TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-20-00563-CV
C. A. C., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 313,577-B, THE HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
C.A.C. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s decree of termination appointing the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as the managing conservator of his child
(Child) and terminating his parental rights.1 The trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that statutory grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights existed and that
termination was in Child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (Q), (2).
On appeal, Father complains about the trial court’s denial of possession and access to Child’s
paternal grandmother (Grandmother)2 and contends that the evidence was legally and factually
1 We refer to C.A.C. by his initials or as Father, and to Child’s mother as Mother. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. Mother’s parental rights to Child were terminated in the decree, but she did not appeal. 2 Grandmother is Father’s biological grandmother, but she adopted Father when he was a child. Grandmother intervened in the case and participated as a party at trial, but she has not appealed from the decree of termination. insufficient to support the trial court’s predicate-grounds and best-interest findings. For the
following reasons, we affirm the decree of termination.
BACKGROUND
Father was indicted in April 2019 for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for
shooting a man with a firearm and incarcerated in May 2019. After Father was incarcerated,
Mother, who was pregnant with Child, began living with Grandmother. Child was born in
August 2019 and lived with Mother and Grandmother at Grandmother’s home until November
2019 when the Department removed Child. The Department filed an original petition in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship and requested an emergency order for protection arising
from Mother’s drug use and an unsafe living environment. In the supporting affidavit, the
investigator averred that the home’s condition was concerning,3 that Mother was a “well-known
drug user and meth [was] her drug of choice,” and that Father “[was] currently in jail for
shooting someone in the back.” The trial court signed an emergency order for protection and
placed Child in foster care. Approximately two months later, Child was placed with fictive kin
after the home study on their home was approved and the home study on Grandmother’s home
was not.
In May 2020, Grandmother filed a petition in intervention seeking to be appointed
sole managing conservator of Child, and she and Father participated in the bench trial that
occurred several months later. Mother did not appear for trial. The Department’s witnesses
3 The investigator averred that “a strong foul odor of animal feces and urine could be smelled just standing outside the front door,” “[t]he floors inside the home were observed to be covered in feces and urine,” “[t]he grout in the tile was black with caked on feces and urine,” and “[t]he bottom of [Grandmother’s] shoes were caked with animal feces that she used to walk through the home and put [them] up on her couch.” 2 were its investigator who removed the child in November 2019, its conservatorship caseworker
assigned to the case, Father, and Grandmother. The investigator testified about her concerns
with the condition of Grandmother’s home when Child was removed, including that she smelled
and observed animal feces “throughout the home.” The caseworker testified that Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine on the day of removal, that the Department’s plan was for the
fictive kin to adopt Child, and that the Department did not recommend placement with
Grandmother. Although the caseworker “saw visible improvement” on subsequent visits to
Grandmother’s home, she explained that Grandmother’s home study was not approved and that
the Department remained concerned because Grandmother had allowed Mother, who was
abusing drugs, to be left alone with Child. The caseworker further testified that the fictive kin
were family friends, and she agreed that they had provided Child with a “safe, stable home,”
were meeting Child’s “emotional and physical needs,” and were willing to adopt and allow visits
for Grandmother.
The Department’s exhibits included the home studies concerning the fictive kin
and Grandmother and photographs of Grandmother’s home that were taken on the day of the
Child’s removal. Grandmother’s home study stated that her home was not approved because of
safety concerns and her inability to provide for Child’s “needs (i.e. supervision).” The
photographs show that the home was unsanitary and unsafe for Child. In her testimony,
Grandmother agreed that the photographs “were not positive at all” but explained that she was
“working a lot of hours at that time” and testified about improvements that she had made to the
home after the removal. Although Grandmother wanted Child to be placed with her, she testified
that she liked the fictive kin and agreed that Child was bonded with them and that they were
taking care of Child’s needs. She testified that she would like Child to be placed with the fictive
3 kin if the Court did not place Child with her. Grandmother confirmed that Father “cannot pay
child support at this time.”
