09/09/2025
DA 24-0615 Case Number: DA 24-0615
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 206N
CARESSA JILL HARDY, a/k/a GLENN LEE DIBLEY,
Petitioner and Appellant.
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-24-566 Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Caressa Jill Hardy, a/k/a Glenn Lee Dibley, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Matt Jennings, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 23, 2025
Decided: September 9, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Caressa Jill Hardy, a/k/a Glenn Lee Dibley (Hardy), appeals pro se the denial of his
amended petition for postconviction relief (PCR). The Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, issued its written order denying such on December 4, 2024. We affirm.
¶3 Following a nine-day jury trial, Hardy was found guilty of two counts of deliberate
homicide and two counts of solicitation for homicide. The facts and procedural history for
those criminal charges are detailed in State v. Hardy, 2023 MT 110, ¶¶ 3-17, 412 Mont.
383, 530 P.3d 814 (Hardy I). Hardy appealed the convictions. In his appeal he asserted
his right to counsel was violated by the State’s use of incarcerated informants; the court
erred by refusing Hardy’s jury instruction to view the informants’ testimony with caution;
he was wrongly precluded from commenting on the State’s failure to call John Braunreiter
as a witness; and prosecutorial misconduct. Hardy I, ¶¶ 22, 42, 55, 64. We affirmed the
convictions. Hardy I, ¶ 82.
¶4 On June 18, 2024, Hardy filed his original PCR petition. Hardy then filed an
amended PCR petition on August 2, 2024. In the amended PCR petition, Hardy asserted
four claims: (1) the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses charged in the
charging document beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for
2 the solicitation for homicide charges such that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to address these offenses; (3) improper use of information by incarcerated
informants; and (4) improper jury instructions. Primarily, the District Court determined
Hardy’s claims were either decided on direct appeal or could have been brought on direct
appeal and were thus barred for PCR consideration and denied Hardy’s amended PCR
petition without requesting a response or holding a hearing.
¶5 Although Hardy’s brief on appeal is less than a model of clarity, Hardy appears to
reiterate the same claims asserted in the amended PCR petition.1 To the extent Hardy’s
brief could be interpreted as raising issues not asserted in his amended PCR petition, we
do not consider them as we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.2
Fletcher v. State, 2023 MT 266, ¶ 9, 372 Mont. 22, 309 P.3d 998.
¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to
determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
conclusions of law are correct. Wilkes v. State, 2015 MT 243, ¶ 9, 380 Mont. 388, 355 P.3d
755. “A district court may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law,
1 For example, in asserting his claims, Hardy belabors about false witness jailhouse informants in a manner which indicates he does not seem to understand the adversarial trial process and how cross-examination is the primary means by which a witness’ inconsistencies and credibility are challenged. Hardy also seems particularly confused as to the procedural history of his PCR claims, asserting the District Court deemed his PCR petition denied upon the passing of 60 days. The amended PCR petition was not “deemed denied” by the passage of time, but rather the District Court issued a written order on December 4, 2024, setting forth its reasoning for denying each of the claims asserted in the amended PCR petition. 2 Hardy’s brief devotes several pages to various complaints about the incompetence of Montana’s Attorney General and other matters not directly related to the procedural history, facts, or law at issue in this appeal. 3 and we review a court’s conclusions of law for correctness.” Herman v. State, 2006 MT
7, ¶ 13, 330 Mont. 267, 127 P.3d 422.
¶7 Under § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, a petition for postconviction relief must “identify
all facts supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the petition and have attached
affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing the existence of those facts.” A district
court may also dismiss a petition for postconviction relief for failure to state a claim if the
petitioner fails to attach the affidavit, records, or other evidence required under
§ 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. Herman, ¶¶ 15, 32. Additionally, postconviction relief cannot
be substituted for direct appeal because this Court “will not consider grounds for
postconviction relief that reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal.” DeShields
v. State, 2006 MT 58, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 329, 132 P.3d 540; see also § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
Hardy’s claim the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses charged is not reviewable through PCR.
¶8 Upon the State resting its case at trial, Hardy had the opportunity to contest
sufficiency of the evidence to each charged offense and also had the opportunity and did,
in fact, to contest sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. Thus, pursuant to
§ 46-21-105(2), MCA—“grounds for relief that were or could reasonably have been
raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or decided in a [PCR]
proceeding”—Hardy’s claim that the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses
charged is not reviewable through PCR.
