Caceres Marquez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-568
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HEYDI GUADALUPE CACERES No. 25-568 MARQUEZ; J. A. F. C., Agency Nos. A220-489-667 Petitioners, A220-489-668 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, BEA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge McKEOWN. Heydi Guadalupe Caceres Marquez (Caceres) and her minor child, citizens

and natives of Honduras, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) decision dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying

their applications for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review the denial of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the BIA

adopts “several of the IJ’s findings, and added its own reasoning, ‘we review the

decisions of both the BIA and the IJ to the extent that the BIA agreed with the IJ’s

conclusions.’” Manzano v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2024) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022)). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of

removal. Where, as here, the agency has presumed that a petitioner has established

past persecution, “the burden is on the government to show by a preponderance of

the evidence that the applicant either no longer has a well-founded fear of

persecution in the country of his nationality, or that he can reasonably relocate

internally to an area of safety.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019).

“Relocation analysis consists of two steps: (1) ‘whether an applicant could relocate

safely,’ and (2) ‘whether it would be reasonable to require the applicant to do so.’”

Id. (quoting Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2010)); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Caceres could

safely relocate. After the murder of her father, Caceres and her family relocated to

2 25-568 Guarajao Viejo, a territory not controlled by her father’s killers. The family lived in

Guarajao Viejo for seven years without being directly threatened or physically

harmed, and after Caceres left for the United States, her family has continued to live

there safely.

Substantial evidence likewise supports the agency’s reasonableness

determination. The agency relied upon four main reasons why Caceres could

reasonably relocate to Guarajao Viejo. Substantial evidence supports each

consideration. First, the BIA emphasized, as noted above, that Caceres and her

family previously relocated to Guarajao Viejo, living and working there without

harm for seven years. That Caceres and her family relocated to Guarajao Viejo in

the past and lived there safely for many years is probative of whether it would be

reasonable for Caceres to do so again today. Contrary to the dissent, nothing

prevented the agency from commonsensically relying on Caceres’s past experience

in Guarajao Viejo in evaluating whether it would be reasonable for her to return

there. The dissent’s citations of Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2012),

and Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003), do not suggest

otherwise. In fact, Gonzalez-Hernandez did not address at all the reasonableness of

a petitioner’s ability to relocate.

Second, the agency emphasized that Caceres would likely receive familial

support when she returned to Honduras. The IJ found that Caceres’s “husband and

3 25-568 their two youngest children can accompany [Caceres] to Honduras and assist [her]

in the transition.” And “even if they cannot, [Caceres’s] mother and three siblings

still live in the country and may be able to offer support.” Caceres’s husband is from

Honduras, he met Caceres in Guarajao Viejo, he lacks U.S. immigration status, and

the couple had multiple children together. It is not speculative to think that Caceres’s

husband may return with his family to Honduras.

The record also does not compel a contrary conclusion that Caceres’s mother

and siblings would be unavailable to help Caceres if she returned. Caceres testified

that she speaks to her mother “almost every day.” Caceres also testified that if

returned to Honduras, she would stay “[a]t my mother’s,” which was prompted after

a brief colloquy with the IJ that started with the IJ’s question, “If the law says that

you have to return to Honduras, where would you return to?”1 Caceres’s testimony

is consistent with her living situation before she fled Honduras, as for seven years,

she lived with her mother and sister, and the family collectively made a living

through farming.

Third, the agency adequately addressed Caceres’s mental health. The IJ

recognized that Caceres’s mental health might make returning to Honduras more

1 The dissent errs in asserting that we “distort[ed] Caceres’s testimony” on this point. In the context of the full exchange, Caceres’s clarifying statement—“[a]t my mother’s”—concerned where Caceres would return to if she were removed to Honduras. The dissent offers no other explanation as to what Caceres would be referring to at this point in her testimony.

4 25-568 challenging but found that Caceres was “not receiving ongoing psychiatric care that

would be interrupted.” That Caceres was not receiving continuing treatment

diminishes the possible unreasonableness of her relocation. Because Caceres

previously received some mental health treatment and participated in various

support, parenting, and church groups, the IJ reasonably determined that Caceres

could utilize those experiences to her benefit in Honduras. The record, therefore,

does not compel the conclusion that Caceres’s mental health problems make it

unreasonable for her to return to Honduras.

Fourth, Caceres’s youth, apparent good physical health, and her knowledge of

cooking and farming further support her ability to reasonably relocate. Cf. Knezevic

v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding relocation unreasonable

where petitioners were elderly, and “had no home, no business, no possessions, no

place to go, and the quality of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina was abysmal”).

