Cabell v. CMH Homes, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedJuly 15, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-00507
StatusUnknown

This text of Cabell v. CMH Homes, Inc. (Cabell v. CMH Homes, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cabell v. CMH Homes, Inc., (S.D.W. Va. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

EVELYN CABELL,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-00507

CMH HOMES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Pending before the court is a Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Untimely and Incomplete Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures. [ECF No. 80]. This motion was filed jointly by Defendants CMH Homes, Inc.; CMH Manufacturing, Inc.; and Southern Ohio Construction, LLC. Plaintiffs have responded [ECF No. 88], and I find that a reply by Defendants is unnecessary to rule on the motion. The motion seeks exclusion of the five potential expert witnesses identified in “Plaintiffs’ Final Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures” [ECF No. 72] because that disclosure was untimely and incomplete. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED. At the request of the parties, I issued an amended scheduling order in this case on May 13, 2021. [ECF No. 68]. As part of that scheduling order, Plaintiffs’ expert witness disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) were due on May 21, 2021. Rule 26(a)(2) requires disclosure of the identity of an expert witness and a report prepared and signed by the expert. For each expert, the report must contain (1) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (2) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;

(3) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (4) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the last 10 years; (5) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous four years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (6) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). And, “[a] party make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D) (emphasis supplied).

Plaintiffs filed a Rule 26(a)(2) disclosure on March 15, 2021, which disclosed Samuel Wood, SCE, PE, as their sole expert. [ECF No. 50]. The March 15 disclosure complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2) and Defendants do not challenge it here. However, on May 21, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a “Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure” [ECF No. 69] that, though timely, did not even attempt comply with Rule 26(a)(2). The supplemental disclosure provided that “[i]n addition to Samuel Wood,

previously disclosed, Plaintiff shall be calling a Licensed Contractor to testify as to the cost of repairing the structure at issue in this case. The name, qualifications and substance of his/her opinions will be provided as soon as possible.” [ECF No. 80-4]. Weeks later, just four days before the deadline for Defendants’ Expert Disclosures, Plaintiffs filed what was styled as “Final Rule 26(a)(3) Disclosures.” [ECF No. 72]. Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiffs were actually filing new or additional expert disclosures. Plaintiffs do not disagree with this characterization and in fact recognize that they intend to treat the five new witnesses identified in the “final” disclosure, in addition to Samuel Wood, as expert witnesses. In addition to being

untimely, Plaintiffs’ final expert disclosure failed almost entirely to comply with Rule 26(a)(2). The final disclosure identified five new expert witnesses: Owen Petershein, Elite Commercial Roofing; Josh Milam, ELM Electrical and Contracting; Matt Westin, Calendar Construction; Paul Teumler, Certified Home Inspector; and Ryan Roggasch, Contractor. The disclosure included estimates from Petershein [ECF No. 80-6], Milam [ECF No. 80-7], and Westin [ECF No. 80-8] for various home repairs,

but these estimates fall far short of the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requirements for an expert report. The estimates are not signed; they include no opinions or the basis or reasoning for any opinions; there is no discussion of the facts or data known to the witnesses and no discussion of evidence or exhibits; there is nothing regarding the witnesses’ qualifications or prior expert testimony; and there is no statement about compensation for serving as a witness. Because Plaintiffs filed incomplete and

untimely expert disclosures, they “necessarily violated” Rule 26(a)(2) and the court’s Amended Scheduling Order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the “automatic sanction” of exclusion when a party fails to comply with Rule 26(a). , 318 F.3d 592, 595 n.2 (4th Cir. 2003). Specifically, Rule 37(c)(1) provides that when “a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure

was substantially justified or is harmless.” The Fourth Circuit has explained why this harsh sanction is necessary and appropriate: “Rule 26 disclosures are often the centerpiece of discovery in litigation that uses expert witnesses. A party that fails to provide these disclosures unfairly inhibits its opponent’s ability to properly prepare, unnecessarily prolongs litigation, and undermines the district court’s management of the case.” , 472 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2005). To overcome the automatic sanction of exclusion, Plaintiffs must show that

their noncompliance was substantially justified or harmless. To determine whether noncompliance is substantially justified or harmless, the Fourth Circuit has said that district courts by the following factors: (1) the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial; (4) the importance of the evidence; and (5) the non- disclosing party’s explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence.

, 751 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting , 318 F.3d at 596–97) (emphasis in original). The first four factors “relate mainly to the harmlessness exception, while the remaining factor—explanation for the nondisclosure—relates primarily to the substantial justification exception.” , 318 F.3d at 597. In their response, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) but cite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in an attempt to justify their noncompliance. Plaintiffs say they filed this action in the midst of the pandemic

“when most of the Courts were shutdown.” [ECF No. 88, at 3]. They claim that a continuance, rather than exclusion, is the appropriate remedy “[e]specially under these trying times where Courts were shut down for such an extended period of time.” [ECF No. 88, at 4]. Though I cannot say whether other courts were “shut down,” this court has remained active throughout the pandemic, albeit at times through remote work. Plaintiffs have, at all times, had access to the court’s online CM/ECF filing system, and they have had access to email and the postal service to serve their

disclosures to Defendants. Beyond that, Plaintiffs’ disclosures were not due until May 21 of . There was certainly no shut down, stay-at-home order, or lack of internet services at that time.

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