The Department’s exhibits also included (i) results from Mother’s drug tests,
including from the day of removal, that showed that she was positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine; (ii) the Department’s final report to the trial court; and (iii) the April 2019
indictment and March 2020 judgment convicting Father of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, a firearm, and sentencing him to eight years’ confinement. In addition to this
conviction, Father admitted to a prior felony conviction for unlawful restraint of a child under
seventeen and to three convictions for assault causing bodily injury to family members, but he
explained that the family assault convictions were “[p]lea deals, the only reason why [he] signed
them.” He spent one year in state jail for the felony conviction for unlawful restraint of a child
under seventeen and was serving the eight-year sentence at the time of trial. Father testified that
he was eligible for parole in May 2023.
Father confirmed that he was incarcerated when Child was born but testified that
he had contact with Mother after Child was born and admitted that he knew Mother “was doing
methamphetamines” while Child was in her care. In particular, he testified about a phone call
with Mother “around the middle of September [2019].” Father testified that he “heard [Child]
screaming” so “obviously there was something wrong there,” that he was “pretty sure [Mother
and another person were] doing drugs over there,” and that he asked Grandmother to go pick up
Child on that occasion. Father, however, testified that he did not tell Grandmother “what was
really going on” because Grandmother “would have called CPS” and he “was trying to avoid
CPS coming into [his life].” He earlier had testified that he did not tell Grandmother that Mother
4 was doing methamphetamine because Grandmother “would have called CPS on her” and he
“was trying to keep [Child] from getting taken.”
Father also testified on his own behalf, and Grandmother’s witnesses were her
direct supervisor at work and her grandson who was seventeen years old and lived with her. The
evidence showed that significant improvements to Grandmother’s home had been made after
Child’s removal and that Grandmother was employed by a school district and as a caregiver for a
disabled child. Her supervisor testified that Grandmother worked with special needs children,
that she was “wonderful” with the children, and that they “love” her. The grandson testified
about the improved condition of Grandmother’s house. Father testified that it was in Child’s best
interest to be placed with Grandmother and not the fictive kin because he “used to sell drugs to
[the fictive kin’s] daughter”; that the daughter “does methamphetamines”; and that she “lived
there on probation for that, for that and a pistol charge.” Father did not have concerns with Child
being placed with Grandmother, and it was his desire that Child be placed there. Although
Father had never met Child in person because he had been incarcerated, he maintained contact
with Child by phone with Grandmother’s assistance and had started classes, including “a GED
class and Cognitive Intervention for Anger.” Father also testified about his conviction for
aggravated assault, explaining that he “shot somebody because they pulled a gun on [him] and
[Mother] while she was three months’ pregnant with [Child] in her stomach” and that he “would
do anything for [Child].”
The guardian ad litem opined that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate
Father’s parental rights and for Child to remain in the fictive kin placement. The evidence
showed that Father was unable to provide for Child and that Child was safe and being taken care
of by the fictive kin who hoped to adopt Child if the parents’ rights were terminated and would
5 allow Grandmother to remain a part of Child’s life. Consistent with the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation, the trial court continued Child’s placement with the fictive kin and signed the
decree terminating parental rights, finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in
Child’s best interest, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2), and that Father “knowingly placed
and knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions and surroundings which endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of child,” id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); “engaged in conduct and
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical
and emotional well-being of the child,” id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); and “knowingly engaged in
criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent’s: 1. conviction of an offense; and 2. confinement
or imprisonment and inability to care for the Child for not less than two years from the date of
the filing of the petition,” id. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). The trial court appointed the Department as
the sole managing conservator of Child with permission to place Child for adoption and to
consent to the adoption. Father’s appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Denial of Access and Possession to Grandmother
In his first and third issues, Father complains about the trial court’s decisions
concerning Grandmother’s intervention in the proceeding and her rights to possession and access
to Child. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion or erred when it refused to place
Child with Grandmother or appoint her as a conservator and when it omitted reference to
Grandmother or her intervention in the decree, effectively denying her access to Child. He
argues that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence that denying access to Grandmother
was in Child’s best interest.
6 “Texas courts have long held that an appealing party cannot complain of errors
that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others.” Torrington Co.
v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). Thus, an appealing party lacks standing to
challenge these types of alleged errors that affect the rights of others. See A.P. v. Texas Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., Nos. 03-18-00780-CV & 03-18-00781-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2268,
*2–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that parents did not
have standing to challenge trial court’s rulings concerning paternal grandmother’s petition in
intervention and collecting cases in which court concluded that parent did not have standing to
complain about alleged error that affected others); see also Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (stating general test for standing); In re I.A.B.,
No. 05-17-00497-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 10629, at *14–15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that grandmother lacked standing to challenge termination of
unknown father’s parental rights).