The agency’s decisions did not affirmatively ignore Caceres’s personal

change in circumstances. The agency instead reasonably weighed those

circumstances against the competing evidence that Caceres would receive familial

support when she returned to the same place she had safely lived for seven years,

and that Caceres had sufficient ability to start her life again in Guarajao Viejo. While

the agency cannot deny asylum on “conjecture,” the agency is entitled to make

reasonable inferences based on the record. Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th

5 25-568 Cir. 2000); Flores-Rodriguez v. Garland, 8 F.4th 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021). The

dissent reaches a contrary conclusion only by reweighing the evidence and failing to

adhere to the deferential standard of review.

Nor did the BIA err in reviewing Caceres’s arguments on relocation for clear

error. Arguments pertaining to the possibility of internal relocation are largely

questions of fact reviewed deferentially by the BIA. See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d

907, 914–16 (9th Cir. 2012).

2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. An applicant

for CAT relief “bears the burden of establishing that she will more likely than not

be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed to her

native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020).

The petitioner must demonstrate that she “will face a particularized and non-

speculative risk of torture.” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023).

Caceres was not tortured in Honduras, nor has she shown a particularized risk of

future torture, especially in view of the agency’s supported relocation findings, as

detailed above.

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of humanitarian

asylum. “An applicant seeking humanitarian asylum must show either ‘compelling

reasons for being unwilling or unable to return’ to his country of nationality ‘arising

out of the severity of the applicant’s past persecution,’ or ‘a reasonable possibility

6 25-568 that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.’” Singh,

914 F.3d at 661–62 (brackets omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). The

BIA adequately considered both prongs of the humanitarian asylum analysis. While

Caceres’s displacement and psychological trauma are unfortunate, the record does

not compel the conclusion that Caceres showed entitlement to humanitarian asylum.

See id. at 662 (“Our case law demonstrates that extremely severe persecution is

required to warrant humanitarian relief.”).

4. There was no due process violation in the agency proceedings. As

indicated above, the agency sufficiently considered the record. And Caceres’s

argument that the BIA did not “hold the IJ to account for the due process violations

which took place during his handling of the case,” is unexhausted, so we cannot

consider it. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The motion to stay removal, Dkt. 3, is denied. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.

7 25-568 FILED APR 6 2026 Caceres Marquez, et al. v. Bondi, No. 25-568 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Our precedent is clear that the government bears the burden of proving that

Caceres’s relocation would be “safe” and “reasonable under all the circumstances.”

Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 936 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other

grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en

banc). The government did not meet its burden with respect to reasonableness—a

necessarily forward-looking inquiry—because it did not establish, and made no

attempt to prove, that the site of Caceres’s internal relocation was “now accessible

to [her].” Matter of M‑Z‑M‑R‑, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 34 (BIA 2012) (emphasis

added). The Immigration Judge (IJ), in findings affirmed by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA), glossed over Caceres’s significant changes in

circumstances and found that relocation would be reasonable based entirely on

“speculation and conjecture,” which is forbidden by Shah v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2000). I respectfully dissent as to the relocation determination.

When considering reasonableness of relocation for asylum and withholding

of removal, the BIA must consider the “totality of the relevant circumstances.” 8

C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(3). The agency failed to do so here

because it looked only backward, and not forward, when assessing those

circumstances. That error alone warrants remanding to the IJ for further factfinding. See Matter of M‑Z‑M‑R‑, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 34.

Though Caceres was previously able to support herself as a teenage field

laborer and subsistence farmer in Guarajao Viejo, Honduras, substantial evidence

does not support that it would be reasonable for Caceres to do so upon her return,

years later and as a mother of three. Her circumstances have changed with regard

to her mental health, her need for childcare, and her work opportunities. It is also

not clear that she would have a place to live: when the IJ asked Caceres directly

about “where [she would] return to,” Caceres responded, “Well, I wouldn’t—I

would not have honestly a place to live.”1 The government solicited no testimony

and presented no evidence about current conditions in Guarajao Viejo or about the

1 The majority distorts Caceres’s testimony. After informing the IJ that she would have no place to live upon her return to Honduras, the following exchange occurred:

JUDGE TO MS. CACERES-MARQUEZ: Your family would not help you if you were ordered to return to Honduras? MS. CACERES-MARQUEZ TO JUDGE: Well, due to the fear because of my father's death, it would be very complicated to go back to the country. JUDGE TO MS. CACERES-MARQUEZ: Okay. I hope you understand that if the law says you must return, then the court will order a return. On the other hand, if there is a basis for you to get some relief, then you would be able to stay. Do you understand that? MS. CACERES-MARQUEZ TO JUDGE: At my mother's.

Caceres’s non sequitur, “[a]t my mother’s,” was offered only after admonishment by the IJ. Even if that statement were taken as responsive to the IJ’s initial question, it was the burden of the government to clarify between the two conflicting responses.

2 25-568 level of support that Caceres’s mother and siblings could provide to Caceres and

her child (or three children, if accompanied by her U.S.-citizen children). Though

the government’s burden here was not demanding because the substantial evidence

standard is forgiving, it cannot be that the complete absence of evidence qualifies

as “substantial.”

