C. C. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 30, 2025
Docket03-25-00479-CV
StatusPublished

This text of C. C. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (C. C. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
C. C. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00479-CV

C. C. M., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 395TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 24-0008-CPS395, THE HONORABLE RYAN D. LARSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Father appeals the district court’s final order terminating his parental rights to his

children, C.M. and S.M.1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. The case was tried to a jury, which

found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds existed for terminating Father’s

parental rights and that termination of those rights was in the children’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2).

Father’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by

an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per

curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from terminations of parental rights).

The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

1 For privacy, we refer to the children by aliases or initials and to the children’s parent as “Father.” See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8; Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d). demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at

744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied). Father’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided

Father with a copy of the Anders brief and the motion to withdraw and advised him of his rights

to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Father has not filed a pro se

brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a response to the Anders

brief, stating that it will not file a brief unless requested by this Court or after reviewing any

pro se response.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record

to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988);

Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have conducted an independent review of the entire record,

including the Anders brief submitted on Father’s behalf. We have found nothing in the record

that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

We have specifically reviewed the district court’s findings as to Father under subsections (D),

(E), and (O) of Family Code section 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no nonfrivolous issues

that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230,

237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s final order terminating

Father’s parental rights.

However, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the right to counsel in suits

seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in th[e Supreme Court of

Texas], including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016)

(per curiam). Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to Father has not yet been discharged. See id.

If after consulting with counsel Father desires to file a petition for review, his counsel should

2 timely file with the Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an

Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justice Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: September 30, 2025

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Penson v. Ohio
488 U.S. 75 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Taylor v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
160 S.W.3d 641 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
in the Interest of P.M., a Child
520 S.W.3d 24 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)
in Re Interest of N.G., a Child
577 S.W.3d 230 (Texas Supreme Court, 2019)

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