TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00750-CV
C. R. F., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY NO. 2024V-025, THE HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the trial court signed an order terminating the parental
rights of C.R.F. (“Mother”) to her children “Jeff,” “Eric,” and “Frank.”1 Mother challenges the
legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of statutory
grounds for termination and its best-interest findings. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D)
(endangering conditions), (E) (endangering conduct), (b)(2) (best interest of child). Mother also
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that the
Department made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that appointing the Department as
the children’s permanent managing conservator is in their best interest. For the following
reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s order.
1 We refer to appellant by her initials or as Mother, to the children by aliases, and to other individuals by their relationships to the child or to Mother. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. In this case, the termination order also terminated the parental rights of Jeff’s father, Eric’s father, and Frank’s father, but none of the fathers have appealed. BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2024, Jason Fowler, a Fayette County Sheriff’s Office Deputy,
was on a routine patrol. At 1:06 a.m., Deputy Fowler noticed a vehicle parked in the parking lot
of a closed business. Deputy Fowler viewed the vehicle as “suspicious” because all the windows
of the car were covered with blankets and quilts and it had a temporary license plate from New
Mexico. Deputy Fowler knocked on the vehicle’s window, Mother lowered the window, and
Deputy Fowler asked her what was going on and why she was there. Mother told him that she
was stopping to rest and was on her way to Clute, Texas, to visit her brother who had just had a
child. Deputy Fowler was informed by his dispatch office that Mother had two outstanding
felony warrants; one from Brazoria County, Texas, for assault family violence and one from
New Mexico for custodial interference. When Deputy Fowler asked Mother about the warrants,
she gave him “some paperwork” that she said addressed the New Mexico incident and told him
she had one child in the car with her. Deputy Fowler turned away from the vehicle to talk to his
dispatch office and heard the engine of Mother’s vehicle revving. Mother then “took off” in her
vehicle with no lights on.2 Deputy Fowler then notified dispatch that he was pursuing Mother
and activated his lights and sirens. Mother drove westbound on State Highway 71, reaching
speeds over 100 miles per hour. Mother then turned and travelled eastbound on State Highway
71 before turning off on Highway 955, stopping, and waving her arms out of the vehicle’s
window “like she was giving up.” When Deputy Fowler approached the vehicle, Mother drove
off again, travelling westbound on State Highway 71, reaching speeds over 111 miles per hour.
Dispatch notified Deputy Fowler that another officer was on the way with a tire deflation device.
After deploying the device, two tires on Mother’s vehicle deflated and she pulled over on the
2 Mother turned her lights on after traveling about 1/8th of a mile. 2 side of the road into the parking lot of a business. When the officers got Mother out of her
vehicle they noticed that there were in fact three children inside; nine-year-old Jeff, six-year-old
Eric, and three-year-old Frank. Mother was taken into custody and charged with evading arrest
with a motor vehicle and child endangerment. Deputy Fowler stated that Mother had been
driving at a dangerously high rate of speed on a dark roadway where animals and livestock are
sometimes present on the road and that at that rate of speed she could easily have lost control of
the vehicle and injured herself, her children, and third parties. The three children were
transported to the Fayette County Sheriff’s Office, which notified the Department.
Alejandra Cerda, a Department investigator, met with the children at the Sheriff’s
Office. Cerda was told that Mother’s brother was unable to leave his county of residence
because he was on probation and could not retrieve the children. Cerda spoke with Jeff, who
stated that he was nine years old and does not attend school because “he is going on a road trip”
to see his uncle in Texas. Jeff said the family had been on the road trip “for about a week.” Jeff
said that they were eating sandwiches, eating out, and had made hamburgers in the car using an
electric mini-grill. They had been sleeping in the car and taking showers at gas stations. Other
than a “nana” in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Jeff said he has no other family. Jeff reported
feeling safe with Mother and that he had not been left home alone by her. Cerda attempted to
speak with Eric, but could not get him to wake up to speak with her. Cerda could not speak with
Frank “due to his age and being nonverbal.” Cerda reported that Eric and Frank appeared to be
dirty and “had a foul odor.” The children did not have jackets and Frank did not have shoes or
socks. The Sheriff’s Office had provided them with blankets and the children appeared to be
healthy and unharmed.