Father’s first and third issues complain of alleged error that did not injuriously
affect him but affected the rights of Grandmother. Thus, we conclude that he lacks standing to
bring these issues. See A.P., 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2268, *2–4; see also In re E.N.J.,
No. 06-15-00019-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8459, at *4 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that father did not have standing to raise issue
challenging failure of trial court to strike petition in intervention and collecting cases in which
“[t]his rule, which concerns standing, has also been applied in parental-rights termination cases
by our sister courts of appeals”); In re L.K., No. 12-11-00169-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10569,
at *18–19 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 20, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that parents
could not raise issue concerning trial court’s denial of conservatorship of children to
7 paternal grandparents who were intervenors “when the intervenors have not raised the
complaint themselves”); K.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00354-CV,
2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6196, at *1, 6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(explaining that “appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or
that merely affect the rights of others” and that court was not persuaded that father could raise
issue about omission of jury question asking if intervenor sister should be appointed children’s
conservator “when [sister] has not raised the complaint herself”). On this basis, we overrule
Father’s first and third issues.
Termination of Father’s Parental Rights
In his second and fourth issues, Father argues that there was no evidence
or alternatively insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s predicate-grounds and best-
interest findings.
Standard of Review
To terminate parental rights, the Department has the burden to prove one of the
predicate grounds in section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code and that termination is in
the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355,
362 (Tex. 2003). The applicable standard of proof is the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.206(a); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that
“[d]ue process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in
parental termination cases”). The clear and convincing evidence standard is “that measure or
degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex.
8 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)); see Tex. Fam. Code
§ 101.007 (defining “clear and convincing evidence”). Although “parental rights are of
constitutional magnitude,” “it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child
not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.
Legal sufficiency review of the evidence to support a termination finding requires
a court to look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and consider
undisputed contrary evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex.
2018); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires weighing
disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” In re
A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the
disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so
significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding
was true.” Id.; see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that, in factual
sufficiency review, court of appeals “should not supplant [fact-finder]’s judgment with its own”).
Predicate Grounds
In his fourth issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s predicate-grounds findings. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (Q). We limit our review to Father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E)—that (i) Father
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Child to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endangered Child’s physical or emotional well-being, and (ii) Father engaged in conduct or
9 knowingly placed Child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered Child’s
physical or emotional well-being. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230,
232–33, 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that only one predicate ground is necessary to support
termination of parental rights when there is also best interest finding but requiring appellate court
to detail analysis for appeal challenging subsection (D) or (E) findings).
“‘Endanger’ means ‘to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.’” In re M.C.,
917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531,
533 (Tex. 1987)). “Although ‘endanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the
possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be
directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id. “Endangerment does not have
to be established as an independent proposition, but can be inferred from parental misconduct
alone,” and courts may look to conduct “before the child’s birth and both before and after the
child has been removed by the Department.” Pruitt v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
No. 03-10-00089-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10272, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2010,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
The relevant inquiry under subsection (E) is whether evidence exists that the
endangerment of the child’s well-being “was the direct result of Appellant’s conduct, including
acts, omissions, or failures to act.” In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 262 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2011, pet. denied) (citation omitted); see Pruitt, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10272, at *14.
“Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or
omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the
parent.” In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d at 262. In contrast, the relevant inquiry under subsection
(D) is whether the child’s environment, including the child’s living conditions and conduct by
10 parents or others in the home, endangered the child’s well-being. V.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., No. 03-19-00531-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 938, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—
Austin Feb. 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by
persons who live in the child’s home . . . is part of the ‘conditions or surroundings’ of the child’s
home under subsection (D).” Id. at *10 (citing In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)).
