C. R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00766-CV

C. R., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 21DFAM328579, THE HONORABLE DALLAS SIMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her parental rights to her

child. 1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and

convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that

termination of those rights was in the child's best interest. Mother’s rights were terminated as to

Jason, based on the (D) (Endangering Conduct Provision), (E) (Endangering Conditions

Provision), (N) (Abandonment Provision), (O) (Ordered Services Provision) grounds and best

interest grounds. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O) and (b)(2).

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by

an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders

1 For the child’s privacy, we will refer to him by the alias “Jason,” and to his family members by their relationships to him. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The biological father of Jason is deceased. The case began with Jason’s two siblings included in the case, but they were each placed with their respective fathers and their cases were severed from Jason’s case. v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per

curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from terminations of parental rights).

The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at

744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied). Appellant’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided

Mother with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and advised her of her rights to

examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Mother has not filed a pro se

brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services waived filing a response to the

Anders brief.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record

to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988);

Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have conducted an independent review of the entire record,

including the Anders brief submitted on Mother’s behalf. We have found nothing in the record

that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s findings as to Mother under subsections (D)

and (E) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no nonfrivolous issues that

could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237

(Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order terminating Mother’s

parental rights.

However, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the right to counsel in suits

seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in the Supreme Court of

Texas, including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27. Accordingly,

2 counsel’s obligation to Mother has not yet been discharged. See id. If after consulting with

counsel Mother desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely file with the

Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at

27–28. Counsel’s motion to withdraw therefore is denied.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: March 21, 2023