3 Cerda met with Mother at the Fayette County Jail. Mother said that she and the
children were sleeping in the car while on their way to visit her brother who she stated lived in
Sweeney. Mother said that when confronted with the warrants she “made the stupid decision to
run” resulting in her children being removed from her care again. Mother reported that she had
Child Protective Services history in Albuquerque originating in 2020 when her children were
removed from her care because Frank’s father had been “involved in a child murder” and the
community backlash caused CPS to investigate. 3 While the New Mexico CPS case was still
open, Mother was charged with custodial interference for taking the children from CPS custody
without permission. Mother stated that the New Mexico CPS returned her children to her care in
2021. Cerda determined that removal of the children was necessary because Mother and the
children were from New Mexico, Mother had fled from law enforcement at high speeds with the
children in the car, Mother was in the Fayette County Jail, and there was no other relative or
parent available to take possession of the children. 4 The Department sought temporary
managing conservatorship of the children.
The Department provided Mother with a family reunification plan that required
her to take a protective parenting class, undergo drug testing, undergo a psychological exam,
participate in counseling due to her history of drug use, and demonstrate “lifestyle changes.”
The Department told Mother that if she tested positive for drugs it would require an OSAR
evaluation followed by appropriate treatment. Mother completed a parenting class while
incarcerated and, after her release, resided in a transitional living facility. After living at the
3 The criminal charges against Frank’s father did not involve any of Mother’s children, and she denied being aware of them at the time she was in a relationship with Frank’s father. 4 Mother reported that she did not know where Jeff’s father was living, that Eric’s father lived somewhere in Kentucky, and that Frank’s father was incarcerated. 4 transitional living facility for a month and a half, Mother moved to New Mexico. The children
were placed in a group home in Texas and were later relocated to live with Mother’s Cousin
in Kentucky.
When Mother moved to New Mexico from the Texas transitional living facility,
the Department informed her that it would be unable to provide her any services because it did
not have the ability to contract with out-of-state providers. The Department advised Mother that
she would have to seek out and pay for services in New Mexico on her own and that, to establish
her sobriety, Mother would need to pay for drug testing in New Mexico. Mother did not provide
the Department with any drug test results. Mother completed a psychological exam that
identified some mental health issues, including bipolar disorder, cannabis use disorder,
adjustment disorder with depression, and behavior described as “hostility” and “scapegoating” of
the children. Mother travelled from New Mexico to attend some of the scheduled in person
visits with the children and had telephone visits with them until visitation was suspended in July
2025 at the request of the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) who cited concerns about
Mother’s hostile and threatening communications with the children’s placement and the
observation that the children’s behavior declined significantly after virtual visits with Mother.
During a one-day bench trial in September 2025, the Department asked the court
to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children and for their current placement to be
continued and approved. At that time, the children were living with Mother’s Cousin in
Kentucky. The CASA agreed that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interest. The Department’s witnesses referenced Mother’s CPS case in New Mexico; her
5 taking the children from CPS custody; and the assault family violence 5 and evading arrest
charges resulting from the high-speed police chase. The Department was concerned that,
although Mother had completed a parenting class, she had not demonstrated lifestyle changes
that the Department believed were necessary to provide the children with a safe environment.
The Department also expressed concerns because it did not know if Mother was sober and did
not know if she was receiving treatment for her mental health issues. The Department witnesses
testified that Mother was hostile in her communications with the Department and with the
children’s placement, to the degree that the placement requested that Mother be prevented from
directly communicating with her. The Department witness testified that the placement had to
“get law enforcement in Kentucky” involved due to Mother’s harassing behavior. This caused
the Department to be concerned about unaddressed anger management issues. The court heard
testimony that the children were thriving in their placement, that they wanted to be there, and
that “things are great right now for them.”
