C. L. Ex Rel. v. L. v. Lucia Mar Unified School District

Ninth Circuit

C. L. Ex Rel. v. L. v. Lucia Mar Unified School District

646 F. App'x 524

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 25, 2016

Docket14-55119

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 646 F. App'x 524 (C. L. Ex Rel. v. L. v. Lucia Mar Unified School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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C. L. Ex Rel. v. L. v. Lucia Mar Unified School District, 646 F. App'x 524 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

C.L., an autistic child, appeals the district court decision affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) findings that (1) his school district, Lucia Mar Unified School District (“Lucia Mar”), properly implemented an individualized education plan (“IEP”) that went into effect in January 2011, and (2) an IEP offered by Lucia Mar to C.L. in February 2012 was an offer of free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Lucia Mar argues that the district court should have dismissed C.L.’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision as untimely. The IDEA imposes a 90-day statute of limitations for appealing an administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), and California adopts this same 90-day time frame for such appeals. Cal. Educ.Code § 56505(k). Due to the ambiguity surrounding the effect of two corrected decisions following the first decision on August 10, 2014, we *525 assume without deciding that the appeal was timely filed.

We adopt the district court’s very careful and well-reasoned decision as to the January 2011 IEP. Lucia Mar properly implemented the January 2011 IEP in the school setting, because there were no major discrepancies between the behavioral services required by C.L.’s IEP and those provided by Lucia Mar. See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 818-25 (9th Cir.2007). Neither the January 2011 IEP, nor any subsequent amendment, required Lucia Mar to provide C.L. with behavioral services in the home setting, and C.L. introduced no evidence to establish that Lucia Mar had any obligation to provide such services in the home.

The question of whether the February 2012 IEP was an offer of free and appropriate public education is moot, because C.L.’s mother consented to all parts of that IEP in August 2015. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (“[A] case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (quotations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

C.L., an autistic child, appeals the district court decision affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) findings that (1) his school district, Lucia Mar Unified School District (“Lucia Mar”), properly implemented an individualized education plan (“IEP”) that went into effect in January 2011, and (2) an IEP offered by Lucia Mar to C.L. in February 2012 was an offer of free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Lucia Mar argues that the district court should have dismissed C.L.’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision as untimely. The IDEA imposes a 90-day statute of limitations for appealing an administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), and California adopts this same 90-day time frame for such appeals. Cal. Educ.Code § 56505(k). Due to the ambiguity surrounding the effect of two corrected decisions following the first decision on August 10, 2014, we *525 assume without deciding that the appeal was timely filed.

We adopt the district court’s very careful and well-reasoned decision as to the January 2011 IEP. Lucia Mar properly implemented the January 2011 IEP in the school setting, because there were no major discrepancies between the behavioral services required by C.L.’s IEP and those provided by Lucia Mar. See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 818-25 (9th Cir.2007). Neither the January 2011 IEP, nor any subsequent amendment, required Lucia Mar to provide C.L. with behavioral services in the home setting, and C.L. introduced no evidence to establish that Lucia Mar had any obligation to provide such services in the home.

The question of whether the February 2012 IEP was an offer of free and appropriate public education is moot, because C.L.’s mother consented to all parts of that IEP in August 2015. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (“[A] case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (quotations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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646 F. App'x 524, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/c-l-ex-rel-v-l-v-lucia-mar-unified-school-district-ca9-2016.

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