Because the evidence pertaining to subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, we
consolidate our review of the evidence. See id. at *11 (citing In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at
503). Evidence of Father’s endangering course of conduct included his conviction for the felony
offense of unlawful restraint of a child under seventeen, his three convictions for assault causing
bodily injury to family members, and, when Mother was pregnant with Child, his conviction for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for
violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment.” (citation omitted)); In re A.W.T.,
61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (“[I]ntentional criminal activity which
exposed the parent to incarceration is relevant evidence tending to establish a course of conduct
endangering the emotional and physical well being of the child.” (citation omitted)). Although
Father testified that he was defending Mother and his unborn child when he shot the man and
that the “only reason” he “signed” the family assault convictions was because they were
“[p]lea deals,” the trial court could have found his testimony not credible. See In re J.J.O.,
131 S.W.3d 618, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (noting that, in bench trial, trial
court determines credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded to their testimony); see also
11 In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (discussing appellate review of witness credibility
issues in context of parental termination case).
Father also admitted that he knew that Mother was using illegal substances but
allowed Child to remain in Mother’s care. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009)
(“[A] parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an
endangering course of conduct.”); Pruitt, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10272, at *21–22 (considering
evidence that parent left children with unsuitable person to be relevant to issue of
endangerment). After hearing Child “screaming” on a phone call with Mother a few months
before Child’s removal such that “obviously there was something wrong there,” Father testified
that he did not tell Grandmother “what was really going on” about Mother’s drug use because
Grandmother “would have called CPS” and he “was trying to avoid CPS coming into [his life].”
He also admitted that he did not tell Grandmother that Mother was doing methamphetamine
because Grandmother “would have called CPS on her” and he “was trying to keep [Child] from
getting taken.” The evidence from the day of removal further supported that Father knowingly
had allowed Child to remain in an unsafe home environment under the care of Mother who tested
positive for methamphetamine on that day.
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E). See
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 232–33, 237; In re A.C.,
560 S.W.3d at 630–31. We overrule Father’s fourth issue.
12 Best Interest
In his second issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support that termination of his parental rights was in Child’s best interest. See Tex.
Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). Father argues that the Department failed to overcome the
presumption that a child’s best interest is served by keeping the child with a parent. See In re
R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (observing that “there is a strong presumption that the
best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent” (citing Tex. Fam. Code
§ 153.131(b))).
Relevant factors in assessing the best interest of a child include: (i) the desires of
the child, (ii) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (iii) parental abilities, (iv) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (v) the emotional and physical
danger to the child now and in the future, (vi) the plans for the child by the individual or agency
seeking custody, (vii) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote
the best interest of the child, (viii) acts or omissions by the parent showing that the parent-child
relationship was not proper, and (ix) any excuses for the parent’s conduct. Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307 (stating that “prompt
and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best
interest” and listing factors that court should consider “in determining whether the child’s
parents are willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment”). No one factor is
controlling, and evidence presented to satisfy the predicate-ground finding may also be probative
of the child’s best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; Pruitt, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS
10272, at *22–23.
13 At the time of trial, Child was approximately thirteen months old and had been
living with the fictive kin for nine months. Their home study was approved, and evidence
showed that Child was safe, well-cared for, and bonded with them; that they wanted to adopt
Child; and that they were willing to allow Grandmother visitation with Child. When asked, the
guardian ad litem agreed that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Child, that
Child “should be freed up for adoption” with the fictive kin, and that the fictive kin were capable
of caring for Child.
Although Father testified about his concerns with the fictive kin, classes he had
started, and his love and positive phone contact with Child, evidence showed that he had never
met Child in person, was incarcerated until at least May 2023, and was unable to provide or care
for Child. His plan for Child was to be placed with Grandmother, but the Department denied
placement with her, providing its reasons for doing so, including concerns about her ability to
protect Child and provide for Child’s needs. Weighing the conflicting evidence, the trial court
could have disbelieved Father’s testimony about the fictive kin and credited the Department’s
evidence. See In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d at 632. Further, the trial court could have considered
Father’s violent criminal history in its best interest determination. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at
27 (explaining that evidence presented to satisfy predicate ground may also be probative of
best interest).
Viewing the evidence under the legal sufficiency standard of review, we conclude
that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that terminating the parental
rights of Father was in Child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C.,
560 S.W.3d at 630–31; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Further, viewing the evidence under the
factual sufficiency standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is such that the trial court
14 reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s parental
rights was in the best interest of Child. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Thus, we conclude
that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest
finding. We overrule Father’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decree of termination.
__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Kelly
Affirmed
Filed: March 2, 2021