The Department acknowledged that the children were bonded with Mother
because of their ages and because they had been in her care for most of their lives. Mother
regularly reached out to the Department for updates on the children, demonstrating to the
Department that she cares about their well-being. In the Department’s view, Mother’s moving
from Texas to New Mexico during the pendency of the case frustrated its ability to provide her
services and obtain sufficient evidence of her sobriety, and “put the burden on Mother” to
demonstrate her ability to provide a safe environment for the children. The CASA testified that
5 The assault family violence charge arose from a physical altercation between Mother and her aunt after a day at the beach. Mother testified that after coming home from the beach, her aunt was drinking and hit Mother. Mother stated that she hit her aunt back, and the aunt and a cousin “jumped” Mother. The record does not reflect whether the children were present during this incident. 6 the current placement is committed to taking care of the children long-term, and that they are
happy and doing well in school. The CASA expressed concerns about Mother’s hostile and
erratic behavior regarding the children’s placement, including her calling the Kentucky law
enforcement officers to the placement’s home for a welfare check in the middle of the night the
day that the children were transported to Mother’s Cousin’s house, despite the CASA’s belief
that Mother was aware that the children had arrived safely. The CASA also testified that Mother
had provided inauthentic photographs showing injuries to the children that she asserted had
occurred at their placement. The CASA was concerned as well that Mother was violating court
orders by attempting to contact the placement rather than communicating through
the Department.
Mother testified extensively at trial. She explained that she had pleaded guilty to
the charge of evading arrest because she was guilty. Mother agreed that the high-speed chase
was dangerous to her children and had been a mistake but claimed that she had fled from the
police only so they would not take her children from her. Mother testified that she returned to
New Mexico after being released from jail after the high-speed chase because it was difficult for
her to comply with the service plan while she lived in transitional housing in Texas. Mother
stated that when she and her mother travelled to Texas to visit her children the Easter following
her arrest and incarceration, her mother was arrested at the Texas-New Mexico border for
possession of fentanyl and was taken to jail. Mother testified that the police “claimed to have
found fentanyl” in her mother’s backpack “but there’s nothing that can corroborate that at
this point.”
Mother testified that, until the night she called police to conduct a welfare check
on the children in Kentucky, she and Cousin had been in regular communication and had
7 discussed the children and their needs. Mother testified that she called the police to Cousin’s
home in Kentucky because she was worried about the children and not to harass or intimidate
anyone. Mother testified that she believes the children’s current placement to be a good one and
that if the court did not terminate her parental rights, she would want them to remain at Cousin’s
house until she gets “all the way settled and off parole.” Mother testified that she lived with
Yolanda and Deborah Littleton in Albuquerque, New Mexico but said that she would be willing
to move to another state to be near the children. She also testified that if the children were
returned to her care she would move with them to Los Angeles, California where her husband
is living.
Regarding the removal of the children from her care in New Mexico, Mother
testified that it occurred because of her relationship with Frank’s father, who had been charged
with child abuse resulting in the death of a child and dismemberment of the child’s body.
Mother stated that she was not living with Frank’s father when he committed those crimes and
that even though Frank’s father “was not doing anything wrong when she was with him,” New
Mexico CPS “wrongly removed the children and wrongly placed them in an abusive foster
home.” Mother denied knowing about Frank’s father’s criminal case and stated that she never
heard him talking to any probation officer or bondsman. Mother stated that she did not know
why Frank’s father was not incarcerated until 2023 when the criminal charges stemmed from an
incident that occurred in 2016, saying: “That would be a question you would have to ask him
directly.” Mother testified that he was not aware of the charges when she was living with
Frank’s father and that he had given her “a false name.” 6
6 Mother provided no explanation for why Frank shares the same name as his father, nor did she explain when she learned of the criminal charges and what she did in response. 8 During a December 2021 visit during the New Mexico CPS case, Mother
observed that Jeff had bruising on his hands and Eric’s hair was matted. Mother testified that she
reported this to New Mexico CPS but they did nothing. Mother stated that she took the children
from New Mexico CPS custody because she was concerned for their well being in foster care.
