C. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 30, 2024
Docket03-24-00329-CV
StatusPublished

This text of C. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (C. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
C. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00329-CV

C. G., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. C2023-0931C, THE HONORABLE MELISSA MCCLENAHAN, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.G. (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights

to his son C.G., Jr., and his daughter S.G.1 After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment

finding by clear and convincing evidence that several statutory grounds existed for terminating

Father’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam.

Code § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (O), (b)(2).

Father’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in

appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between the

1 For the children’s privacy, we will refer to them by their initials and to their family members by their relationships to the children. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The parental rights of the children’s mother also were terminated after she entered into a mediated settlement agreement. defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute

frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective &

Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying

Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Father’s counsel has certified to this Court that

he has provided Father with a copy of the Anders brief and informed Father of his right to

receive a copy of the entire appellate record and file a pro se brief. The Department of Family

and Protective Services has filed a response to the Anders brief, waiving its right to file an

appellee’s brief. To date, Father has not filed a pro se brief.

We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s

endangerment findings as to Father under subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code, and we

have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings.

See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining due process and due course of law

considerations pertaining to terminations under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of Family Code).

After reviewing the record and the Anders brief, we find nothing in the record that would

arguably support Father’s appeal. We agree with Father’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous

and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental

rights. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw.2

2 The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing

2 __________________________________________ Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: July 30, 2024

of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, counsel’s obligations to Father have not yet been discharged. See id. If after consulting with counsel Father desires to file a petition for review, his counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 28.

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Penson v. Ohio
488 U.S. 75 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Taylor v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
160 S.W.3d 641 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
in the Interest of P.M., a Child
520 S.W.3d 24 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)
in Re Interest of N.G., a Child
577 S.W.3d 230 (Texas Supreme Court, 2019)

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