C. S. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 16, 2019
Docket03-18-00834-CV
StatusPublished

This text of C. S. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (C. S. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
C. S. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, (Tex. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-18-00834-CV

C. S. B., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 98TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-17-001541, THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant C.S.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s decree terminating her

parental rights to her daughter K.B. (“Kaylee”), who was two years old at the time of trial. 1 As

explained below, we will affirm the decree of termination.

Standard of Review

To terminate a parent’s rights to her child, the Texas Department of Family and

Protective Services (“the Department”) must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

parent engaged in conduct that amounts to statutory grounds for termination pursuant to section

161.001 and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001; In re

S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or

1 To protect her identity, we will refer to the child by an alias. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The trial court also terminated Kaylee’s father’s parental rights, but he has not appealed. degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to

the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; In re K.M.L.,

443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). When we are asked to review the sufficiency of the evidence,

we must “provide due deference to the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity

to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and

demeanor of witnesses.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we look at “all the evidence in

the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266

(Tex. 2002); Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 449 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied).

We “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could do so” and will “disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have

disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Our review does not

require that we disregard undisputed evidence contrary to the determination. K.M.L., 443

S.W.3d at 113. If after viewing the evidence in the proper light, including undisputed evidence

that does not support the findings, we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could have formed a

firm belief or conviction that the Department carried its evidentiary burden, the evidence is

legally insufficient. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Williams, 150 S.W.3d at 449. In considering the

factual sufficiency, we consider the entire record and ask whether the “disputed evidence is such

that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its

finding.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. If the disputed evidence that could not be credited in favor

of the finding is so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or

2 conviction as to the truth of the Department’s allegations, we will hold that the evidence is

factually insufficient. Id.

Factual and Procedural Summary

Mother was almost seventeen years old when Kaylee was born in March 2016;

she was nineteen at the time of trial. Kaylee has Alagilles Syndrome, a genetic disorder that

affects her liver, heart, and other organs. In March 2017, the Department filed its petition

seeking conservatorship over the child. In its supporting affidavit, Department investigator Iesha

Pillow explained that the Department had received a referral alleging medical neglect by Mother.

The referral alleged that Mother had missed an appointment to get Kaylee’s medically prescribed

formula and gave “conflicting stories about having enough formula.” The referral further alleged

that Kaylee needed a liver transplant and that Mother discussed transplant options with a

specialist in late 2016, but then declined to place the child on the wait list, stating that “nature

will take its course and take care of it.” According to the referral, Kaylee weighed twelve

pounds and was “experiencing failure to thrive,” vitamin deficiencies, and jaundice; Mother had

missed some “critical doctors’ appointments”; and Mother had declined a feeding tube procedure

recommended by Kaylee’s doctors. The referral alleged that Kaylee’s medical conditions could

be fatal if not treated properly and that Mother was not receptive to offers of help and “does not

seem to take [Kaylee’s] medical conditions seriously.” The Department attached a letter written

by a pediatric dietician at the Dell Children’s Medical Center, explaining Kaylee’s medical

specialists’ concerns about her health, Mother’s responses, and the care Kaylee had been

receiving at home.

3 After an initial investigation, Kaylee was removed from Mother’s care and placed

in a foster home. During the pendency of the case and while she was in the care of her foster

parents, Kaylee received a liver transplant, and a nasogastric feeding tube (“NG-tube”) was

inserted. 2 Mother complied with many of the requirements placed on her by the court, but she

did not fully comply with requirements related to her mental health and her ongoing use of

marihuana. She also missed many of Kaylee’s doctor’s appointments and visitations. The

Department eventually sought termination, resulting in the underlying bench trial.

During the seven-day trial in November 2018, the trial court heard testimony by

Pillow; Mother; her mother, with whom she and Kaylee lived (“Grandmother”); Megan Dryer,

the family’s Any Baby Can caseworker; CASA volunteer Elizabeth Rosenbaum; Department

caseworker Erin Mark; Kaylee’s foster mother Crystal Pearson; Department investigator Jennifer

Williamson; Alise Fulton, who supervised many of Mother’s visitations; the doctor who

performed Mother’s psychological evaluation; Mother’s therapist; several members of Kaylee’s

medical team; three of Mother’s relatives; and several witnesses who had been involved in

providing services to Mother during the pendency of the case.

Pillow testified at trial that in investigating the 2017 referral, she interviewed

some of Kaylee’s dieticians and social workers, who were concerned that mother was not paying

attention during medical appointments and “doesn’t understand the severity of [Kaylee’s]

condition.” They also told Pillow that they had concerns about Kaylee’s need for a liver

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