Mother was charged with custodial interference, received a deferred sentence, and later was able
to regain custody of the children in 2022. At that time, Jeff attended a public elementary school
but, in 2023, Mother lost her car and was unable to take them to school so she started home
schooling them using an online program.
Mother testified that she has learned in therapy how to handle stressful situations
and to “process” the situation instead of reacting to it. Although the parenting class was helpful
and taught her skills she can implement in the future, Mother acknowledged that she “still has
some work to do.” She agreed that contact between her and the children would need to be a
stairstep progression. Mother also testified that if her parental rights were terminated, she would
be devastated but that she would not go to Kentucky to try to take the children or interfere with
their placement.
The trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Jeff, Eric,
and Frank, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had knowingly placed or
knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their
physical or emotional well-being, that Mother had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional
well-being, and that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the children
was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2).
Mother appeals.
9 STANDARD OF REVIEW
To terminate parental rights under Section 161.001, the Department has the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory predicate grounds and that
termination is in the best interests of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re
R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 271 (Tex. 2024); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2024); In re
J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); see also
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.206(a). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of
proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d
624, 626 (Tex. 2018) (“Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship implicate rights of
constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection.”). Parental rights have
been described as “essential,” “a basic right,” and “far more precious than property rights.”
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972)). They are “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected by the
United States Constitution. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000); E.E. v. Texas Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., 598 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). “When the
State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that
fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
“Consequently, termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary
termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20.
“This heightened proof standard carries the weight and gravity due process requires to protect the
fundamental rights at stake.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630.
10 “A correspondingly searching standard of appellate review is an essential
procedural adjunct.” Id. “The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent
to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. “Evidence is legally
sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and
considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631. “Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires
weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.”
Id. “In a factual-sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence
is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id.
“Evidence is factually sufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a
reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the
factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.
However, “an appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only fact
findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). “Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the
constitutional underpinning of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and
physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” Id. In reviewing
findings for factual sufficiency, we must give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and
cannot supplant the factfinder’s judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108-09
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 314 (stating that factfinders are “sole
arbiters of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony” and
“entitled to choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another with respect to the disputed
facts of this case”); In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (stating that when reviewing
11 termination order, appellate courts defer to “decision of the factfinder who, having full
opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the
credibility and demeanor of witnesses”).
DISCUSSION
Reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Mother
Mother asserts that there is legally insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with her. See
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(f)(1). Mother argues that “there is no evidence CPS made a sincere
effort to reunify this family.” Subsection 161.001(f) provides that:
(f) In a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services, the court may not order termination of the parent-child relationship under Subsection (b)(1) unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence and describes in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order that:
(1) the department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent; . . .
Id. The court filed the following findings of fact:
2.1 The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to the parents. However, despite those reasonable efforts to return the children home to the parents, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents return.
2.2 The Court specifically finds that those reasonable efforts include the following:
12 2.2.1 The Department created a family service plan that is narrowly tailored to address any specific issues identified.
2.2.2 The Department set up services for [Mother] while she was incarcerated and when she was released.
2.2.3 The Department facilitated parent-child visits even after the parents were located out of state.
2.2.4 The Court extended the original dismissal date of the case and the Department allowed extra time to work services.
Mother asserts that the record contains evidence showing that the Department failed to
communicate with her, failed to inform her about and set up certain services, failed to return her
phone calls and correspondence, and failed to maintain accurate notes and records regarding her
efforts to complete the services set forth in the family service plan.
“The concept of a ‘reasonable effort’ to return the child is effectively a sliding
scale, depending on the situation.” In re K.T.J.M., No. 06-09-00104-CV, 2010 WL 1664027, at
*4 n.12 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is well established that
“reasonable efforts” to reunite a parent and a child can be satisfied through the preparation and
administration of a service plan. See, e.g., In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2011, no pet.); C.G. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. No. 03-18-00852-CV,
2019 WL 3367524, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). “While
implementation of a family service plan by the Department is generally considered a reasonable
effort to return a child to the parent, that is not the only evidence which can satisfy this element.”
In re F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d 752, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). “The
Department’s efforts to place the child with relatives may constitute legally and factually
13 sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable
efforts.” In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d 698, 704-05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). The proper
inquiry is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts. In re M.V.G.,
440 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—Waco, 2010 no pet.); In re J.A., No. 04-20-00242-CV,
2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). “The
issue before us is whether the Department’s reunification efforts were reasonable under the
circumstances.” In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied).
The evidence at trial was that the Department provided Mother with a service plan
and, while incarcerated, she completed some of the required courses. Mother testified that she
communicated with her caseworker and the caseworker’s supervisor, stating “I can’t say they
were the best, but they did give me somewhat of communication.” Mother stated that the
Department caseworker assigned to her did a good job of keeping her informed about the
children and that the supervisor would return her communications when he could. The
Department informed Mother that it would be unable to arrange for and pay for services if she
left the State of Texas, and Mother moved to New Mexico after she was told that it would be her
responsibility to provide proof of sobriety and of completing the family service plan. There was
evidence that the Department facilitated Mother’s visits with the children, both in person and
virtually and even after Mother had moved to New Mexico. The Department also arranged for a
relative placement for the children with Mother’s Cousin, and Mother agreed that this placement
was good for the children.
There was evidence that the Department created a detailed service plan for
Mother, provided Mother with opportunities to visit the children, and placed the children with a
relative whom Mother agreed was a good placement. Viewed in a light favorable to the
14 judgment, the evidence was legally sufficient for the factfinder to conclude that the Department
made reasonable reunification efforts.
Statutory ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights
Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s findings of statutory grounds. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). We
limit our review to the trial court’s finding that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or
emotional well-being. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); J.B.M.H. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective
Servs., No. 03-22-00661-CV, 2023 WL 2920315, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 13, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (court may consider one endangerment finding under either (D) or (E)
without addressing the other endangerment finding, even in cases where the other finding is
challenged on appeal).
Endangerment means exposing a child to loss or injury or jeopardizing a child’s
emotional or physical well-being. See Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531,
522 (Tex. 1987). A finding of endangerment requires more than the threat of metaphysical
injury or possible ill effects from a less-than-ideal family environment, but the Department does
not have to prove that the conduct was directed at the child or that the child suffered an actual
injury. Subsection (D) authorizes termination of parental rights if clear and convincing evidence
establishes that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) authorizes termination of parental rights if
clear and convincing evidence establishes that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly
15 placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Although both grounds require proof
of endangerment, they are otherwise separate and distinct grounds. See A.S. v. Texas Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.); In re
S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The primary distinction between subsections (D) and (E) is the cause of the
endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d at 85. Under
subsection (D), the focus is on “conditions or surroundings” that endanger the child, while under
subsection (E), the focus is on “conduct” that endangers the child. Id. Moreover, “[a] single act
or omission can support termination under subsection (D),” J.G. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., 592 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.), while “termination
under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary,
deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.” C.B. v. Texas Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., 458 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied).
Also, subsection (D) always requires proof of scienter, i.e., evidence that parents
“knowingly” placed or “knowingly” allowed their child to remain in endangering conditions or
surroundings. See In re T.H., 131 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied);
cf. In re I.D.G., 579 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (“Scienter is not
required for an appellant’s own acts under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), although it is required when
a parent places her child with others who engage in endangering acts.”). “Subsection D is not a
basis for terminating parental rights if the parent is unaware of the endangering environment.”
