Cabel v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Cabel v. State

93 So. 260, 18 Ala. App. 557, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 223

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 6, 1922

Docket3 Div. 427.

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 93 So. 260 (Cabel v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cabel v. State, 93 So. 260, 18 Ala. App. 557, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 223 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922).

Pincite

Opinion

BRICKEN, P. J.

This defendant was indicted and tried for assault with intent to murder. She was convicted of assault and battery and duly sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for the term of four months. Prom this judgment of conviction she appeals, and it is here insisted that the court erred in refusing to allow defendant to show on cross-examination of the injured party, Mrs. Lelon Loftin, and by her husband, W. D. Loftin, that a civil action for $10,000 against tbis defendant was pending, wherein Mrs. Loftin (the witness) was plaintiff, and that this civil suit was based upon the same act as that complained of in tbis prosecution.

Tbis insistence is well taken, and tbe rulings of the court iu this connection constituted error to a reversal. This evidence was admissible, and should have been allowed, in order to show bias or interest upon tbe part of these witnesses, so that their testimony could be weighed and considered by the jury in the light of such bias or interest, if such existed. The general rule is that . on cross-examination of a witness, any fact may be elicited which tends to show bias or partiality, and, if tbe witness denies tbe fact showing the bias or interest, the cross-examining party may call other witnesses to contradict the witness on this very material question. It cannot be doubted that tbe bias or interest contemplated by this rule may be engendered by a pecuniary interest, as well as by ill will, bate, or by love or friendship. And certainly, it cannot be doubted that the outcome of a criminal prosecution, based upon the same transaction as that of a civil action, would be regarded as having much influence upon the latter. The following authorities sustain the holding here made, and show that error of such nature as to materially affect the substantial rights of this appellant was committed by the court in these several rulings complained of and to which exceptions were duly reserved: Byrd v. State, 17 Ala. App. 301, 84 South. 777; Tapscott v. State (Ala. App.) 88 South. 376; 1 Brown v. State (Ala. App.) 90 South. 54; 2 Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 South. 409, 46 Am. St. Rep. 28; Shackleford v. State, 147 Ala. 688, 40 South. 665. 3

*558 No other questions are presented. Eor the errors designated, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

1

Ante, p. 67.

2

Ante, p. 91.

3

Reported in full in the Southern Reporter; reported as a memorandum decision without opinion in the Alabama Reports.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BRICKEN, P. J.

This defendant was indicted and tried for assault with intent to murder. She was convicted of assault and battery and duly sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for the term of four months. Prom this judgment of conviction she appeals, and it is here insisted that the court erred in refusing to allow defendant to show on cross-examination of the injured party, Mrs. Lelon Loftin, and by her husband, W. D. Loftin, that a civil action for $10,000 against tbis defendant was pending, wherein Mrs. Loftin (the witness) was plaintiff, and that this civil suit was based upon the same act as that complained of in tbis prosecution.

Tbis insistence is well taken, and tbe rulings of the court iu this connection constituted error to a reversal. This evidence was admissible, and should have been allowed, in order to show bias or interest upon tbe part of these witnesses, so that their testimony could be weighed and considered by the jury in the light of such bias or interest, if such existed. The general rule is that . on cross-examination of a witness, any fact may be elicited which tends to show bias or partiality, and, if tbe witness denies tbe fact showing the bias or interest, the cross-examining party may call other witnesses to contradict the witness on this very material question. It cannot be doubted that tbe bias or interest contemplated by this rule may be engendered by a pecuniary interest, as well as by ill will, bate, or by love or friendship. And certainly, it cannot be doubted that the outcome of a criminal prosecution, based upon the same transaction as that of a civil action, would be regarded as having much influence upon the latter. The following authorities sustain the holding here made, and show that error of such nature as to materially affect the substantial rights of this appellant was committed by the court in these several rulings complained of and to which exceptions were duly reserved: Byrd v. State, 17 Ala. App. 301, 84 South. 777; Tapscott v. State (Ala. App.) 88 South. 376; 1 Brown v. State (Ala. App.) 90 South. 54; 2 Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 South. 409, 46 Am. St. Rep. 28; Shackleford v. State, 147 Ala. 688, 40 South. 665. 3

*558 No other questions are presented. Eor the errors designated, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

1

Ante, p. 67.

2

Ante, p. 91.

3

Reported in full in the Southern Reporter; reported as a memorandum decision without opinion in the Alabama Reports.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

93 So. 260, 18 Ala. App. 557, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cabel-v-state-alactapp-1922.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack