C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. v. Aguilar

CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedSeptember 11, 2024
DocketK24J-00450 JJC
StatusPublished

This text of C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. v. Aguilar (C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. v. Aguilar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. v. Aguilar, (Del. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT of the STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark Kent County Courthouse Resident Judge 38 The Green Dover, DE 19901 Telephone (302)735-2111

Ms. Victoria Petrone, Esquire Mr. Jorge Antonio Angulo Aguilar Baird Mandalas Brockstedt 553 Money Road, Apt. A & Federico, LLC Townsend, DE 19734 2711 Centerville Road, Suite 401 Wilmington, DE 19808 Mr. Jorge Antonio Angulo Aguilar c/o JGP Contracting LLC 350 N. Main Street Smyrna, DE 19977

Submitted: August 19, 2024 Decided: September 11, 2024

RE: C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc., et al. v. Jorge Antonio Angulo Aguilar, C.A. No. K24J-00450 JJC

Dear Ms. Petrone and Mr. Angulo: Plaintiffs, C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. and Herminio Cisneros Campos (collectively referred to as “C & C”), seek to confess judgment against Defendant Jorge Antonio Angulo Aguilar (“Mr. Angulo”) in the amount of $44,000. At Mr. Angulo’s request, the Court held a hearing pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 2306(b) to determine if he understandingly waived notice and his opportunity to be heard before entry of final judgment. For the reasons that follow, C & C did not

1 demonstrate that Mr. Angulo knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the confession of judgment. Evidence Presented at the Hearing Mr. Angulo signed a loan agreement and promissory note on March 8, 2023.1 The terms of those agreements required him to repay a $100,000 interest-free loan to C & C within three months.2 The promissory note contained a paragraph conspicuously entitled “Confession of Judgment.”3 That provision ostensibly permitted C & C to enter judgment against Mr. Angulo without notice or hearing.4 It recited that the note’s maker, Mr. Angulo, understood the provision and that he either had the assistance of counsel before reviewing it or elected to forgo the help of counsel before signing it.5 At the hearing, C & C presented the testimony of three credible witnesses. First, C & C called Mr. Cisneros, one of the two plaintiffs, who testified with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. He confirmed that (1) he lent Mr. Angulo $100,000; (2) Mr. Angulo signed the loan agreement and note; and (3) Mr. Cisneros believed that Mr. Angulo understood the terms of the agreement and note when they signed the documents. Next, C & C presented the testimony of C & C’s chief financial officer, project manager, and secretary, Heather Jacobs. Ms. Jacobs testified that she discussed the documents with Mr. Cisneros and Mr. Angulo in the office, and that Mr. Angulo appeared to understand them. Her testimony barely touched on the confession of judgment provision, however. She merely testified that she told Mr. Angulo that the

1 (Pls’. Ex. No. 1) Loan Agreement at 2; Promissory Note at 4. 2 Loan Agreement ¶ 3. 3 Promissory Note ¶ 6. 4 Id. 5 Id. 2 confession of judgment provision meant that if Mr. Angulo did not repay the loan, C & C “will take [Mr. Angulo] to court.” Lastly, C & C called Mr. Angulo as a witness during its case-in-chief. Mr. Angulo later testified in his portion of the case as well. From the outset, Mr. Angulo conceded the note’s enforceability and that he still owed C & C a significant portion of the funds he had borrowed. He maintained throughout his testimony and argument, however, that he should be permitted to repay C & C through a side agreement that he entered with Mr. Cisneros. C & C objected to the admission of evidence regarding Mr. Angulo’s position concerning the unpaid balance and the alleged side agreement. For the reasons explained at the hearing, the Court sustained C & C’s objection because those issues fell outside the limited scope of the hearing.6 The hearing record is also significant for what it did not include. Specifically, it included no evidence to provide even an inference that Mr. Angulo understood the agreement or could read English. The record also contained no evidence that demonstrated that Ms. Jacobs, who spoke and read English, explained the nature of a confessed judgment to Mr. Angulo. Nor did the record contain evidence regarding Mr. Angulo’s sophistication in business matters. Finally, the record contained no evidence to demonstrate how long C & C permitted Mr. Angulo to review the documents before he signed them. Contentions of the Parties C & C contends that Mr. Angulo consented to this confessed judgment when he signed the loan agreement and promissory note. At the outset, C & C stresses that it filed a notice for entry of judgment and affidavit that met the requirements of

6 See Customers Bank v. Zimmerman, 2013 WL 6920558, at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 22, 2013) (recognizing that Superior Court Civil Rule 58.1 provides that a hearing for confession of judgment is limited in scope to the issue of waiver of the rights to notice and a hearing). 3 10 Del. C. §2306.7 C & C further asserts that Mr. Angulo knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily agreed to a confessed judgment. In response, Mr. Angulo admits that he signed the loan agreement and concedes that the agreement and note are enforceable. He instead focuses on an alleged side agreement with C & C that he contends should permit him to repay the balance due by performing continued contractual work for C & C. Mr. Angulo has not addressed the confession of judgment provision at any point, however. Applicable Standards and Scope of the Hearing A debtor’s due process rights to notice and a hearing are subject to contractual waiver provided the debtor agrees to a confessed judgment if he or she defaults.8 A confessed judgment does not become final, however, until after the debtor has the right to a hearing to determine if he or she “understandingly waived [the] right[s] to notice and an opportunity to be heard.”9 In a hearing held for that purpose, a creditor who seeks to confess judgment bears the burden of persuasion.10 There, the creditor must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waived the right to notice and a hearing.11 The Court considers the totality of the circumstances when making those findings.12 The General Assembly articulated the necessary prerequisites for judgments by confession in 10 Del. C. § 2306. Section 2306 requires the Court to hold the hearing, if requested by the defendant, before entering final judgment.13 Four

7 See 10 Del. C. § 2306 (providing the filing and notice prerequisites for seeking a confessed judgment). 8 Mazik v. Decision Making, Inc., 449 A.2d. 202, 204 (Del. 1982). 9 10 Del. C. § 2306(b). 10 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58.1(d)(5). 11 McQuillin v. Evans, 2023 WL 7018042, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 24, 2023). 12 Id. 13 10 Del. C. § 2306(b); see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58.1(d)(5) (providing that a debtor may appear in Court and object to the entry of judgment by confession and that a hearing is then held to determine if the debtor effectively waived his or her rights). 4 factors aid the Court in determining whether a debtor (1) understood the effect of a confession of judgment provision, and (2) intentionally waived his or her rights to notice and opportunity to be heard. Those factors include: (1) The defendant’s business sophistication and experience with similar documents; (2) whether the defendant consulted an attorney; (3) whether all bargaining parties took the necessary steps to ensure that the terms of the agreement were read and understood at the time the transaction was entered; and (4) whether the defendant had the opportunity to review the document containing the confession of judgment [provision].14 Findings of Fact and Analysis The two principals speak Spanish but the promissory note in this case was written in English.

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Related

Mazik v. Decision Making, Inc.
449 A.2d 202 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1982)
Pellaton v. Bank of New York
592 A.2d 473 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
C & C Drywall Contractors North, Inc. v. Aguilar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/c-c-drywall-contractors-north-inc-v-aguilar-delsuperct-2024.