In re A.L.H., 468 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). “So, in
scrutinizing the endangerment finding, we focus not only on evidence of endangerment but also
16 on evidence showing the parent’s awareness of the endangering environment.” In re J.E.M.M.,
532 S.W.3d 874, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
The evidence at trial was that Mother had evaded arrest by driving, initially
without headlights on at night, at speeds over 100 miles per hour with her children in the car.
Mother first drove westbound on a state highway at this high rate of speed, then turned around
and travelled eastbound on the same highway and pulled over to wave at the pursuing officer as
if she was going to cease her efforts to evade arrest. Instead, Mother again drove westbound at
speeds over 100 miles per hour and did not stop until police deployed a deflation device that
deflated her tires and caused her to have to pull over. The arresting officer testified that her
speed was dangerous to herself, to the children, and to others. He stated that at that speed she
could easily have lost control of the vehicle and caused injury to herself and the children. He
also stated that animals roam near the roadway in that area making driving at a high rate of speed
even more dangerous. Mother testified that she knows she made a mistake and that her actions
were not “appropriate” for a parent. Mother stated that she reacted emotionally and did not make
a conscious decision to put the children in danger. Mother testified that “in her heart” she thinks
she did endanger the children by fleeing from the police, stating that she made a “dangerous and
bad decision.”
We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a
finding that Mother knowingly placed the children in conditions or surroundings which
endangered their physical or emotional well-being so as to support a finding of endangerment
under subsection (D). See J.M.B.H. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
No. 03-22-00661-CV, 2023 WL 2920315, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 13, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that evidence that Mother allowed children to ride in car driven
17 by intoxicated Father endangered children under subsection (D)); In re A.R.G., No. 04-19-00749-
CV, 2020 WL 1277739, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(concluding that evidence showing that “Mother drove with her children in her car while under
the influence of methamphetamines support[ed] the trial court’s finding that the children were
endangered, thereby jeopardizing their safety, within the meaning of subsection (D)”); In re
R.H., No. 10-17-00054-CV, 2017 WL 4293268, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 27, 2017, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that children were endangered under subsection (D) when they
were inside Mother’s “disabled vehicle on the railroad tracks—a dangerous situation”). Because
section 161.001 requires proof of only one statutory predicate ground to support termination, see
A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362, we need not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that
Mother endangered the children under subsection (E); see Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Best interest
Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b0(20. Relevant factors in
assessing the best interest of a child include (i) the desires of the child, (ii) the stability of the
home or proposed placement, (iii) parental abilities, (iv) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (v) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future, (vi) the plans for the child by the individual or agency seeking custody, (vii) the programs
available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the best interest of the child, (viii)
acts or omissions by the parent showing that the parent-child relationship was not proper, and
(ix) any excuses for the parent’s conduct. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.
1976); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307 (stating that “prompt and permanent placement of the
18 child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest” and listing factors that
court should consider “in determining whether the child’s parents are willing and able to provide
the child with a safe environment”). These factors are not exhaustive, no one factor is
controlling, evidence on each factor is not required, and evidence presented to satisfy the
predicate-ground finding may also be probative of the child’s best interest. In re C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 27. “We must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances in light of the Holley
factors’ to determine whether sufficient evidence supports” the best-interest finding. In re
J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (quoting In re B.F.,
No. 02-07-00334-CV, 2008 WL 902790, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
Some evidence in the record indicates that termination is not in the best interest of
the children. The record shows that the children are bonded with Mother; that Mother
“discourages bad behavior” by the children; and that Mother encourages them to make good
choices, be kind to each other, and listen to their placement. The CASA described Mother as an
active parent who is sometimes “overzealous.” Mother worked many of the services outlined in
the Department’s plan and stated that she has learned some coping mechanisms to use in
circumstances that frustrate her. Mother attempted to send school supplies to the children,
participated in in-person and video visitation with the children, and consistently sought
information from the Department about the children’s well-being. Until Mother’s Cousin
requested that Mother not contact her directly, Mother spoke regularly with this placement about
the children’s behavior, needs, and preferences. Moreover, Mother testified that her actions,
including acts of custodial interference and the high speed car chase were done in an attempt to
protect her children and keep them with her.