To be sure, the agency is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the

record. Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2018). But the

inferences drawn by the agency are either facially unreasonable or do not flow

from the record. The IJ found that “[t]he respondent’s husband and their two [2-

year-old, U.S.-citizen] children can accompany the respondents to Honduras and

assist them in the transition.” Yet, as the dissenting BIA judge points out, “it is not

clear how the ‘additional burden’ of caring for toddlers relocated from their home

country would affirmatively ‘assist in the transition’ back to Honduras.” Nor is it

clear that Caceres’s husband would accompany her. Similarly, the IJ speculated

that Caceres could use coping skills she developed to self-treat her diagnosed

depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. But this too is unsupported

by the record: as the dissenting BIA judge flagged, “the coping strategies

documented in [Caceres’s] evidentiary submissions were tied in large part to the

bonds she built with her church community in the United States,” and would likely

not be available to her in Guarajao Viejo. The IJ’s speculation led to illogical

3 25-568 inferences, which were affirmed by the BIA. Those unreasonable inferences

should not be credited by this court.

By denying Caceres’s petition for review, the majority has lowered the

government’s burden to the floor. It bends over backwards to draw inferences

against Caceres, even in the absence of any pertinent evidence. The majority

writes that Caceres “would likely” receive unspecified familial support, supra at 3,

echoing the IJ’s finding that Caceres’s mother and siblings “may be able to offer

support.” But that is mere conjecture. The majority tries to wave away this

concern, stating, “[i]t is not speculative to think that Caceres’s husband may return

with his family to Honduras.” Supra at 4 (emphasis added). May return? Would

likely receive support? May offer? These statements are obviously, and

definitionally, speculative.

The majority further notes that Caceres was previously able to live safely in

Guarajao Viejo. However, such evidence goes to a safety analysis, and not a

reasonableness analysis. See Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999

(9th Cir. 2003). The government had the burden of proof for both prongs of the

relocation analysis. And worse, such evidence is entirely backward-looking—the

majority does not even attempt to link its conclusion that the town is “now

accessible” to her given changed circumstances. Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. at 34.

4 25-568 The majority falters yet again by holding that the agency adequately

addressed Caceres’s mental health. Supra at 4. The majority asserts, without

citation to supporting law or evidence, that the fact that “Caceres was not receiving

continuing treatment diminishes the possible unreasonableness of her relocation.”

Id. But it was the government’s burden to prove that it would be reasonable for

Caceres to relocate to Guarajao Viejo notwithstanding her diagnosed depression,

anxiety, and PTSD. The majority eliminates that burden and creates a novel

presumption that mental health conditions are irrelevant unless the asylum-seeker

is receiving “continuing treatment,” even when, as here, the asylum-seeker was

unable to obtain such treatment because of the high cost of care. The majority

commits precisely the same error that warranted an initial remand by the BIA, in

which the BIA determined that the IJ had undervalued Caceres’s mental anguish

“caused by or resulting from” watching her father be shot and killed.

Finally, the majority notes that the IJ considered Caceres’s youth, physical

health, and knowledge of cooking when determining that her relocation would be

reasonable. That consideration, at least, was grounded in the record.

Consideration of social and cultural constraints, including age, gender, and health,

is appropriate in a reasonableness-of-relocation analysis. Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367

F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004). But proving that an asylum-seeker is young,

healthy, and knows how to cook cannot plausibly constitute adequate consideration

5 25-568 under the “totality of the relevant circumstances” test, especially when the IJ and

BIA failed to consider proffered evidence of other, country-based social and

cultural constraints: that safe and permanent internal relocation within Honduras is

extremely difficult, that young children in female-headed households are

particularly vulnerable to exploitation, and that deportation to Honduras is

“tantamount to a death sentence” because of the extreme violence faced by arriving

deportees.

Setting aside the unsupported speculation by the IJ, the BIA, and the

majority, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that the

government failed to meet its burden to prove that Caceres’s relocation to Guarajao

Viejo would be reasonable under the totality of the relevant circumstances. To be

clear, this is not a heavy burden to bear. Had the government solicited any

testimony or presented any evidence relevant to the reasonableness of Caceres’s

relocation, we would be evaluating the burden from a different perspective. But

the government did not, and the majority errs in denying Caceres’s petition in full.

I would grant Caceres’s petition for review of her asylum, withholding of

removal, and Convention Against Torture claims, each of which was dismissed by

the BIA due to its holding that Caceres’s internal relocation would be reasonable. I

concur with the remainder of the majority’s decision: that substantial evidence

supports the agency’s determination that Caceres could safely relocate, that

6 25-568 substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of humanitarian relief, that there

was no due process violation in the agency proceedings, and that the BIA did not

err in reviewing Caceres’s arguments on relocation for clear error.

7 25-568