4 The District Court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.
¶9 Hardy asserts that the testimony of incarcerated informants was false so that there
was not probable cause to support the solicitation for homicide charges and, as a result, the
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction is ‘the court’s fundamental
authority to hear and adjudicate cases or proceedings.’” In re E.G., 2014 MT 148, ¶ 11,
375 Mont. 252, 326 P.3d 1092 (quoting In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, ¶ 54, 370 Mont. 422,
305 P.3d 739). Jurisdiction of district courts in Montana is established by the Montana
Constitution. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4. District courts have original jurisdiction over all
felony criminal cases in Montana. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1). Accord § 3-5-302(1)(a),
MCA. Lack of probable cause—based on the totality of the circumstances there are
“reasonable grounds for suspicion, supported by circumstances reasonably strong in
themselves to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious [person] to believe the accused is
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09/09/2025
DA 24-0615 Case Number: DA 24-0615
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 206N
CARESSA JILL HARDY, a/k/a GLENN LEE DIBLEY,
Petitioner and Appellant.
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-24-566 Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Caressa Jill Hardy, a/k/a Glenn Lee Dibley, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Matt Jennings, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 23, 2025
Decided: September 9, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Caressa Jill Hardy, a/k/a Glenn Lee Dibley (Hardy), appeals pro se the denial of his
amended petition for postconviction relief (PCR). The Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, issued its written order denying such on December 4, 2024. We affirm.
¶3 Following a nine-day jury trial, Hardy was found guilty of two counts of deliberate
homicide and two counts of solicitation for homicide. The facts and procedural history for
those criminal charges are detailed in State v. Hardy, 2023 MT 110, ¶¶ 3-17, 412 Mont.
383, 530 P.3d 814 (Hardy I). Hardy appealed the convictions. In his appeal he asserted
his right to counsel was violated by the State’s use of incarcerated informants; the court
erred by refusing Hardy’s jury instruction to view the informants’ testimony with caution;
he was wrongly precluded from commenting on the State’s failure to call John Braunreiter
as a witness; and prosecutorial misconduct. Hardy I, ¶¶ 22, 42, 55, 64. We affirmed the
convictions. Hardy I, ¶ 82.
¶4 On June 18, 2024, Hardy filed his original PCR petition. Hardy then filed an
amended PCR petition on August 2, 2024. In the amended PCR petition, Hardy asserted
four claims: (1) the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses charged in the
charging document beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for
2 the solicitation for homicide charges such that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to address these offenses; (3) improper use of information by incarcerated
informants; and (4) improper jury instructions. Primarily, the District Court determined
Hardy’s claims were either decided on direct appeal or could have been brought on direct
appeal and were thus barred for PCR consideration and denied Hardy’s amended PCR
petition without requesting a response or holding a hearing.
¶5 Although Hardy’s brief on appeal is less than a model of clarity, Hardy appears to
reiterate the same claims asserted in the amended PCR petition.1 To the extent Hardy’s
brief could be interpreted as raising issues not asserted in his amended PCR petition, we
do not consider them as we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.2
Fletcher v. State, 2023 MT 266, ¶ 9, 372 Mont. 22, 309 P.3d 998.
¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to
determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
conclusions of law are correct. Wilkes v. State, 2015 MT 243, ¶ 9, 380 Mont. 388, 355 P.3d
755. “A district court may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law,
1 For example, in asserting his claims, Hardy belabors about false witness jailhouse informants in a manner which indicates he does not seem to understand the adversarial trial process and how cross-examination is the primary means by which a witness’ inconsistencies and credibility are challenged. Hardy also seems particularly confused as to the procedural history of his PCR claims, asserting the District Court deemed his PCR petition denied upon the passing of 60 days. The amended PCR petition was not “deemed denied” by the passage of time, but rather the District Court issued a written order on December 4, 2024, setting forth its reasoning for denying each of the claims asserted in the amended PCR petition. 2 Hardy’s brief devotes several pages to various complaints about the incompetence of Montana’s Attorney General and other matters not directly related to the procedural history, facts, or law at issue in this appeal. 3 and we review a court’s conclusions of law for correctness.” Herman v. State, 2006 MT
7, ¶ 13, 330 Mont. 267, 127 P.3d 422.
