas pressure was so great and severe that many of the gas pipes in the town of Caddo, especially those lying on top of the ground, walked, crawled or moved from the usual place, and that the defendants, each and all of them, well knew, or if they had used ordinary prudence and diligence of an ordinary prudent person, would have known, that said gas pressure was too strong and great for the pipes and plumbing and fixtures for gas purposes of those used by plaintiff and other citizens using gas in the town of Caddo, and if the defendants, each, either, or all of them, had used ordinary and proper care they would and could have prevented said high pressure being turned into the mains and pipes, including those in plaintiffs' residence, and thereby prevented the loss, destruction of plaintiffs' residence, * * * at least they could have notified plaintiffs that said high pressure was going to be turned into said mains and pipes and in plaintiffs' residence, which they did not do, so that plaintiffs could have used care to prevent said fire. That if the defendants had used proper care and diligence, as an ordinary prudent person would have done, they could and should have secured, obtained, and used proper appliances to prevent such high pressure coming direct from gas wells from entering the mains and pipes entering plaintiffs' residence."

It was further alleged:

"That the building of plaintiffs that was destroyed by fire on account of the carelessness and negligence of the defendants was worth at the time of such destruction * * * $12,000; that the sum of $12,000 would not replace said building, furniture, fixtures, and clothing and money that was lost and destroyed in said fire, caused by the negligence, wanton, willful, and unskillful management of the defendants, their employees and representatives or agents in turning in said high gas pressure which was the approximate and immediate cause of said fire."

These allegations, and perhaps others of similar import, we think are reasonably sufficient to show, notwithstanding the indefinite character of the isolated portion first quoted, that the appellant company and other defendants were each and all distinctly, jointly, and severally charged with the commission of the negligent acts complained of. The assignments and propositions relating to this subject are accordingly overruled.

In answer to special issues, the jury found that on or about the date alleged in the plaintiffs' petition the Caddo Gas Company turned into its lines an undue excess of natural gas, and was guilty of negligence in so turning in the gas or permitting it to be turned in, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury complained of by plaintiffs.

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271 S.W. 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caddo-gas-co-v-jeffries-texapp-1925.