19 But evidence in the record also supports a finding that termination is in the
children’s best interest. The children are placed with a relative and both the Department and
Mother agree that the placement is a good one. Mother has a history of removing her children
from CPS custody and taking other actions that have resulted in her incarceration. Mother has an
assault family violence charge against her arising out of an altercation with her aunt and a
cousin; there was no evidence that this case has been resolved. Mother had a relationship with
Frank’s father, a person who had been charged with injury to a child involving death and
dismemberment of the corpse. Although Mother denied knowing about the charges until she
learned of them later in a “news report,” a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve that Mother was
unaware of the charges, which resulted in a 37-year prison term for Frank’s father. Mother
testified that her relationship with Frank’s father caused New Mexico CPS to remove the
children from her care and described the action as “an unlawful taking of my children and a
backlash to [Frank’s father’s] criminal case.” Mother stated that Frank’s father “was not doing
anything wrong” when she was with him and that the CPS removal was “wrong.” A reasonable
factfinder could conclude that Mother was diminishing the seriousness of Frank’s father’s
egregious crimes resulting in the death and dismemberment of another child and the danger he
could present to the children. At trial Mother was inconsistent about her plans for the children
stating first that they would remain with her cousin and she would relocate to Kentucky to be
near them while she completed probation and “transition[ed] slowly” but later stating that she
planned to move with the children to Los Angeles to be with her current husband. Despite her
plans, Mother offered no testimony at trial regarding the husband, whom she married in 2022, or
what type of living conditions the children would be in if they moved to California with Mother.
20 There was evidence that the children are thriving in their placement and that it can
be a long-term placement for them. The Department acknowledged that Mother had worked her
services but expressed concern about her ability to provide the children with a safe and stable
environment. The Department expressed concern about Mother’s sobriety, which it had not
confirmed because she moved out of the state and had not provided them with drug testing
comparable to what it would have required had she remained in Texas. The Department also
expressed concern about Mother’s hostility when communicating with the Department and the
placement and her unaddressed anger management and mental health issues.
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction
that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding. Similarly, we are unable to say
that the evidence contrary to the finding is “so significant that the factfinder could not have
formed a firm belief or conviction” that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. Consequently, the evidence is also factually sufficient to support the
finding. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630-31. We overrule
Mother’s challenge to the best-interest finding.
Conservatorship
Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
court’s finding that appointing Mother as the children’s permanent managing conservator is not
in their best interest. We have, however, already concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court’s endangerment and best-interest findings. In this context, Mother does
21 not have standing to challenge the portion of the decree appointing the Department as the
children’s managing conservator. See In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (explaining that order terminating the parent-child relationship
divests parent of legal rights and duties with respect to child (citing Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.206(b))); see also A.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., Nos. 03-18-00780-CV,
03-18-00781-CV, 2019 WL 1342163, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (concluding in context of parents’ appeal from judgment terminating their parental rights,
that parent lacked standing to challenge trial court’s striking of grandmother’s petition in
intervention and collecting cases in which court concluded that appealing parents lacked standing
to complain of errors that did not injuriously affect them or that affected rights of others); In re
H.M.M., 230 S.W.3d 204, 204-05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding
court lacked jurisdiction to consider mother’s appeal of trial court’s failure to grant sole custody
to her father after it terminated her parental rights). Further, once an appellate court overrules a
parent’s challenge to an order terminating the parent’s rights, the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as sole managing conservator may be considered a “consequence of the
termination.” See In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 (citation omitted). We overrule Mother’s
challenge to the trial court’s conservatorship finding.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.
__________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice
22 Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis Concurring in part, Dissenting in part by Justice Ellis
Affirmed
Filed: March 27, 2026