¶7 Under § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, a petition for postconviction relief must “identify
all facts supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the petition and have attached
affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing the existence of those facts.” A district
court may also dismiss a petition for postconviction relief for failure to state a claim if the
petitioner fails to attach the affidavit, records, or other evidence required under
§ 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. Herman, ¶¶ 15, 32. Additionally, postconviction relief cannot
be substituted for direct appeal because this Court “will not consider grounds for
postconviction relief that reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal.” DeShields
v. State, 2006 MT 58, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 329, 132 P.3d 540; see also § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
Hardy’s claim the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses charged is not reviewable through PCR.
¶8 Upon the State resting its case at trial, Hardy had the opportunity to contest
sufficiency of the evidence to each charged offense and also had the opportunity and did,
in fact, to contest sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. Thus, pursuant to
§ 46-21-105(2), MCA—“grounds for relief that were or could reasonably have been
raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or decided in a [PCR]
proceeding”—Hardy’s claim that the State failed to prove each element of all the offenses
charged is not reviewable through PCR.
4 The District Court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.
¶9 Hardy asserts that the testimony of incarcerated informants was false so that there
was not probable cause to support the solicitation for homicide charges and, as a result, the
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction is ‘the court’s fundamental
authority to hear and adjudicate cases or proceedings.’” In re E.G., 2014 MT 148, ¶ 11,
375 Mont. 252, 326 P.3d 1092 (quoting In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, ¶ 54, 370 Mont. 422,
305 P.3d 739). Jurisdiction of district courts in Montana is established by the Montana
Constitution. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4. District courts have original jurisdiction over all
felony criminal cases in Montana. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1). Accord § 3-5-302(1)(a),
MCA. Lack of probable cause—based on the totality of the circumstances there are
“reasonable grounds for suspicion, supported by circumstances reasonably strong in
themselves to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious [person] to believe the accused is
guilty of the offense charged”—for a felony offense does not eliminate the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Plouffe v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Hum. Servs., 2002 MT 64,
¶¶ 18-19, 309 Mont. 184, 45 P.3d 10 (citations omitted). In fact, a claim of lack of probable
cause related to a charged criminal offense would be brought and adjudicated in the court
in which the charging document was filed. City of Bozeman v. Lehrer, 2020 MT 55, ¶ 7,
399 Mont. 166, 459 P.3d 850. Upon being charged and through to conviction, Hardy had
the opportunity to contest probable cause related to the solicitation charges and also had
the opportunity to do so on direct appeal. Thus, pursuant to § 46-21-105(2), MCA, Hardy’s
claim for lack of probable cause is not reviewable through PCR.
5 Hardy’s claim of improper use of information by incarcerated informants is not reviewable through PCR.
¶10 In his amended PCR petition, Hardy alleges his right to counsel was violated by
prosecutorial misconduct due to the State indirectly eliciting incriminating statements from
Hardy in the absence of counsel. Hardy pursued this specific claim on direct appeal.
Hardy I, ¶¶ 21-39. Thus, pursuant to § 46-21-105(2), MCA, this is not reviewable through
PCR.
Hardy’s claim that the jury instructions were inappropriate is not reviewable through PCR.
¶11 In his amended PCR petition, Hardy asserts the trial judge gave the jury a
presumption of guilt by focusing on “purpose” as an element, causing the jury to disregard
the requirement that the State prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Hardy also
asserts the trial judge misspoke when verbally reading the instructions to the jury indicating
if all of the elements were “provided” rather than “proved,” the State met its burden of
proof. Again, Hardy had full opportunity to object as to any improper jury instructions at
trial and had full opportunity to and did, in fact, appeal his jury instruction issues on direct
appeal. Hardy I, ¶¶ 40-47. Pursuant to § 46-21-105(2), MCA, as jury instruction issues
either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal, such are not reviewable
through PCR.
¶12 After reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that Hardy’s amended
petition for postconviction relief should be denied because the District Court did not lack
subject matter jurisdiction and each of the other claims asserted either could have been
6 raised on direct appeal or were raised and considered on direct appeal and are therefore
barred by § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶14 Affirmed.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ JIM RICE